Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a follower of Islam, was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York (FCI Otisville). Plaintiff's religious beliefs required participation in congregational prayer five times a day but under the FCI Otisville policy, the prison chapel was available only once a day and no other space within the facility was made available to plaintiff and others in his faith. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from the district court's dismissal of his claims that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, based on a finding that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his congregational prayer policy claim. Because the court found that plaintiff did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal arose from defendant's conviction, after a guilty plea, on child pornography charges. Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court erred when it imposed a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3559(e) in the apparent absence of judicial record evidence regarding the age of the victim of his prior state offense. Accordingly, the court remanded solely for resentencing.

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud and subsequently appealed her sentence of principally 78 months' imprisonment. Defendant argued that her sentence was procedurally defective and substantively unreasonable. Defendant argued that the district court procedurally erred by: (1) inadequately considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; and (2) neglecting to address several of her objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, allegedly in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(3)(B). The court held that because defendant did not raise either procedural objection before the district court, the court's review was restricted to plain error. The court further concluded that neither alleged procedural defect amounted to plain error. Because the court also concluded that the sentence chosen by the district court was substantively reasonably, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a noncitizen from Nigeria, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's decision finding petitioner removable under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because his conviction of embezzlement by a bank employee under 18 U.S.C. 656 constituted an aggravated felony. The court held that because none of the facts to which petitioner actually and necessarily pleaded to establish the elements of his embezzlement revealed whether that offense was committed with a specific intent to defraud, it was error for the BIA to infer that his conviction was an offense involving fraud or deceit. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed her conviction of one count of mail fraud and three counts of tax evasion for calendar years 1995-1997. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the mail fraud and the tax evasion counts were improperly joined. The court agreed with the sufficiency challenges relating to the tax evasion counts for 1996 and 1997 and reversed her convictions on those counts. The court vacated defendant's convictions for mail fraud and tax evasion for 1995 on the ground that those counts were improperly joined, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his conviction following his guilty plea to illegally transporting aliens within the United States; assisting an inadmissible alien in entering the United States; and illegally being present in the United States after having previously been removed. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court miscalculated the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines by adding two points to his criminal history pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) for his commission of an offense while under a criminal justice sentence. The court held that defendant's knowledge that he was subject to a term of supervised release was not required for the district court to impose an enhancement based on the fact that defendant committed the instant crimes while "under a[] criminal justice sentence." The court declined to reach defendant's ineffective assistance claim and dismissed without prejudice. With regard to defendant's remaining claims, the court found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Grenadines, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he was removable based on his second-degree assault conviction in violation of New York Law 120.05(2) and on the basis of petitioner's conviction of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in violation of New York Penal Law 110 and 220.3. The court concluded that a conviction for second-degree assault under section 120.05(2) categorically constituted a "crime of violence" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 16(b). The court also concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky did not overturn the court's precedent holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not applicable in the deportation and removal context. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.

Defendant, a securities broker, pleaded guilty to charges related to his conduct involving a bribe greater than $70,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in calculating restitution insofar as it ordered both restitution and forfeiture in the amount of defendant's gains from the fraudulent scheme underlying his conviction. The court held that it was error for the district court to substitute defendant's gains for the victims' losses in calculating restitution, but declined to exercise the court's discretion to notice the error, as defendant failed to object in the district court, and had failed on appeal to show that the error affected his substantial rights or undermined the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Plaintiffs, motorcyclists, appealed from a jury verdict finding New York State Troopers not liable for injuries that plaintiffs sustained, including one plaintiff who sustained mortal injuries during a traffic stop. Plaintiffs claimed that the troopers violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force. The court held that the district court did not err by declining to instruct the jury regarding the use of "deadly force" in addition to a correct instruction on excessive force. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant, a computer programmer employed by Goldman Sachs & Co., appealed his conviction for stealing and transferring proprietary computer source code of Goldman's high frequency trading system in violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832. Defendant argued, inter alia, that his conduct did not constitute an offense under either statute because: (1) the source code was not a "stolen" "good" within the meaning of the NSPA, and (2) the source code was not "related" to a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the EEA. The court agreed and concluded that defendant's conduct did not constitute an offense under either the NSPA or the EEA, and that the indictment was therefore legally insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.