Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010 defendant, then serving a sentence in Rhode Island state prison for parole and probation violations, was charged with a 2000 armed robbery and murder of a gas station manager (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); 924(j)(1) and 1951(a)). The governor refused to transfer defendant to federal custody because doing so would expose a Rhode Island citizen, to a potential death sentence on federal charges, in contravention of the state's longstanding rejection of capital punishment. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to state charges. Unable to obtain custody under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18 U.S.C. App. 2, the federal prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit issued a writ of prohibition, reasoning that the writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a request for custody under the IAD and that the governor has a right to refuse such transfer. To grant the federal government custody would be to allow it to circumvent the IAD.

Investigation of a massive drug-trafficking operation led to apprehension of Ramirez, who admitted that he and defendant were partners in a franchise of the larger drug-trafficking ring. Defendant's residence was searched by 18 officers and a dog; they drove an armored vehicle onto the lawn and parked in front of a picture window, detonated noise-flash devices, causing windows to shatter, and, carrying assault rifles, breached the door with a battering ram and stormed into the residence. The district court denied a motion to suppress, accepted a conditional guilty plea to charges of distribution of, and conspiracy to distribute, in excess of five kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846) and imposed a 200-month sentence. The First Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the the officers' conduct amounts to violation of the knock-and-announce rule or even violation of the knock-and-announce rule involving the use of excessive force, an exclusionary remedy is not available. Upward adjustment of the sentence was justified; defendant managed at least one other participant in the criminal enterprise so that sentencing guideline section 3B1.1(b) applied.

The buyer of a personal computer found child pornography on the hard drive and contacted authorities. The seller, a non-commissioned Naval officer, was ordered to return to his home, where police were questioning his pregnant wife. His house was searched and he was questioned at the house and at the station. He entered a guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(b) and 2258(8)(A), reserving the right to appeal denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit remanded. Given the influence of military authority, defendant was in custody when he was questioned at home without having received a Miranda warning. The situation at the house would have left any member of the armed services reasonably feeling that he lacked free choice to extricate himself, and sufficiently compelled to answer to authority. Authorities deliberately planned to subject defendant to unwarned questioning, so a warning issued after leaving the house may have been inadequate to cure the situation with respect to statements made at the station.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens into the U.S. (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), (v)(I) and was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release. Shortly after defendant's release, her probation officer filed a motion requesting a written reprimand and warning because defendant had tested positive twice for cocaine use. The court never acted on the motion, but defendant entered a treatment program. After she left the treatment program, the probation officer filed another motion, which remained pending until defendant was arrested about four years later. The district court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to time served and 26 months of additional supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court had relation-back jurisdiction under the Delayed Revocation Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(i), even though the warrant on which defendant was arrested was not based on an oath or affirmation.

Defendant, a patent attorney and licensed engineer, the divorced father of children born in 1985, 1986, and 1991, was ordered in 2002 to pay weekly child support of $1,406 per week plus $300 per week toward past medical expenses. He has paid no child support since issuance of the final order. He attempted to appeal the order to the U.S. Supreme Court and filed unsuccessful suits and appeals in four states (New Hampshire, Vermont, Virginia, and Maryland) and in two federal courts, arguing that the order was invalid because the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Convicted of willful failure to pay child support, 18 U.S.C. 228(a)(3), defendant was sentenced to 24 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support findings that he was able to pay and willfully refused to pay. The district court properly charged the jury on willful blindness.

Officers executed a search warrant at defendant's residence and found a loaded firearm, defendant's identification, five bags of heroin, a bag of cocaine, $500 in cash, a razor blade, and empty baggies. In custody, he waived his Miranda rights and told the police that the gun belonged to him. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant was sentenced as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 226 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Because two of defendant's prior convictions were for serious drug offenses and drug-dealing is notoriously linked to violence, the court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession law. The prosecution's reference to defendant as a drug dealer was not improper, despite the fact that he was not charged with drug crimes. In sentencing, the court relied on two Massachusetts assault and battery convictions as predicate offenses without evidence that the felonies involved violence.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to arson of a building owned by an organization receiving federal financial assistance, 18 U.S.C. 844(f). After a prior appeal led to remand for resentencing, defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. The First Circuit affirmed. The loan scheme in question fit the statutory definition, even though the federal funds had been disbursed before the arson. An arsonist would be fairly warned that the building was related to a current federal loan.

In 2000 defendant and others robbed a warehouse. In an ensuing gunfight, one robber was killed and defendant was wounded. Defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); aiding and abetting unlawful carrying and use of a firearm during and in relation to the robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and aiding and abetting the death of an accomplice in commission of an armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(j). The First Circuit vacated the sentence. On remand, the district court rejected defendant's lesser included offense argument, request for a mitigating role adjustment, and request for a reduced sentence based on post-offense rehabilitation, but granted reduction of the base offense level (from 43 to 38), noting the lack of evidence that defendant intended to kill his accomplice. It imposed a 240-month sentence on count 3, a concurrent 50-month sentence on count 1, and a consecutive five-year sentence on count 2, stating that it had evaluated the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The First Circuit affirmed convictions on counts 1 and 3, but vacated on count 2 and remanded. Conviction under section 924(j) necessarily includes a finding that the defendant violated section 924(c) and there was no evidence that Congress intended cumulative punishments.

Petitioner was prosecuted and convicted 13 years after the murder of his wife. The evidence suggested that the motive was to obtain control of a small inheritance for drugs and prostitutes. The highest court of Massachusetts denied his petition in accordance with the special procedure for dealing with post-conviction petitions in Section 33E cases (the provision deals with a narrow class of capital cases): a single judge acts as gatekeeper to bar access to the full court on any issue that could have been raised at the time of direct appeal, unless (as a general rule) the relief is sought on a basis that is both new (in the sense of having been unavailable at the time of direct appeal) and substantial. The federal district court denied habeas corpus on the ground that the denial of relief on collateral review by the state court rested on a procedural basis in state law (the gatekeeperâs finding of failure to raise the claim on direct appeal) that was independent of the federal right and adequate to bar further relief: the gatekeeper had acted in accordance with a state rule or practice that was "firmly established and regularly followed." The First Circuit affirmed.

Petitioner, convicted of a 1984 Massachusetts murder, exhausted state appeals. After hearing new evidence that, according to a witness, another man had made self-incriminating about the murder, the district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner did not establish prejudice.