Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals
by
Defendant appealed his conviction for transporting a minor for illegal sexual purposes, transporting an unlawfully present alien, and harboring an unlawfully present alien. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent to commit unlawful sexual activity; the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental charge to the jury upon receipt of its first note, which the district court described as a modified Allen charge; the district court's jury instructions on harboring an unlawfully present alien was not erroneous; and defendant's argument that the district court committed non-harmless error by sustaining the government's objections to two questions during the victim's cross examination was rejected. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Vargas-Cordon" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to exceed authorized access to a government computer in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy. On appeal, defendant principally challenged the supplemental instruction regarding the jury's power to render inconsistent verdicts. The court concluded that the district court's instruction misled the jury as to its duty to follow the law and such error was not harmless where the court could not say with any confidence that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have convicted defendant of felony-level unlawful computer access conspiracy. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of conviction based on such error and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Moran-Toala" on Justia Law

by
Defendant appealed his conviction for three counts of possession with intent to distribute and one count of escape. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in holding that his residence in a halfway house as a condition of the modification of his supervised release constituted "custody...by virtue...of [a] conviction of any offense" under 18 U.S.C. 751(a), and that therefore he was not an escapee under the statute. The court held that residence in a halfway house as a condition of post-incarceration supervised release was "custody" for purposes of section 751(a); defendant's placement in the halfway house was part of the original sentence for his 1993 conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine; the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the search of an apartment where he resided after leaving the halfway house because defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy; and defendant's residence in the apartment began after he escaped from the halfway house in violation of section 751(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Edelman" on Justia Law

by
Defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly failing to register and update his sex offender registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. Defendant's principal argument on appeal was that SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to him because SORNA was enacted in 2006, defendant had already served his full sentence, left the military and severed any connection to the federal government. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kebodeaux, Congress possessed the requisite authority through the Military and Necessary and Proper Clauses to hold defendant to SORNA's registration requirements. View "United States v. Brunner" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner, convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and second-degree burglary, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After petitioner was charged, petitioner elected to represent himself pro so. The trial judge introduced petitioner's standby counsel to the jury as his attorney and later corrected the mischaracterization by reintroducing him as a "legal advisor." On appeal, petitioner challenged the judge's introduction, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The court concluded that the state proceeding did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Further, McKaskle v. Wiggins did not support petitioner's position because standby counsel's extremely limited participation was simply not substantial or frequent enough to have seriously undermined petitioner's appearance before the jury in the status of one representing himself. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ramos v. Racette" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner was found guilty of murder but his conviction was reversed on direct appeal and remanded for a new trial because of a mistake in swearing the venire panel from which the trial was selected. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to prevent New York State from retrying him for murder. The court concluded that, because 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A) required a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, without regard to the statutory section under which the habeas proceeding was filed, a state prisoner must secure such a certificate in order to appeal from the denial of habeas relief sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, 28 U.S.C. 2254, or any other provision of law. In this instance, the court excused petitioner's failure to seek a COA and granted his belated COA request nunc pro tunc. The court also concluded that petitioner was placed in jeopardy at the initial murder trial and no different conclusion was warranted by the fact that the venire panel was not sworn in accordance with New York law. Further, the evidence at petitioner's first trial was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar his retrial following reversal of his initial conviction based on the error in swearing in the venire panel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hoffler v. Bezio" on Justia Law

by
Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. The court concluded that defendant failed to show that any error affected his substantial rights because he failed to object in the district court to alleged Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(I) errors. The court declined to consider defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

by
The United States appealed from the district court's entry of a post-verdict judgment of acquittal in favor of defendant, setting aside the guilty verdict on conspiring and violating the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA). Defendant's charges stemmed from his operation of a poker club in the back room of a warehouse, out of which he conducted a legitimate business selling electric bicycles. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the plain language of the IGBA included defendant's poker business. View "United States v. DiCristina" on Justia Law

by
Defendant, found incompetent to stand trial, is being detained at a hospital facility operated by the BOP pending trial on charges of, inter alia, drug trafficking, racketeering, and murder. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of the government's motion to authorize BOP medical personnel to treat him with antipsychotic medications despite his unwillingness to undergo such treatment. The court affirmed the district court's order authorizing involuntary medication where the district court properly set out the standard established by Washington v. Harper. Harper established that there must be a showing that the inmate has a serious mental illness, he poses a danger to himself or others, and the proposed treatment is in the inmate's medical interest. The district court's decision had no error of law or fact and its order for the involuntary medication of defendant under the Harper standard was well within the range of permissible decisions. View "United States v. Bryant (Hardy)" on Justia Law

by
Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of possession of a firearm following a conviction for a felony. Defendant pulled up to a two-hour scheduled traffic-safety vehicle checkpoint in the Bronx where an officer ran defendant's license and noticed that defendant was on parole and out potentially after curfew. A handgun and a gravity knife were subsequently discovered on defendant. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the criminal history database search was a de minimis extension of the constitutional traffic checkpoint; the police had probable cause to believe that defendant was violating his parole; and defendant's arrest was constitutional, notwithstanding state laws prohibiting officers from arresting parole violators without a warrant in the absence of a crime or offense. View "United States v. Bernacet" on Justia Law