Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, an addict with no prior criminal history, was one of 12 indicted co-conspirators convicted of conspiracy to import five or more kilograms of cocaine and one or more kilograms of heroin, as well as actual importation of five or more kilograms of cocaine, and was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed. Affidavits supported the decision to authorize wiretaps under 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c) and speculation that a confidential source must already have known and shared with the investigators the details of the conspiracy's inner workings before the wiretap application was illogical and unsupported. The district court decision that defendant knowingly and voluntarily decided to cooperate, without counsel, waiving his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, was not an error.

Three defendants were convicted of conspiracy and drug charges (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, 860) stemming from a drug distribution operation in a public housing project and two were convicted of gun charges (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, 860) because of the killing of three unintended victims in a botched attempt to kill a rival gang member. Two received sentences of life in prison; the third was sentenced to 151 months. The First Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded for resentencing of the defendant not involved in the attempted assassination. The defendants were not prejudiced by the court's error in responding to notes received from the jury during deliberations without alerting counsel. The court's questioning of prospective jurors outside the presence of the defendants was justified. The court also rejected challenges concerning the composition of the jury and Spanish translations. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, except with respect to the quantities of drugs attributed to the defendant not involved in the killings.

An inmate of the Maine corrections system, sought a civil rights remedy (42 U.S.C. 1983) for alleged denial of adequate medical care for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) by healthcare professionals at a jail and the state prison. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed with respect to the contractor that provides care, stating that the evidence could not establish Eighth Amendment violations, but reversed with respect to a physicians' assistant. Although the contractor acknowledged that its care "fell short of the mark," carelessness or inadvertence falls short of the Eighth Amendment standard of deliberate indifference. There was a material dispute about deliberate indifference by the physicians' assistant, who had a financial interest in limiting care and a disciplinary history.

A Maine jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm following a conviction of misdemeanor domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on closing argument statements that there was no suggestion that the gun was planted or that defendant did not know it was there. The first statement was not improper, given an argument that defendant was framed; the second was not prejudicial.

Petitioner was convicted, in Massachusetts state court, of murdering his 11-month-old son and is serving a life sentence. The child's death was attributed to malnutrition; the family followed strict religious dietary restrictions. The district court rejected a habeas corpus petition that claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that there was no alternative defense strategy that would have created a reasonable probability of success. The court rejected arguments based on petitioner's competency, failure to raise an insanity defense, and the discrepant outcomes for the various defendants responsible for the child's death.

Defendant was convicted of drug crimes committed and determined to be a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based in part on a state youthful offender adjudication. The Third Circuit affirmed in 2010. On rehearing, the First Circuit vacated, noting that its prior decision had been based on erroneous precedent. For career offender purposes, a conviction for an offense committed before age 18 counts only if classified as an adult conviction under the laws of that jurisdiction. Under the Massachusetts law relevant to defendant's prior adjudications, he was a "youthful offender," not just a "juvenile delinquent;" the classification has some, but not all, characteristics of an adult conviction and is not a career offender predicate. The court remanded, stating that although the sentence was below the career offender range, the designation can be influential even if not treated as controlling.

The inmate, convicted in 1978 of murder, gained a reputation as a "jail house lawyer" while serving his life sentence and acquired a number of "separations," a term used to indicate a conflict counseling against assignment of one inmate to the same institution as another inmate or staff member. Because of the separations, Pennsylvania began billeting him in other states' institutions pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. In 2001 he was transferred to Maryland. A letter, written in connection with the transfer, noted that the inmate is not a discipline problem, but is a "nuisance" as a jailhouse lawyer. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the inmate's protected First Amendment activities and the transfer. The timing of the transfer and the use of the term "nuisance" did not establish retaliatory motive.

The defendant had sexually explicit online conversations with an officer posing as a 12-year old girl. Agents obtained a warrant to search his residence for evidence of violation of 18 U.S.C. 1470 (transfer of obscene material to a minor) and 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) (coercion or enticement of a minor), seized a computer system and cds, and found child pornography. Defendant was charged with transferring obscene material to a minor under age 16 (18 U.S.C. 1470) and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B)). The district court granted a motion to supress, holding that the agents lacked probable cause to search for child pornography. The First Circuit reversed, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. The agents had probable cause to search the digital media and, in searching for evidence of interaction with minors, had to thoroughly search the electronic files.

The defendant, part of a conspiracy that stole and re-sold computer parts and memory, pled guilty and was sentenced to 33 months in prison plus 36 months of supervised release and ordered to pay to the victim, jointly and severally with a co-conspirator, restitution of $800,000 plus interest. After he fell behind on the payments, the government obtained a writ of garnishment. The district court held that the government cannot meet its obligation to enforce an order of restitution to a private-party crime victim by using the garnishment procedure of the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. 3205. The First Circuit reversed, noting statutory changes that make compensation of private victims a high priority. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. 3613) specifically authorizes use of the FDCA to enforce private-victim restitution orders.

Police obtained warrants, believing that the suspect had beaten a victim with a nightstick, went to the apartment before dawn, broke down the door, and promptly removed the suspect. The suspect's 15-year-old sister claims she was pushed down, injured her knee, and was handcuffed. The parents claim to have had guns held to their heads; the mother was wearing only underpants. The suspect's girlfriend claims that officers threatened to take her baby. They were detained for 40-60 minutes. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the court denied officers' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The First Circuit reversed with respect to claims based on detention of the plaintiffs. Officers had an interest in protecting their own safety and in an unimpeded search; plaintiffs were cuffed only for the duration of the search. There was no clear constitutional violation. The court affirmed with respect to other claims. The sister's injuries were sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim; no reasonable officer would think it clearly necessary to point an assault weapon at a handcuffed 15-year-old girl with no history of violence. Similarly, it was not clearly reasonably necessary to point a gun at the head of a woman, not a suspect, and nearly naked. The court also declined claims of state-law official immunity.