Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(2), Williams was sentenced to 70 months in prison. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that statements made by the prosecution during summation and rebuttal summation deprived him of his right to a fair trial. He focused on criticisms by the prosecution of certain arguments made by the defense, on the prosecution’s characterization of witness testimony as “the truth” and “the absolute truth,” and on the prosecution’s statement in rebuttal summation that “[t]his is not a search for reasonable doubt. This is a search for truth and the truth is that the defendant possessed that gun on July 25, 2009.” No objection to these statements was made at trial. The government attorney erred in her statement that “this is not a search for reasonable doubt,” but the error was followed by correct instructions and Williams was not prejudiced.

Freeman was convicted in New York of second-degree assault, second-degree vehicular assault, common law driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in identifying as harmless the erroneous admission of evidence obtained from a blood draw compelled pursuant to a warrant found invalid under state law. The Second Circuit affirmed denial. The challenged harmlessness determination regarding an error of state law was itself a decision of state law that cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2 and was sentenced to 151 months, for participation in an advance-fee scheme, in which the victim is persuaded to pay a sum of money up front in order to receive a larger sum of money at a later. The district court concluded, based in part on email exchanges, that he was a manager or supervisor of at least one other participant in the scheme, and that the overall criminal activity involved five or more participants. The Second Circuit affirmed. Courts may rely on unique email addresses in assessing a defendant’s role in a scheme and calculating the number of participants for sentencing purposes.

Defendant was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8)(A), and 2256(8)(C). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated because he was compelled as a parolee to make self-incriminating statements during a mandatory polygraph examination and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Batista (a former veteran police officer) appealed his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and ecstasy, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1); (2) conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349 and 1344; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2); and his sentence of a 180-month term of imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. Alcantara, who cooperated in the investigation, appealed his 120-month sentence, following a guilty plea of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1); and distribution of and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, sentencing enhancements, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, alleged due process violations (based on a claim that a juror was asleep during trial), and a wiretapping warrant.

In 1995, Sheikh Abdel Rahman was convicted of soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Mubarak while he was visiting New York; attacking American military installations; conspiring to murder President Mubarak; conspiring in the successful 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center; conspiring to bomb other New York structures; and conspiring to commit sedition. His conviction was affirmed in 1999. Stewart was a member of his legal team and agreed to "Special Administrative Measures." Despite those obligations, Stewart smuggled messages to and from the incarcerated Sheikh, mostly relating to continuance of a ceasefire that an Egyptian militant group had declared on violent efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government. Stewart was convicted of conspiring to defraud the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 371; providing and concealing material support to a conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons in a foreign country, 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to provide and conceal such support, 18 U.S.C. 371; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Second Circuit affirmed but remanded for resentencing. On remand, he court determined that the Guidelines sentence was 360 months, which was also the statutory maximum, and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Defendant, a loan officer, recruited buyers to obtain mortgage loans for which they were not qualified by using false information. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The Second Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by allowing jurors, after the beginning of jury deliberations and after receiving various cautionary instructions, to take the indictment home to read on their own time.

Defendant threatened to reveal office gossip that the General Counsel of the New York State Comptroller's Office was having an affair unless the General Counsel recanted a recommendation to the State Comptroller to reject a proposal by defendant's company. He was convicted of attempted extortion of the office under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and interstate transmission of extortionate threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(d). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that his conduct did not come within the statutory definition of extortion because he did not "attempt to obtain property" from the General Counsel.

Hearing that Warren had called him an insulting name, Darnell notified his friends to leave the area, entered the store, followed by his brother, Darryl. Darryl grabbed Warren and said “I told you to stay out of this store.” Darryl’s gun fired. Darnell drew his gun and pointed it at another. Darryl fired four more shots into Warren. After Darryl pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder, Darnell was convicted of second-degree depraved-indifference murder and sentenced to 17-1/2 years to life in prison, the same sentence received by his brother. The appellate court affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to convict Darnell as an accomplice to depraved-indifference murder. Before the conviction became final, the New York supreme court reversed a depraved-indifference murder conviction based on accomplice liability where the attack on the victim was “quintessentially intentional.” State courts rejected a motion to vacate Darnell’s conviction. He filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this was the fourth case to advance the “somewhat perverse argument” that petitioner should be released from custody because the evidence suggests he is more culpable than he was found to be.

Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, was knocked unconscious and injured when a prison transport bus, in which he was riding with his wrists and ankles shackled, took a sharp turn. He claimed defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by transporting him on a bus without a seatbelt. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. Failure of prison officials to provide seatbelts to prison inmates does not, standing alone, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.