Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a judgment resentencing him for attacking a correctional officer while he was an inmate. On appeal, defendant argued primarily that his resentencing by videoconference constituted a violation of his right to be physically present. The court agreed that the government had not satisfied its burden of proving that he waived his right to be present and that the district court erred in finding a valid waiver. However, this error did not prejudice defendant. The court also held that defendant's sentence was reasonable and therefore, affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from convictions related to narcotics offenses and resisting arrest. The court affirmed the convictions on the narcotics counts but vacated his conviction for resisting arrest where there was no evidence that he engaged in any conduct whatsoever that demonstrated a desire to injure an agent or would cause an agent to apprehend immediate injury.

Petitioner, convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and assault, appealed from the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether petitioner had established prejudice for the procedural default of his claim that his Miranda rights were violated and whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during the Huntley hearing. The court held that the decision of the Appellate Division was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Therefore, the court deferred to the determination made by the state court and held that petitioner was not prejudiced by Huntley counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Further, because petitioner could not show that he was prejudiced by the alleged Miranda violation, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the Miranda claim was procedurally barred.

Contorinis was a co-portfolio manager of the Fund, which invested in companies in the retail and personal products sectors. In 2000, Contorinis befriended Stephanou, who became an investment banker in the Mergers and Acquisitions group at UBS in 2002. Stephanou regularly provided confidential information to several friends and, in 2005, shared information about a planned acquisition with Contorinis and others. Based on a series of transactions following Stehanou’s disclosures the about and on-again, off-again acquisition, Contorinis was convicted of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading. The district court imposed a forfeiture order of $12.65 million. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. A challenged jury instruction adequately conveyed the definition of material, nonpublic information; the court was within its discretion in admitting evidence of contemporaneous trades by individuals who received inside information from the same source as Contorinis. The court vacated the order to forfeit gains acquired by Contorinis’s employer, but not by him.

Fabrikant was arrested and arraigned on five counts of criminal animal cruelty, pursuant to New York Agriculture and Markets Law 353. All but two of her dogs were taken. The seized dogs were spayed or neutered and sent to live in foster homes pending conclusion of the criminal case. Fabrikant was ultimately acquitted but apparently never asked that her seized dogs be returned after the trial. She filed a pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the New York SPCA, several of its employees, and some of the prospective adopters who originally alerted the SPCA about the dogs’ conditions. The complaint included federal claims for malicious prosecution and for violations of her rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Accordingly, although they acted under color of state law, the SPCA defendants were protected by qualified immunity and could not be held liable for the spaying, neutering, or fostering out of Fabrikant’s dogs. Officers had probable cause to search Fabrikant’s house and arrest her.

Adams entered the U.S. from Jamaica in 1990 on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Arrested in New York in 1992, for attempting to sell cocaine to an undercover officer, Adams represented that he was “Michael Thomas” and pleaded guilty. “Thomas” failed to appear for sentencing. The state court received a form from Jamaica certifying that “Michael Thomas” had committed suicide. Adams returned to Jamaica where, in 1994, he married a U.S. citizen. Adams applied for an immigrant visa, representing that he had never been in the U.S. and had never been arrested or convicted. The consul granted an immigrant visa in 1997. He was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2008, returning from a trip to Jamaica, he was stopped by Customs officials, who suspected that Adams was “Michael Thomas” in the outstanding arrest warrant. The Board of Immigration Appeals ultimately ordered removal. Adams argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), barred removal because Adams was the beneficiary of an adjustment of status when he obtained an immigrant visa and that there is a five-year limitation on rescinding the status of a lawful permanent resident. The Second Circuit rejected the arguments.

Grayton was found guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. Penal Law 125.25(1), based on a 2001 shooting death, and was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment. He exhausted his state appeals and timely petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his exclusion from a Geraci hearing violated his constitutional right to presence at all material stages of the trial. Geraci hearings are held in New York state courts to determine whether a defendant has procured a witness’s unavailability by misconduct and has thus forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights in regards to that witness. The district court assumed, without deciding, that Grayton had a federal constitutional right to be present at the hearing, then determined that he had waived that right. The Second Circuit affirmed, first holding that there is a right to be present at a Geraci hearing. Grayton had at least minimal knowledge of the proceeding; if he objected to his exclusion, it was incumbent upon him to have made that known. It is not unreasonable to call failure to do so waiver.

Graham was the leader of a group of violent robbers associated with a public housing project in Brooklyn. Following a conflict after a robbery, Graham forced Thompson to get into Graham’s vehicle by firing a single shot into the ground with a 9-millimeter pistol, then provided Thompson with a Mac-10 to commit a robbery to repay his debt. Thompson ultimately did not commit the robbery. Graham was indicted for: conspiracy to extort Thompson, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and 3551; discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), 2 and 3551.; and using an explosive to commit a felony, 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1), 2 and 3551. Graham’s 50-year sentence included two consecutive, mandatory 10-year terms of imprisonment for the violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), based on Graham’s discharge of a gun while threatening Thompson. The Second Circuit reversed with respect to one count. The term “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1) does not include the cartridge in the 9- millimeter semiautomatic pistol used by Graham.

A New York state court judge found Gibson, charged with criminal mischief, not competent to stand trial and filed a temporary order of observation, transferring Gibson to custody of the mental health commissioner for a period not to exceed 90 days, for treatment to restore capacity to stand trial. New York law distinguishes between temporary orders and final orders, which are intended to prepare the subject for release into the community. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 730.40(1). While detained, he filed a federal complaint alleging civil rights violations and requesting to proceed in forma pauperis. While federal law generally permits a court to waive fees for those who cannot afford them, the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act generally prohibits a “prisoner” who has filed three or more frivolous actions in federal court from filing another lawsuit without paying required fees, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Act defines “prisoner” as “any person . . . detained in any facility who is accused of . . . violations of criminal law.” The district court concluded that Gibson was was a “prisoner” under the PLRA, and that, based on previous frivolous filings, he was barred from filing another complaint without first paying fees. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Antico was convicted of participating in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 23 1962(c), and illegal gambling, 18 U.S.C. 1955, and sentenced to 108 months in prison. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the racketeering conviction the sentence. The district court acted within its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury, based on Antico’s history of jury tampering and other factors. The court took reasonable measures to avoid prejudice, including a neutral explanation to the jurors.