Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of various sex offenses. On defendant's appeal from his conviction and sentence imposed by the district court, counsel filed a motion with this court pursuant to Anders v. California and the government filed a motion for summary affirmance. The court granted the motions because there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal and remand could not benefit defendant in this case where the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence without providing a written statement that explained with "specificity" the reasons for the sentence imposed. The court held that, although it had previously held that, solely in the context of an Anders motion, failure to provide a written statement of reasons that complied with 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2) always necessitated a remand to the district court, the court saw no reason why the Anders context required this unique treatment. Therefore, the court held that, although compliance with the strictures of section 3553(c)(2) was always required, remand was not always required to remedy noncompliance. In so ruling, the court abrogated the court's prior holding in United States v. Hall only to the limited extent that it uniformly required remand in these circumstances.

Defendant appealed his conviction for visa fraud and conspiracy to commit visa fraud, as well as his sentence. Defendant had requested specific jury instructions with respect to the government's burden of proof regarding his knowledge of the fraud for which he was indicted. The district court denied these requests and instead gave a general instruction on acting "knowingly." Defendant challenged those denials as well as the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. The court found these challenges meritless. In calculating defendant's Guidelines sentencing range, the district court relied on four enhancements, three of which defendant challenged on appeal. Though the basis of the district court's application of the leader/organizer enhancement could have been more fully elaborated, the court found that the record supported its application here. Regarding the obstruction-of-justice and number-of-document enhancements, however, the court agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their use in this case. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence. Defendant also challenged the order of restitution imposed by the district court under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Because the court found the record evidence insufficiently specific to demonstrate that each client to whom the court ordered restitution was a "victim" of the fraud, the court vacated the restitution order. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for resentencing, including reconsideration of the restitution award.

Petitioner was convicted in New York for promoting prostitution in the third degree and subsequently sought review of the BIA's order declining to reconsider whether she had been convicted of an aggravated felony and dismissing her appeal from an order of removal. Petitioner argued that her offense did not constitute an aggravated felony because New York law defined "prostitution" more broadly than federal law did for the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(i). The court held that because N.Y. Penal Law 230.25(1) punished conduct that did not involve a "prostitution business" as the term prostitution was used in the INA, petitioner's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony. Thus, the BIA erred in finding petitioner removable. The court also held that because petitioner was not removable, the court need not address her challenge to the agency's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.

Defendant was convicted of crimes committed while working for American Airlines at JFK Airport, specifically, conspiracy to import and actual importation of five or more kilograms of cocaine and conspiracy and attempt to distribute and possess with intent to distribute the same quantity of cocaine. On appeal, defendant argued that (1) his statements made pursuant to a proffer agreement should not have been received in evidence because (a) they were elicited through economic coercion, and (b) defense counsel's conduct did not trigger the provision in defendant's proffer agreement waiving Fed. R. Evid. 410; (2) his Sentencing Guidelines range was erroneously enhanced for abuse of a position of trust; and (3) the ordered forfeiture was miscalculated. The court identified no merit in the first two arguments, but concluded that the last required further fact-finding to determine whether the conspiracy's proceeds were realized at the wholesale or retail level. Accordingly, the court affirmed all aspects of the judgment except for the forfeiture order, which the court vacated, remanding the case for further proceedings.

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to kill U.S. officers, to acquire and export anti-aircraft missiles, and to provide material support to a known terrorist organization. Two defendants were additionally convicted of money laundering and conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The court held that the United States had federal subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute defendants; the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a hearing on certain issues; because the court concluded that defendants' proffered evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404 and that the district court did not commit manifest error by excluding it under Rule 403, defendants' evidentiary challenge to the exclusion was rejected; defendants' remaining challenges were rejected and their convictions were affirmed under 18 U.S.C. 2332(g); the district court's jury instruction was correct and that 18 U.S.C. 2339B did not violate the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding that no proof was required that a defendant intended his aid to support the terrorist activity of a terrorist group; and one defendant's insufficiency challenge was rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court, following his guilty plea to conspiring to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349. At sentencing, defendant argued that he was not responsible for the losses incurred during the time period he was incarcerated because his incarceration was evidence of his withdrawal from the conspiracy. The district court disagreed and attributed the actual losses incurred during the entire conspiracy to defendant when it calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced defendant to 51 months imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued that his incarceration was prima facie evidence that he withdrew from the conspiracy, which then shifted the burden to the government to prove the contrary. The court disagreed and held that the evidence before the sentencing court of defendant's incarceration; the nature of the bank fraud conspiracy that he formulated, led, and executed; and defendant's contact with a co-conspirator upon his release from prison supported the district court's finding that he did not withdraw from the conspiracy during his incarceration. Accordingly, the district court did not err in attributing the actual losses of the entire conspiracy to defendant.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The claim rested on the New York state trial judge's failure to make specific findings justifying the removal of petitioner's twelve-year-old brother from the courtroom during trial. At issue was whether New York's intermediate appellate court exorbitantly misapplied New York law when it held that petitioner failed to preserve this claim for state appellate review. The court held that the sparse record prevented it from saying definitively that defense counsel properly objected or requested that the brother remain in court. The court also held that because the New York appellate court's finding that this claim was not preserved for appellate review was an independent and adequate state ground for decision, which barred review of the claim by federal courts, the court affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed pro se an order dismissing his complaint against defendants for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that medical care providers, Christopher Aiken and Dr. James Hohensee, at the Niagara County Jail, were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs during his incarceration at the jail. Plaintiff also appealed from a judgment dismissing his claims against the remaining defendants, alleging that excessive force on the part of corrections officers, Paul Curcione, Jeff Chawer, and Sergeant Tammy Williams. The court held that plaintiff's complaint fell short of alleging a deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Practitioner Aikin and Dr. Hohensee to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend where issues of medical judgment could not be the basis of a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference was lacking. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams for plaintiff's failure to exhaust the requisite administrative review process as to Williams. The court further held that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was satisfied by an untimely filing of a grievance if it was accepted and decided on the merits by the appropriate prison authority. Therefore, plaintiff had met the exhaustion requirement of his original filing and the district court's contrary determination was erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Defendant, James Gansman, appealed from a judgment convicting him of insider trading under the so-called "misappropriation theory." At issue was whether the district court erred in declining to adopt an instruction proposed by Gansman setting forth a theory of the defense based in part on SEC Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2. The court held that Gansman was entitled to assert a defense theory that he did not have the requisite intent to commit securities fraud, and that in defining the nature of his relationship with Donna Murdoch, a woman with whom he was having an affair, to the jury, he had the right to use language found in Rule 10b5-2. The court held that, nevertheless, Gansman was not entitled to a new trial in the circumstances presented because the slightly modified instruction given by the district court was legally sufficient. Gansman raised a number of other challenges to his conviction, all of which were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), and (a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced defendant to 121 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to finance future counseling costs of one of the victims depicted in the images and videos. On appeal, defendant challenged the restitution order and his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that, based on the facts in this case, defendant's possession of the victim's images was no a substantial factor in causing her loss. The court held, however, that the district court committed no procedural or substantive error in imposing the sentence of imprisonment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.