Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Valerio, a citizen of Costa Rica, entered the U.S. illegally in 1991. Her companion paid $500 to obtain a birth certificate and Social Security card in the name of Rosa Hernandez, a person living in Puerto Rico. For about 12 years, Valerio used Hernandez's identity to hold a variety of jobs, pay taxes, open lines of credit, purchase cars, obtain a drivers' license, and take a loan to purchase a home. She obtained various welfare benefits for herself and her family under her real name, withholding information regarding income and assets she held under Hernandez's name. She used the Hernandez identity to vouch for herself as Valerio. When the real Hernandez discovered the situation, police apprehended Valerio, searched her apartment, and found numerous documents relating to her true identity and her assumed Hernandez identity. She was convicted of three counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and holding that Valerio was not prejudiced by the performance of her trial attorney.

Defendant, then 19, was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Upon searching him, police found bags containing small amounts of cocaine base and marijuana. He was charged with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and with aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2, and pled guilty to the first count. At a hearing, the AUSA stated that defendant qualified as a career offender based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Defendant did not object. The presentence report described juvenile adjudications for resisting arrest and assault and battery and adult convictions, for assault and battery and for resisting arrest. The government argued for a sentence of 96 months, rather than the guidelines recommendation of 151-188 months for a career offender, due to defendant’s youth and the relatively non-serious nature of the predicate offenses. Defendant still made no objection to his classification as a career offender He was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed. Despite decisions clarifying which types of Massachusetts convictions could be considered predicates for career offender status under 4B1.1, defendant could not meet the prejudice prong of the plain error test.

After pleading guilty to stealing firearms and possessing stolen firearms, defendant received a sentence of 54 months' imprisonment, based, in part, on a finding that he qualified as a "prohibited person" who, because of his history of substance abuse, was barred from possessing firearms. The First Circuit affirmed. The court first held that defendant had waived an argument that an interview with the Pretrial Services Office during which defendant disclosed information about his drug use, involved a promise of confidentiality, and that inclusion of the information in the sentencing report violated his due process rights and FRCP 32. The court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his attorney allowing him to disclose the information.

Former Massachusetts state senator Wilkerson, pleaded guilty to attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951) based on her acceptance of money in exchange for favorable influence in her official capacity on issuance of a liquor license and sale and development of publicly-owned land. The district court received a lengthy presentence report, conducted a thorough hearing, and stated reasons for imposing a sentence of 42 months, near the middle of the guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed. The court’s statement that "tax violation by a public official is not a personal matter" is most plausibly interpreted as a segue to make a "larger point" about the public implications of an over-engaged official's failure to attend to her own legal responsibilities. Its statement that Wilkerson "was simply inattentive and inattentive in a way that permitted her to have access to money that she should not have had" was fair comment on the implications of non-compliance with campaign-finance requirements. Its statement that Wilkerson's engagement as a college "consultant" was one of "a series of very embarrassing things" she did in response to her financial troubles was specific to the circumstances of the arrangement. The district court's skeptical appraisal of the arrangement was reasonable.

After a jury convicted defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm, the trial judge learned that a pocket-sized New Testament Bible was found in the jury deliberation room. The judge notified defense counsel, who immediately moved for a new trial, arguing violation of the Sixth Amendment rights to a trial before an impartial jury and to confront witnesses. The judge rejected a request to recall each juror for individual voir dire. The judge denied a second motion for a new trial, arguing that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing and rebuttal arguments. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant waived his Confrontation Clause argument. The district court’s decision to question only the foreman about whether the Bible influenced deliberations was within its discretion. Even if the prosecutor’s statements about defendant’s failure to explain himself were improper, they were not prejudicial in light of their brevity, the amount of evidence of guilt, and a curative instruction.

Husband established two "multi-level marketing" companies (pyramid schemes) that supposedly sold health and dietary supplements, but actually sold very little. Wife recruited new members, primarily from an immigrant community. New members would make an initial investment and then receive part of the investments paid in by new recruits. Wife urged potential investors to borrow to invest at the highest possible level, promised that there was no need to sell merchandise, and promised lifetime payments. The couple lived lavishly until they could find no more new investors. By the time the scam imploded, roughly 500 investors had lost about $20,000,000. Both were convicted of numerous counts of mail-fraud, money-laundering, and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1341, 1957, 371). Having affirmed husband's convictions in an earlier opinion, the First Circuit affirmed wife's convictions. The court rejected arguments concerning sufficiency of the evidence, wife's knowledge, the elements of money-laundering, and variance from the indictment.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base and ecstasy, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846. Due to prior state drug possession convictions, he was sentenced to life in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the prosecutor's entreaty to the jury that it “speak the truth” and convict defendant, to an instruction concerning reasonable doubt, and to the sentence.

Defendant, a 60-year-old pro se plaintiff, received notice that his three appeals would be dismissed unless he paid fees or filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis. He called the clerk's office and stated that he had filed a motion with the district court. A clerk stated that he had called the court of appeals in Boston, not the district court in Springfield. His response: "Go to fucking Springfield and get it." The clerk asked if he was serious. Defendant answered: "What's so fucking funny, you fucking [offensive name]?" The clerk hung up and went to her supervisor, who spoke to defendant and attempted to locate the motion. Defendant responded: "What kind of douche bags do you hire? I'll come down there with my shotgun and show you who means business." When defendant said: "You're lucky I'm only talking on the phone and not driving down there with my shotgun," the supervisor told him to stop making threats. Defendant muttered vulgarities and hung up. After investigation by U.S. Marshals and the FBI, he was convicted of threatening a U.S. official, 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions.

Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant appealed his conviction and sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The First Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized incident to a Terry stop, including a firearm. Defendant's actions provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and the officers acted reasonably throughout.A prior conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon qualified as a predicate offense under ACCA.

Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 1986 shooting deaths of two men, but after a hearing in juvenile court, he was transferred for adult criminal proceedings. His first conviction was vacated in 1992. He was convicted again in 1994, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state supreme court affirmed the juvenile court's transfer decision, his conviction, and his life sentence. In 1999, he filed a motion for a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court rejected the motion and the supreme court affirmed. In 200 he filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that it is barred from reviewing the state court decision because it rests on an independent and adequate state ground.