Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to charges of taking a motor vehicle, by force and with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, (18 U.S.C. 2119) in exchange for an agreement that the prosecutor recommend sentencing at the lower end of the guidelines range. The agreement did not stipulate to a criminal history category, but did outline sentencing exposure and provided estimated ranges for criminal categories one through six. The presentencing report classified defendant as a career criminal, based on two prior violent felonies. The court imposed a sentence of 120 months incarceration and five years of supervision. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the defendant waived appeal, the court considered the case because the district court failed to sentence him according to the agreed upon recommendation. Defendant's argument that that the career offender classification was not meant to be triggered by convictions involving consensual mutual combat between individuals who chose this as their lifestyle amounted to acquiescence in the court's classification of the convictions and reliance on the sentencing report.

In 2009, defendant engaged in sales of cocaine base to an undercover agent in Maine. In January 2010 he entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 841(b), and 846. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, effective August 2010, reduced the drug quantity thresholds required to trigger specific mandatory minimum sentences. On November1, 2010, the sentencing guidelines were amended. On November 8, the district court imposed a sentence of 56 months, rather than the 10-year mandatory minimum set by the pre-FSA drug statute. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that the FSA does not address retroactive application, but that it was unrealistic to suppose that Congress strongly desired to put the new quantity threshold guidelines in effect by November 1, even for crimes committed before the FSA, but balked at giving the same defendants the benefit of the new minimum sentencing guidelines.

After gang-member shooting victims were taken to the hospital, police officers watching the emergency room entrance, observed the defendant and another known gang member leaving. They followed and pulled over the speeding car. Believing the occupants to be acting "nervous" and to have a gun, the officers conducted a thorough search of the car and found a gun and crack cocaine hidden in an access panel. A second search, by an expert familiar with "hides," revealed ammunition. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court denied a motion to suppress and sentenced defendant to 188 months incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The officers had reasonable suspicion, the five-minute duration of the search before the gun was found was reasonable, and the scope of the search, including the easily accessible hidden compartment, was reasonable.

Defendant was charged with sales of crack cocaine in 2006. The pre-sentence report classified him as a career offender and he was sentenced to 90 months incarceration. The Third Circuit held that a 1997 Massachusetts conviction for conspiracy to violate state drug laws did not qualify as a predicate offense. On remand, the court admitted three new documents to establish a New York conviction, held that the defendant's presence was not required at the hearing, and reaffirmed the career offender designation and 90-month sentence. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting the various options available to the court. The defendant should be permitted to allocute and to raise the issue of post-sentencing rehabilitation.

Upon release from incarceration, the defendant was notified of the requirement that he register as a sex offender. Although he initially complied, he was twice convicted of failure to register under Rhode Island law. In 2007 the defendant moved to Maine and failed to notify authorities of his address change and failed to register. He was convicted under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16913, and sentenced to 85 months incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act requires that the government prove only general intent, that the defendant was aware of his failure to register; the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

In 1983 defendant was convicted of rape of a child, robbery, and kidnapping. After release from prison, he was involuntarily committed in 2003 in a civil proceeding, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, 14, to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons, where such persons are held without limit until adjudged safe for release. Defendant is anatomically male but suffers from gender identity disorder(GID), a psychological condition involving strong identification with the other gender. The Center has resisted demands for female hormones and clothing and defendant recently sought to castrate herself with a razor blade. The district court ordered the Center to begin hormone therapy, The Center concedes that defendant needs treatment and that hormone therapy has been recommended as medically necessary, but says that security concerns reasonably underpin its refusal. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that those under civil commitment are entitled to an extra margin of protection and that punishment of the defendant's behavior and the defendant's risky behavior are not determinative. Regardless of motives, the Center failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment; the court noted its history of delays, poor explanations, missteps, changes in position, and rigidities.

In the defendant's trial for second-degree child molestation, the state trial court admitted evidence that the defendant had molested two other young men. The court found that the prior bad acts were sufficiently similar to the crime charged to show a scheme, modus operandi, or common plan to molest young boys in the defendant's home and that the probative worth of this evidence outweighed any unfairly prejudicial effect. The state supreme court affirmed defendant's conviction. The federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendant did not exhaust state remedies; in his state appeal he cited no specific constitutional provision, tendered no substantive federal claim, and relied on no federal constitutional precedent. Rejecting the merits of the claim, the court noted that the Supreme Court has not laid down a governing rule concerning the admission of prior bad acts evidence and held that admitting the evidence was not so arbitrary as to deny defendant a fair trial.

Defendant, convicted of knowingly possessing firearms after having been committed to a mental institution (18 U.S.C. 922(g)) and knowingly possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number (18 U.S.C. 922(k)), was sentenced to two years imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in finding the defendant competent; it relied on an unobjected-to forensic evaluation by treating professionals and defendant's own assertions and those of her attorney. Defendant's strange and ill-advised conduct and behavior did not mandate a finding of incompetence. The court properly denied a motion to suppress; it reasonably concluded that defendant's gesture to the headboard in which the guns were located, while answering "yes" to whether she had weapons demonstrated that she understood the officer intended not only to learn of the existence of the weapons, but also to find them. Her consent to the search and her waiver of a jury trial were voluntary.

The defendants, arrested in a reverse sting operation after they drove to a sham drug deal in a vehicle containing $100,000 in cash, were each convicted of a single drug conspiracy count. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The court first acknowledged that, taking into account only unchallenged evidence, the record was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was more than an innocent bystander to the transaction. However, tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's case and potentially disastrous to the defense. The court erred in allowing "overview" testimony by the lead officer, announcing the defendants' roles in the conspiracy, although the officer was not a witness to many of the events; the witness was no better suited than the jury to put the pieces together. The testimony also implicitly "vouched" for later testimony. The officer's testimony about the post-arrest interview statements of a third defendant, who offered to cooperate, violated the Confrontation Clause, even though the cooperating defendant was not directly quoted.

After a tip led them to a website containing the male defendant's phone number and pornographic pictures of the female defendant's eight-year-old daughter, the police obtained a warrant and searched the woman's home. They seized electronics containing pornographic images; the woman admitted to abuse of the girl. The district court denied a motion to suppress. The male defendant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment; the mother was sentenced to 27 years. Each was ordered to pay $67,600 in restitution. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The defendants had an expectation of privacy on their password-protected website, which was searched without a warrant. It is not clear whether they shared the password with others and risked loss of privacy; whether the police search exceeded the tipster's private search; whether the tipster was assisted by authorities; whether the police expected to find something significant beyond pornography described by the tipster; whether the police had a reasonable belief that harm was imminent; or whether the evidence would have inevitably been discovered independently. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a "Franks" hearing, based on its finding that the tipster's affidavit established a link between the pornography and the female defendant's home.