Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During his trial for the 1986 shooting death of an acquaintance, defendant unsuccessfully urged the jury to find that someone else could have shot the victim, that the killing was accidental, or that he had been too impaired by alcohol or drugs to form specific intent to kill. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life without parole. Almost five years later, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, based on trial counsel's failure to present a mental impairment or illness defense. Following an evidentiary hearing, defendant was denied a new trial. The state's highest court determined that defendant was competent to stand trial and that counsel's decision was not unreasonable, in light of defendant's opposition to the mental impairment defense. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed.

After running from police, defendant was arrested and convicted of possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in violation of the National Firearms Act. 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), 5871. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that he knew the shotgun barrel was shorter than 18 inches, the statutory characteristic subjecting the weapon to the Act. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant, a man familiar with guns, was aware of the type of weapon he possessed.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to 17 counts of transportation, distribution, and possession of child pornography, through use of the internet. The First Circuit rejected his appeal of denial of a motion to suppress. The search warrant was adequate despite the fact that the IP address defendant used to accomplish his crimes was a "dynamic" and not a "static" one. The court also affirmed an order of $3,800 restitution under 18 U.S.C. 2259 to a victim, who was a minor when her father created the pornographic videos circulated by defendant.

Defendant,convicted of 21 counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault against his two stepchildren, four counts of endangering the welfare of a child and one count of indecent exposure and lewdness, exhausted direct appeals in New Hampshire state courts. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, rejecting claims that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by prohibiting him from cross-examining his stepchildren regarding their accusations that he had also abused younger siblings. The First Circuit affirmed. Exclusion of cross-examination did not deprive defendant of a defense; he was able to introduce other evidence that the children "invented" the allegations. Trial courts may place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and to possess it with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant was a conspirator and to support the finding of the amount of the drug attributable to him. The trial court properly admitted evidence of law enforcement officers' precautions in executing a search warrant and in refusing to declare a mistrial sua sponte in response to prosecution testimony referring to a threat of violence by one of defendant's co-conspirators and to the Mexican origin of the drugs.

Petitioner is serving a life sentence in a Massachusetts state prison for first-degree murder. The state's highest court affirmed the conviction. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present a defense that petitioner's Tourette's Syndrome exacerbated the effects of alcohol and Artane, and that he was legally insane at the time of the killing on account of the Tourette's Syndrome and other mental illness.

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Finding that he had three prior violent felony convictions, the district court imposed a 15-year sentence, the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The First Circuit remanded for resentencing. Although two Pennsylvania burglary convictions qualified as predicate offenses under ACCA, a 1980 Massachusetts conviction for breaking-and-entering did not.

Defendant arrived in the U.S. in 1985, at age three. He became a lawful permanent resident and submitted an Application for Naturalization (N-400). He orally went through the form at a Citizenship and Immigration Service office. He answered "No" to: "Have you ever committed a crime or offense for which you were not arrested?" and "Have you ever sold or smuggled controlled substances, illegal drugs or narcotics?" His application was recommended and he was notified by N-445 of a mandatory oath ceremony. The N-445 contained questions to confirm that the applicant had maintained good moral character. Defendant again answered "No." He was naturalized in 2006. In fact, he had distributed cocaine 2004-2005, and, between the N-400 interview and the oath ceremony, was arrested for distributing cocaine and amphetamines. After pleading guilty to drug charges, defendant was convicted of making a material false statement to DHS (18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2)) and unlawfully applying for and obtaining naturalization (18 U.S.C. 1425(b)). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that admission of form N-445 violated his right to confrontation; that admission of form N-445 under the public records exception to hearsay was error; and that repeated reference to his prior conviction was unfairly prejudicial.

Defendant owned and operated a beauty salon in downtown Boston that was lightly damaged by a fire in 2005. Investigators concluded that defendant had set the fire in order to collect insurance proceeds, and he was convicted of attempted arson, 18 U.S.C. 844(i). The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in admitting testimony about defendant's conversation about his plan to commit arson and his involvement in an earlier arson and in refusing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor began a line of questioning concerning polygraph evidence.

Following vacation of his original sentence for conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and remand for resentencing, the district court sentenced defendant to a 10-year term. The First Circuit affirmed. The court upheld a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm "in connection with another felony offense," USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice; and calculation of the criminal history level. The court articulated a plausible sentencing rationale and imposed a sentence within the range of reasonable outcomes.