Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The owner of supermarkets involved his family in a scheme to provide cash for food stamps, beyond what is permitted by Puerto Rico law. A conservative estimate put receipts from the fraud above $4 million, which was intermingled with more than $20 million in food stamp proceeds. Family members testified and he was convicted of conspiracy to commit food stamp fraud, 7 U.S.C. 2024(b) and 18 U.S.C. 371, and for knowingly conducting and attempting to conduct financial transactions affecting interstate commerce involving the proceeds of unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and 2, sentenced to 108 months in prison, and ordered to forfeit $20 million. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement for the owner's leadership participation in the scheme. Even legitimate funds are subject to forfeiture when they become involved in a scheme to conceal illegal funds. The court properly weighed the harm caused by the crime.

Maine has two procedures for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. Section 3863 provides for temporary hospitalization without an adversary proceeding. For full-scale commitments Section 3864 requires a traditional adversary proceeding,culminating in a determination of whether the subject both is mentally ill and poses a danger to himself or others. Section 3864 commitment causes a loss of the right to possess firearms. Both defendants were hospitalized under section 3863. Each was indicted for possession of a gun following section 3863 hospitalizations. The district court denied their motions to dismiss, which argued Second Amendment right to bear arms and Fifth Amendment due process rights. The First Circuit reversed. The statutory bar to possession applies only to a person "who has been adjudicated as a mental defective" or "has been committed to a mental institution," and Section 3863 does not satisfy that definition.

After pleading guilty to three counts of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school (18 U.S.C. 841 (a) and(b)), defendant was sentenced to 174 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that a Massachusetts state-court "guilty-filed" disposition to charges of resisting arrest qualifies as a conviction under the career offender guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a)(3). The court noted that the disposition is similar to probation and that, although defendant was 17, he was charged as an adult. Although the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on a challenge to another conviction, which had been expressly waived by defendant, the error did not warrant reversal.

Defendant, caught attempting to induce a person he believed to be a minor to engage in sexual activity, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The First Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that the behavior defendant attempted to engage in was criminal under Puerto Rico law; the trial judge properly took notice of that law. The court properly refused to give an entrapment instruction.

Convicted of failing to surrender to serve a sentence for investment fraud, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(2), defendant was sentenced to 15 months in prison, based in part on a statutory enhancement for committing an offense while released: the offense was the failure to surrender. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the enhancement applies to failure to surrender.

Husband and wife filed returns for tax years 1997-1999 reporting zero income, despite having reportable income. Based on advice from their dentist and their own research, they concluded that no provision of the Internal Revenue Code imposed liability on them for taxes, and attached this explanation to their returns. They succeeded in stopping their employer from withholding taxes claiming exemptions and having the employer treat them as independent contractors, not subject to withholding of social security and medicare taxes. Between 2000 and 2008, despite reportable income asserted by the government to exceed $100,000 in each year, they filed no returns and took steps that made it more difficult for the government to track their assets. Between 1999 and 2007, the IRS repeatedly informed them that their position was frivolous and specifically warned of criminal sanctions. Convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 371 (2006); attempted evasion of payment of tax, 26 U.S.C. 7201; and four counts of willful failure to file income tax returns, each was sentenced to 36 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the convictions were based on defendants' conduct, not guilt by association.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of possession with an intent to distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)) and appealed denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed. An investigatory "Terry" stop and pat-down of defendant was based on reasonable suspicion. A 911 caller from the residence reported a man at the residence, with a gun and making threats and the police stopped men they believed to have just left the residence. Their conduct indicated likely possession of a gun. The court properly determined that defendant's actions in taking a bag out of his pocket, throwing it on the ground, and disclaiming ownership, was an attempt to cooperate, rather than submission to legal authority.

In May 2009, defendant was charged with making false statements in a passport application, falsely representing that he was a U.S. citizen, and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1542, 911, 1028A. In August he filed a motion to dismiss based on violation of his right to a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1). The court denied the motion, finding that 15 days granted for discovery and preparation of pretrial motions were excludable and that his trial would begin within the prescribed 70 day period. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 29 months in prison. The First Circuit reversed. The exclusion of 10 days for pretrial motions and discovery was error, given the absence of any recorded ends-of-justice finding. The exclusion of 16 days between a pretrial conference and the motion to dismiss was improper; defendant only vaguely suggested that he might seek a continuance and did not "lull" the court and prosecution into believing he was waiving his rights.

In 1981 defendant, a habitual sex offender, was sentenced to a term of perpetual imprisonment for rehabilitation, to last a minimum of 12 years. He was not released from prison until 2008. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendants, high-level government officials, enjoyed immunity. Defendant's general claims of failure to supervise did not state a claim; there was no evidence that specific defendants were even aware of his continuing incarceration.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). Calculation of his criminal history, with upward adjustments because of use of a computer, the number of images, images depicting violence, and images of pre-pubescent children, resulted in a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months. The district court rejected an argument that the guidelines were too punitive and imposed a sentence of 90 months. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that the district court examined all the relevant factors and that the sentence was reasonable.