Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Three defendants were charged with conspiring to defraud the U.S. by obstructing the functions of the IRS, endeavoring to obstruct administration of the Internal Revenue laws, filing false tax returns, making false statements to FBI agents, and scheming to conceal material facts from a federal agency in connection with a charitable organization founded in 1993, which promoted Islamic jihad. A 24-day trial resulted in acquittal on all charges for one defendant and sentences of 12 months and 11 months in prison for the others. The First Circuit reversed acquittal on conspiracy counts, reinstating a guilty verdict, and affirmed the convictions on other counts. The variance in proof at trial did not prejudice defendants' substantial rights and the evidence was sufficient to prove a conspiracy narrower than charged.

In 2000 defendant entered a plea of guilty to two drug-related conspiracies and the court imposed concurrent 10-year sentences, followed by five years of supervised release. Approximately 14 months after his release, the U.S. Probation Office notified the court of four violations; a later filing revealed six additional violations. Defendant admitted to violations that ranged in severity from failing to obtain lawful employment to associating with individuals engaged in narcotic trafficking. Although the term recommended under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual was three to nine months of incarceration, the court sentenced defendant to 60 months in each case, which was the statutory maximum sentence available because the underlying offenses were Class A felonies (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the court considered the relevant factors.

In April 1999, a Massachusetts jury convicted petitioner of rape, kidnapping, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and carjacking. After unsuccessful attempts at post-trial relief in state court, he filed an unsuccessful petition for habeas corpus. The district court also denied a motion by which petitioner sought to subject evidence to DNA testing. The First Circuit affirmed. The court properly denied the discovery motion, given petitioner's speculative theories and baseless allegations. The court also rejected an argument that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254, pursuant to which the district court evaluated the petition, unconstitutionally restricts review to existing Supreme Court precedent.

Customs and Border Patrol officers seized more than two kilograms of heroin and 96 kilograms of cocaine from defendant's vehicle during a border search conducted upon his return to Puerto Rico from the Dominican Republic. Convicted of intentionally possessing heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)) and intentionally importing heroin and cocaine to the U.S. heroin and cocaine (21 U.S.C. 952(a) and 960(b)(1)(A), (B)), defendant was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support conviction. The court properly denied a motion to suppress; probable cause was supported by evidence of alterations to the car, inconsistent answers to questions, a canine inspection, and abnormal scan results. The court properly instructed the jury on a willful blindness theory and properly denied a request for an offense-level reduction for playing a minor role in the criminal activity.

After defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute narcotics, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846), the district court sentenced him to 84 months in prison and four years of supervised release. Less than halfway through supervised release, he violated conditions. The district court revoked and sentenced him to an additional 11 months in prison, to be followed by a new two-year period of supervised release. He served the incarcerative portion of the sentence, but again violated release conditions. Defendant conceded the violations. The court revoked supervision, and imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison. In explaining its rationale for eschewing the GSR (five to eleven months), the court noted that the guidelines were merely advisory and defendant's "history of non-compliance." The First Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no claim of procedural error and that the district court was within its discretion, given its reasons.

After pleading guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute significant amounts of cocaine, crack, and marijuana, defendant moved to withdraw his plea as involuntary due to his excessive consumption of prescription drugs, lack of sleep, familial coercion, and history of bipolar disorder. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him to 380 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, bypassing an argument that appeal was barred by a plea provision waiving his right to appeal. Defendant's sworn statement were so lacking in detail and corroboration, the district court was justified in relying on the change-of-plea colloquy and signed plea agreement to deny the motion, and in doing so without an evidentiary hearing. The court noted the "suspect" timing of the motion, after receipt of an unfavorable sentencing report.

In 2005 husband and wife were attacked outside a restaurant; husband died, wife was seriously injured. Six months after the attack, wife sued husband's parents, seeking part of husband's large estate. Wife was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), for use of interstate facilities in murder-for-hire about 26 months after filing the civil suit. The district court dismissed, based on wife's failure to appear at a deposition, delays, and failure to comply with court orders.The First Circuit affirmed, noting repeated and flagrant abuses in the record and the failure of alternative approaches. None of wife's excuses for her extreme misconduct were sufficient to save the case.

Defendants and 16 others were charged with distribution and conspiracy to distribute controlled substances including 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846) and aiding and abetting. Defendants were convicted. The First Circuit vacated, holding that the evidence at trial against the two prejudicially varied from the conspiracy charge in the indictment. The evidence indicated two separate conspiracies, one based in Maine and one in Massachusetts, with materially different goals. There was little evidence that the defendants joined in the Maine-based conspiracy to distribute both drugs, as alleged. Even if defendants did join in the Massachusetts conspiracy to distribute only cocaine, they were unfairly prejudiced by the difference between that conspiracy and the one alleged in the indictment.

After opening fire on officers attempting to arrest him, defendant was charged as a felon in possession of ammunition (18 U.S.C. 922 (g)); assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, and interfering with a detective who had been deputized as a special federal office (18 U.S.C. 1111); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)). He unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the second count, arguing that section 111 did not apply because the detective was working as a local police officer under local supervision at the time. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). vidence was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the officer was engaged in federal duties at the relevant time. The court rejected various evidentiary challenges.

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree child abuse in Rhode Island state court, was denied habeas corpus by the district court. Petitioner was watching his girlfriend's two-and-one-half-year-old child when the child became increasingly ill. It was later determined that the child, who survived, incurred a subdural hematoma and was suffering increased intercranial pressure that threatened his life. Petition claimed that the child, who did not show signs of prior abuse, was prone to falling and had fallen down stairs. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence was circumstantial, but substantial.