Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in the U.S. District Court, Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Prior to trial, Appellant unsuccessfully moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police over the course of several encounters, arguing that any waiver of his Miranda right to remain silent was a product of threats and coercion. On appeal, Appellant contended that the district court failed to instruct the jury, under 18 U.S.C. 3501(a), to “give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.” The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was no meaningful difference between the instruction called for by section 3501 and the instruction given at Appellant’s trial; and (2) even if courts should follow more closely the precise language of section 3501, any error on the court’s part to do so in this case went unchallenged and was unlikely to have affected the outcome of Appellant’s trial. View "United States v. Colon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in state court, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court, asserting (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction; and (2) because the prosecutor argued at Petitioner’s state-court trial that Petitioner had shot and killed the victim but, at an earlier state-court trial, argued that Petitioner’s accomplice had shot and killed the victim, the prosecutor’s inconsistent approaches deprived him of his due process rights. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented in Petitioner’s state-court trial was adequate to support his conviction; and (2) the prosecution of Petitioner and his accomplice in different trials on materially inconsistent theories of guilt did not violate due process, as (i) state law permitted such a course of action, (ii) any potential inconsistency in result between Petitioner’s and his accomplice’s cases had been remedied by the time the Supreme Court heard Petitioner’s appeal, and (iii) the Commonwealth did not unfairly manipulate the evidence. View "Housen v. Gelb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second-degree murder. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal by the state court. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, which denied habeas relief but issued a certificate of appealability as to three claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the state court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for second-degree murder; (2) the state court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find a due process violation based on the unavailability of the victim’s larynx; and (3) the state court’s determination that certain statements made by the prosecutor did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to warrant setting aside Petitioner’s conviction was not an unreasonable application of the law. View "Magraw v. Roden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, two former San Jan municipal police officers, Raquel Delgado-Marrero (“Delgado”) and Angel Rivera-Claudio (“Rivera”), were convicted on drug and gun charges arising from an FBI reverse sting operation. Both defendants received a fifteen-year sentence. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated Delgado’s convictions and remanded her case for a new trial, holding that the district court committed reversible error by excluding the testimony of a defense witness; and (2) withheld judgment on Rivera’s convictions for thirty days, holding that Rivera’s sentence could not stand in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, where the district court plainly erred in articulating the jury instructions imparted in connection with a post-verdict special jury form. View "United States v. Delgado-Marrero" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possessing with intent to defraud counterfeit United States currency. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in (1) admitting evidence seized by police during and after Appellant’s arrest ensuing from the officers’ investigative stop, as the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify their actions; (2) denying Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, as sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s intent to defraud; and (3) issuing a jury instruction on the statutory element of fraudulent intent, as the instructions issued in this case were neither incorrect on the law nor unfairly prejudicial in favor of the government. View "United States v. Silva" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of distribution of heroin. The indictment alleged that “death and serious bodily injury resulted from the use of such substance.” In federal prosecutions, under Alleyne v. United States, if the distribution of drugs is proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury to have been “death resulting,” a defendant will face a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence. In this case, Defendant admitted all of the facts relevant to each count other than the “death resulting” allegations. Although the government did not prove to a jury that Defendant’s distribution of drugs resulted in death, the district court imposed the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence, in violation of Alleyne. However, Alleyne was decided after sentencing and while the case was on appeal. The government asked the First Circuit Court of Appeals to depart from the usual practice of remanding for resentencing and instead to permit the prosecution on remand to empanel a sentencing jury to allow the government to prove that a death resulted from Defendant’s drug dealing. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing in the customary manner, holding that the government’s proposed course of action was foreclosed on the facts of this case. View "United States v. Herrerra Pena" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a computer that held child pornography. The presentence investigation report (PSI Report) suggested a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The district court disagreed with the PSI Report, determined that Defendant was subject to a GSR of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months, and varied downward and imposed a seventy-two-month sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the reasons that supported the imposition of Defendant’s sentence were fully sufficient to justify the sentence imposed. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to possession of ammunition by a convicted felon pursuant to a plea agreement. The probation department recommended a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of up to twenty-seven months based in part on Defendant’s contempt conviction. At a disposition hearing, defense counsel argued that the contempt conviction had been imposed in violation of Puerto Rico laws. The district court refused to lower the GSR on this basis and imposed a thirty-six-month incarcerative sentence. Thirteen days later, defense counsel filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) motion to reconsider judgment and sentence. Before the district court took any action on the matter, defense counsel filed a notice of appeal. The district court subsequently denied the Rule 35(a) motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) Defendant’s original notice of appeal did not create appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s disposition of the Rule 35(a) motion; but (2) the Court had jurisdiction to review Defendant’s claim of procedural error in the imposition of the sentence itself, and the district court erred in its imposition of the sentence. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Defendants worked for Sports Off Shore (SOS), a gambling business based in Antigua. After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of violations of the Wire Act and other offenses for conducting an illegal gambling business. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding, as regarding Defendants’ common challenges to their convictions, that (1) the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the safe harbor provision of the Wire Act; (2) Defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence failed because the Wire Act applies to the internet; (3) Defendants could be convicted of violating the Wire Act despite their ignorance of the law; (4) Defendants’ convictions were not an improper extraterritorial application of the Wire Act; (5) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendants even though SOS accepted bets on forms of gambling not covered by the Wire Act; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a directory of all SOS employees. View "United States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Sixty-four-year-old Plaintiff was born anatomically male but suffered from severe gender identity disorder. In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2000, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging that the DOC was denying her adequate medical care by not providing her with sex reassignment surgery. The district court subsequently issued an order requiring the Commissioner of the DOC to provide Plaintiff was sex reassignment surgery, finding that the DOC’s failure to provide the surgery violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. The DOC appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Plaintiff had a serious medical need for sex reassignment surgery and that the DOC refused to meet that need for pretextual reasons unsupported by legitimate penological considerations in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Kosilek v. Spencer" on Justia Law