Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted, inter alia, of murder and appealed the denial of his petition for a wit of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner alleged that his rights were violated by the trial court's admission of (1) evidence of uncharged crimes and a tattoo featuring the word "Enforcer" and (2) the testimony of a medical examiner about an autopsy she had not performed. The district court rejected both claims. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that petitioner's first claim was without merit where, in admitting the contested evidence, the trial court reasonably applied New York law in a manner that was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States law or the Constitution. The evidence at issue was at least arguably relevant, and even assuming there was error, the evidence was not "so extremely unfair that its admission violate[d] 'fundamental conceptions of justice[.]'" The court also held that petitioner's second claim also failed because the state court's rulings were not contrary to clearly established federal law at the time.

Defendant appealed his conviction for substantive and conspiratorial racketeering stemming from his involvement with the Genovese organized crime family. The court concluded that: (1) Racketeering Act One stated valid subpredicate offenses under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), (b)(2), for substantive and conspiratorial extortion of intangible rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 501(a), and the jury's finding that such offenses were proved was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the requisite pattern of racketeering proved; (3) the district court's admission of challenged evidence did not exceed its discretion under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, or 801(d)(2)(E); various challenges to the district court's jury instructions were without merit; and the challenged sentence was reasonable both as a matter of procedure and substance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner was convicted in New York state court of second-degree murder on a theory of depraved indifference to human life in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25[2]. Petitioner appealed the judgment of the district court denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, arguing that the killing could only properly have been found to have been intentional, and not reckless as required under New York law for a conviction of depraved indifference murder. The court could not conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's entirely reasonable verdict where petitioner impulsively decided to confront his ex-girlfriend, the victim, just hours before the attack, which occurred on a public street, and struck multiple blows with his knife in the direction of both the victim and the victim's daughter.

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a multi-count superseding indictment, including a charge of conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence. Because there was an inadequate factual basis for defendant's guilty plea with respect to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of numerous offenses relating to her involvement in a fraudulent "high-yield investment program." Before defendant was indicted and before the applicable statute of limitations had run, the district court granted a government application to suspend the statute of limitations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3292 while the government sought the assistance of the Hungarian government in recovering records relating to transfers of the scheme's proceeds into Hungarian bank accounts. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the indictments should have been dismissed because insufficient evidence supported the district court's order to suspend the running of the statute of limitations. The court held (1) that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the district court's order; (2) that section 3292 did not require that the foreign evidence sought be necessary for an indictment, nor that it be obtainable only through an official request to a foreign government; and (3) that district courts could rely on ex parte proceedings when deciding to issue section 3292 orders. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed the district court's order denying his post-judgment motion for an order directing the Social Security Administration (SSA) to re-tender a check for retroactive supplemental social security benefits that he was owed. The court held that the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act, Pub. L. No. 111-114, 123 Stat. 3029, barred the SSA from making any payment to an incarcerated individual covered by the Act, regardless of when the underlying obligation to pay the individual arose. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion.

Defendants appealed from judgments following a jury trial that resulted in their convictions for racketeering and related offenses. Defendants all contended, inter alia, that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the relatedness and continuity factors required to establish a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). The court concluded that the district court's RICO instruction was legally erroneous and this error was prejudicial with regard to Chris Cain. With regard to the racketeering convictions of David Cain, Jr. and Jamie Soha, however, applying a plain error standard of review, the court concluded that it was not reasonably likely that a properly instructed jury would have failed to find a pattern of racketeering. Accordingly, the court reversed the RICO convictions with regard to Chris Cain only and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions in all other respects.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), and was sentenced to a 233-month term of imprisonment. The court applied three two-level sentencing enhancements pursuant to USSG 2G1.3 because the offense involved: commission of a sex act; use of a computer to entice a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; and misrepresentation of identity to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct or undue influence to engage in such conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed. There was no double-counting. The sentence was substantively and procedurally reasonable.

In 1988 petitioner was convicted of first-degree robbery. After his release, he was arrested for murder and attempted murder and, in 2001, entered a plea of guilty in New York state court. Treating the attempted murder as a second violent felony, the state court imposed three consecutive terms of 25 years. The Department of Correctional Services determined that an undischarged portion of the robbery prison term should be added to the 2001 sentence. Direct review ended in 2005; from 2005-2008, petitioner pursued post-conviction motions in state court. In 2008, he filed a federal petition for habeas corpus, which was dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The petition did not mention the DOC sentencing calculation. The Second Circuit affirmed. State applications for post-conviction relief did not toll the one-year statute of limitations. Section2244(d)(2) limits tolling to those applications for post-conviction or other collateral review that are made with respect to the pertinent judgment: the 2001 conviction and sentence. The applications at issue were directed neither to the conviction nor to the sentence; they concerned only a post-conviction administrative determination that the sentence ran consecutively to the earlier undischarged prison term.

Petitioner was convicted in a New York state court of second-degree murder. Petitioner subsequently appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The court held that because the evidence was sufficient to support petitioner's conviction of "depraved indifference" murder under New York law, his counsel's failure to preserve a claim of insufficiency in the trial court was not prejudicial.