Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment.

Davis and Gunn were convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies of suspected drug dealers, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Count One); attempting to commit such a robbery in the Bronx (Wickham robbery) (Count Three); two counts of using and discharging a firearm during the Wickham robbery, including causing the death of Grey, 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (j) (Counts Six and Seven); and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1), 846 (Count Eight). Davis was also convicted of attempting to commit a Hobbs Act robbery in Long Island (Elmont robbery), 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Count Two), and two counts of using and discharging a firearm during the Elmont robbery, including causing the death of Laing (Counts Four and Five). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Davis’s challenge to venue in the Southern District of New York for Counts Two, Four, and Five, the Hobbs Act and firearms counts relating to the Elmont robbery.

Highsmith pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and weapons possession in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to make a specific finding of fact as to whether the firearm, which he admits to having possessed in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, “[was] discharged” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012), which held that the more lenient sentences Congress created under the Fair Sentencing Act, 124 Stat. 2372, applied to those defendants who were to be sentenced after the FSA became law for crimes committed before that event. Clarifying that it was overruling its 2011 decision, United States v. Acoff, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Dorsey, but rejected Highsmith’s argument that the district court plainly erred by adopting the presentence investigation report without making further fact findings.

Wernick was convicted on five counts, including receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A); reproducing child pornography for distribution by computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(3)(A); possessing materials containing images of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B); and persuading, inducing and enticing minors to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Wernick appealed his 360-month sentence, but not his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by considering certain sexual conduct directed at young children, not charged in the indictment or proven at trial, as “relevant conduct” that increased his offense level with respect to Count Five. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court erred in considering the sexual acts with young children as effectively part of one offense of conviction (the enticement of teenagers), relevant to calculating the seriousness of that offense under the Guidelines, rather than as separate criminal acts to be considered at a different stage of the sentencing process.

Irwin appealed the district court’s denial of his petition to vacate his convictions for assault in the first degree and witness intimidation in the third degree. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had caused serious physical injury, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the above witness intimidation count.

Plaintiffs, New York inmates with complicated histories of incarceration, claimed that their release dates were incorrectly calculated. Their due process claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) were dismissed on grounds that prison system officers and employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed. The state defendants could not necessarily “fairly be said to ‘know’” that due process required that the inmate be afforded certain credits and cited precedent, by its terms, does not instruct prison administrators as to the calculation of release dates when multiple sentences are at issue.One sentencing judge’s instructions may conflict with that of another.

Harrington is serving a statutorily mandated 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court rejected his challenge to the sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed. Harrington’s vagueness challenge to the ACCA was barred because it was not presented to the district court. First degree unlawful restraint under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-95, is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, that together with two prior first-degree robbery convictions compelled imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum 15-year prison term.

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other New York State prisoners convicted of violent felonies, alleging that they were denied parole as a result of an “unwritten policy” to deny parole to violent felons, and that this unofficial policy violates the Due Process, Equal Protection Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. To state a claim for violation of due process rights, plaintiffs would have to allege that they were denied parole based on an “inappropriate consideration of a protected classification or an irrational distinction.” They did not do so. Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices, and prisoners either in the aggregate or specified by offense are not a suspect class. The rational basis for a distinction in parole determinations is preventing early release of potentially violent inmates who may pose a greater danger to others. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to guidelines that do not create mandatory rules for release but are promulgated simply to guide the parole board in the exercise of its discretion.

McGarry claimed that while he was a pretrial detainee at the Vermont Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, facing charges related to a domestic dispute, prison officials compelled him to work in the prison laundry under threat of physical restraint and legal process. His pro se complaint alleged violation of his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed, reasoning that McGarry did not allege that his work in the laundry was “like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the Thirteenth] Amendment.” The Second Circuit reversed. The complaint plausibly stated a claim; defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. Correctional institutions may require inmates to perform personal housekeeping chores such as cleaning the areas in or around their cells without violating the Thirteenth Amendment, but it is “clearly established” that requiring hard labor of pretrial detainees (persons not “duly convicted”) violates the Thirteenth Amendment. A pretrial detainee’s compelled work in a laundry for up to 14 hours a day for three days a week doing other inmates’ laundry cannot reasonably be construed as personally related housekeeping chores and officers of reasonable competence could not disagree.

Traders employed by brokerage firms were indicted for conspiring with employees of Watley, a day trading firm, to commit securities fraud by providing their employers’ confidential information to Watley. After a mistrial on conspiracy to commit securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, 1349, the government retried the conspiracy count with honest services fraud and property fraud as the charged objects of conspiracy. The jury convicted under each theory. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Skilling, limiting honest services fraud to schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks. After sentencing, the SEC initiated administrative proceedings and disclosed transcripts of investigative depositions taken as early as 2004. With access to those transcripts, defendants moved for a new trial, contending that the transcripts included material required to be disclosed under Brady because it contradicted or undermined testimony of key government witnesses on a central question: whether allegedly misappropriated information was confidential under Carpenter v. U. S. The district court concluded that the jury would not have reached a different result had the transcripts been disclosed. The Second Circuit vacated. Failure to disclose portions of the transcripts violated Brady and undermined confidence in the verdict. The court also did not adequately instruct the jury on the scope of honest services fraud.