Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction based on two counts of bank robbery and sentence of life imprisonment. The court held that the three strikes statutory scheme under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1) was constitutional and did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Further, defendant's argument that prior convictions subjecting a defendant to life imprisonment under section 3559 must be found by a jury in a bifurcated jury trial was without merit. The court considered all of defendant's remaining arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his conviction or correct his sentence on the principal grounds that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, and (2) from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. The court vacated so much of the July 2009 Order as summarily rejected petitioner's biased-investigator ineffective assistance of counsel claim and remanded to the district court for further proceedings on this claim, including such proceedings as could be necessary for the court to determine whether to appoint counsel to represent petitioner in connection with this claim. The court declined to address petitioner's remaining issues.

The government appealed from the district court's decision vacating defendant's conviction of one count of attempted enticement of a minor and grant of his motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The government argued that the district court erred because the deviation between the text of the indictment and the jury charge neither affected the "core criminality" proven at trial nor modified an "essential element" of the crime, nor did it leave defendant open to be charged again for the same offense. The court agreed with the government's contentions and therefore reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants were convicted on charges arising from an elaborate, years-long financial fraud. Defendant Gowing continued to take actions in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud even after he was arrested and released awaiting trial for that same charge. On appeal, Gowing principally argued that the district court's application of 18 U.S.C. 3147 was error because he did not commit a separate or additional offense while on release, but only continued to commit the conspiracy. Because the statute did not make such a distinction, and because Gowing's other sentencing arguments were without merit, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Defendant was convicted of transporting into his state of residence a firearm acquired in another state in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3). Defendant appealed on the ground that section 922(a)(3) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The court held that, in light of the ample alternative means of acquiring firearms for self-defense purposes, section 922(a)(3) did not impose a substantial burden on the exercise of defendant's Second Amendment rights. Since section 922(a)(3) did not burden defendant's Second Amendment rights in a away so substantial as to justify heightened scrutiny, his facial challenge to the statute also must fail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from the adoption by the district court of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to revoke his supervised release for violating a mandatory condition of supervision that he "shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime." Defendant principally disputed the district court's determination that, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, good cause existed to allow the government to introduce hearsay evidence during his Violation of Supervised Release (VOSR) hearing. The court held that defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; the evidence presented at the VOSR hearing was sufficient to support the district court's finding that defendant committed felony assault under New York law; and the district court did not err in denying defendant's request to reopen the VOSR hearing.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court granted a certificate of appealability as to whether petitioner's representation was per se ineffective under the Sixth Amendment when, although he had a licensed attorney of record, a disbarred attorney acted as his de facto counsel. The court concluded that if the performance of the licensed attorney passed muster under Strickland v. Washington, the defendant's decision to rely upon other sources did not violate the Sixth Amendment. If the licensed attorney's performance did not pass muster under Strickland, the defendant's rights were protected. Accordingly, the per se ineffectiveness rule did not apply in this case and the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal arose out of the suppression of defendant's station house confession to unlawful dealings in firearms. That confession followed an incriminating statement made in response to brief questioning at the apartment where defendant was arrested earlier that day. The confession followed Miranda warnings; the earlier incriminating statement did not. The district court suppressed the station house confession as the product of a deliberate, two-stage interrogation strategy barred by Missouri v. Seibert. Relying on the court's decision in United States v. Capers, the district court reasoned that the admissibility of defendant's station house confession turned on whether the decision to forego Miranda warnings at the apartment was "legally justifiable." Finding that it was not, the district court suppressed the station house confession. The court concluded that the district court's determination rested on a misapplication of Capers. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court sentencing him principally to a term of imprisonment of 228 months for committing drug offenses. At issue was whether the district court correctly determined, for the purpose of applying U.S.S.G. 2D1.1., the most closely analogous substance listed in the Drug Quantity Table of that Guideline to the controlled substance seized from defendant at the time of his arrest. Because the district court did not have the benefit of the court's opinions in United States v. Chowdhury and United States v. Figueroa, which were issued while this appeal was pending and which governed this case, the court remanded for resentencing.

Defendants appealed from separate judgments of conviction related to their activities in a narcotics trafficking ring. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. Having conducted an independent review of the record, the court found no error in the district court's thorough and considered analysis of defendants' various claims. To the extent defendants have raised claims that were not initially brought before the district court, the court held that they did not reveal error, much less plain error. These complex proceedings were conducted with care and fairness and therefore, the court affirmed the judgments.