Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After attempting to stop defendant for driving with illegal tinted windows, police gave chase and stopped his truck. Inspecting the interior of the abandoned truck, police found two wrapped blocks of what was later found to be cocaine. The chemist who tested the blocks was not available for trial, due to mental illness, and the officers had not observed the testing. Testimony was supplied by another chemist. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841). The First Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial, citing the Confrontation Clause. There were several questions about the reliability of the testing that the witness was unable to answer; the error was not harmless.

In 2002 defendant was convicted under the Massachusetts aggravated rape statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 22(a). He exhausted state appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to the case, for failure to define "resulting in serious bodily injury." It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the phrase was not a technical term and could be understood by non-lawyers.

Following a carjacking that resulted in a shooting death, defendant executed a plea agreement without having been informed that the maximum penalty for the crime was life imprisonment. He ultimately received a sentence of 360 months, though his plea agreement recommended 120 months. The First Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the appeal provision in his plea agreement is unenforceable because the district court violated FRCP Rule 11 by failing to inform him of the maximum penalty at his hearing.

A few hours after a domestic disturbance, Austin was spotted trying to get into his former girlfriend's apartment and given disorderly conduct and criminal trespass warnings. He was later spotted, visibly agitated, in a park, in violation of an ordinance closing the park over night. A civil citation issued. In response to a call from a payphone, indicating that a woman had been killed at the girlfriend's address, different officers went to the area and stopped defendant who matched Austin's general description and was walking on the street. A pat-frisk revealed a gun. It later came to light that the call was a hoax and that defendant was not involved with Austin. Defendant was convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arrest was based on probable cause, following a valid "Terry" stop that was brief and appropriate to the circumstances.

Convicted of armed robbery of a convenience store, assault and battery, and intimidation of a witness, petitioner was sentenced to five to six years. His habeas corpus petition was denied in the district court. The First Circuit affirmed. The state appeals court's determination that a rational juror could have found that petitioner possessed a weapon at the time of the robbery was not objectively unreasonable, based on his words, "I'll blow you away," while holding his hand in his jacket, suggestive of a gun. Petitioner's statement, to a victim, that he would come back and kill him if he saw him on the news, was sufficient to support conviction for witness intimidation. The court noted that petitioner had beaten the victim, taken the victim's bicycle, and demanded that the victim give him the security tapes.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and of social security fraud. The district court did not impose a forfeiture order based on a finding of inability to pay. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded for entry of a forfeiture order under 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1). The court properly admitted testimony about statements by a co-conspirator and about jailhouse statements by another that were statements against penal interest. With respect to forfeiture the court erred in considering arguments never raised by defendant and in placing the burden on the government to prove ability to pay.

Defendant was sentenced to life in prison after conviction for his role in importing and distributing marijuana. The First Circuit affirmed. Defense counsel's cross examination of government witnesses opened the door to defendant's prior criminal history and that history was relevant to defendant's knowledge of the presence of contraband and intent to distribute it. Limiting instructions eliminated any potential prejudice. Hearsay testimony about jailhouse statements made by one of defendant's associates was admissible as a statement against penal interests with adequate corroboration and did not violate the confrontation clause. Any error in jury instructions did not affect the outcome.

Based on his participation in an armed robbery of a supermarket, defendant was convicted on counts of robbery, use of a firearm, possession of a stolen firearm, and as a felon in possession. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the court should have held a formal competency hearing, prior to his arraignment, and should have required him to plead personally. The court also rejected a claim under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), a challenge to jury instruction concerning defendant's refusal to give DNA evidence when arrested, claims of misconduct by defense counsel and the prosecution, and a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, which the court characterized as "hopeless."

Police arrested defendant while executing a search warrant at his apartment. They recovered five firearms, 398 rounds of ammunition, firearms-related items (rifle scope, rifle case, and holsters), 29.4 grams of marijuana, 243.49 grams of cocaine, knotted plastic baggies, and $6,556 cash. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment plus five years of supervised release, the minimum permissible under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The First Circuit affirmed. Sentencing under the ACCA requires that defendant has been convicted of at least three prior violent felonies, serious drug offenses, or a combination thereof, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Defendant's larceny from the person conviction was a violent felony providing the third required predicate offense for ACCA sentencing. The principal distinguishing characteristic of robbery under Massachusetts law is force.

Defendants, jointly tried and convicted of drug-related crimes, unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus (18 U.S.C. 2255). The First Circuit affirmed with respect to one defendant and vacated with respect to the other. A partial courtroom closure during jury selection based on crowding likely violated the Sixth Amendment because there was not a substantial justification, but one defendant procedurally defaulted the claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. Defendant's counsel's failure to object to the closure did not amount to ineffective assistance. The other defendant is entitled to a new habeas hearing because the lower court did not address an allegation that his attorney was not aware of the closure nor present to object; defendant is entitled to appointed counsel in connection with a hearing on the issue. The fact that the clerk, not the judge, effectuated the courtroom closure, was not an impermissible delegation. The judge was responsible for the decision.