Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with being a previously-convicted felon in possession of firearms and ammunition and seeking forfeiture of the unlawfully possessed property. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search was granted and the government filed an interlocutory appeal seeking review of the suppression order. Because the court found that the search was proper under the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's determination that he had three or more prior convictions for felonies categorized as "violent" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and that he was subject to the ACCA mandatory minimum sentence as a result. The court held that defendant's convictions for escape from custody qualified as violent felonies. Therefore, the district court did not err in imposing the ACCA's mandatory minimum sentence.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to disclose the contents of a jury note and engaged in an ex parte colloquy with a juror accused of attempting to barter his vote. The court held that trial court deprived defendant of his right to be present at every stage of the trial. Because the deprivation was not harmless, the court vacated and remanded for a new trial.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief after finding that he did not derive citizenship from his father. The district court ruled that petitioner was not in his father's "legal custody" when his father naturalized. The court concluded that the district court erred because it relied on an unenforceable Dominican Republic custody award where New York had jurisdiction to determine custody. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court following an evidentiary hearing on a remand pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, denying petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to set aside certain convictions on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that petitioner's request for an expansion of the certificate of appealability was denied because his submission failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court also held that there was no error in the district court's conclusion that there was no deficient performance by counsel with respect to the failure-to-advise aspect of petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim or his claim that his attorneys overrode his desire to testify. The court saw no basis on the present appeal for concluding, as to any count, that there was any reasonable probability that, had there been objections, the jury would not have found petitioner guilty. Thus, petitioner could not show that the failures to object satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and this facet of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was properly rejected. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for physically obstructing access to a reproductive services facility in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. 248. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that he was entitled to a jury trial as opposed to a bench trial. Because the court concluded that defendant was charged with a petty offense, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on account of his trial counsel's failure to object, under New York law, to venue in Ontario County, New York, for one of the alleged rapes, which appeared to have occurred in Monroe County, New York. The court held that trial counsel's failure to object to venue resulted in defendant receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief and remanded.

Appellant Spies petitioned for a rehearing on the court's decision in United States v. Nadirashvili where the court vacated appellant Solomonyan's sentence because the district court used the incorrect standard, preponderance of the evidence, in applying two offense level enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the involvement of: (i) 200 or more firearms, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(E); and (ii) a destructive device, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A). The court found that the district court used the incorrect standard in applying the enhancements of appellants Spies and Kharabadze. Therefore, the court vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing.

Plaintiff, an inmate in Great Meadow Correctional Facility, originally filed suit pro se against three Great Meadow employees, alleging pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was improperly denied access to medically-prescribed therapeutic diets, resulting in violations of his Eighth Amendment right to due process. After plaintiff's in forma pauperis status was revoked, plaintiff paid the filing fee so that he could proceed with his case. Subsequently, the district court, relying on a Report & Recommendation prepared by a magistrate, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, appealed the revocation of his in forma pauperis status, as well as the decision of the district court to grant summary judgment to one of the defendants. The court held that, based on the court's recent opinion in Mills v. Fischer, that any action against a prosecutor for initiating a prosecution or for presenting the prosecution's case that was dismissed sua sponte on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity was deemed "frivolous" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court held that the remainder of plaintiff's arguments on appeal were without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of narcotics violations and unlawful possession of a firearm. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it declined to sever the firearm count. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever where there was a sufficient logical connection between the narcotics counts and the firearm count; where separate trials of the narcotics counts and the firearm count would have required much of the same evidence; where the district court took adequate precautions to limit the danger of unfair prejudice; and where defendant had not met his heavy burden of showing substantial prejudice from the joinder of the narcotics counts with the firearm count. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction.