Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiring to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. On appeal, defendant argued that the indictment to which he pled guilty failed to adequately allege a nexus between his alleged conduct and the United States, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment before a criminal statute may apply extraterritorially. The court concluded that defendant's argument was waived because the existence of a territorial nexus was not an element of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Yousef" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction on one count of making false statements to the Government, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of mail fraud. The court held that there was no per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to be represented by one's counsel of choice and to effective assistance of counsel when a district court, after defense counsel has become incapacitated, appoints counsel, over defendant's objection, to deliver the defense summation, notwithstanding the fact that appointed counsel did not witness the presentation of the evidence. Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim failed because the district court's decision to appoint substitute counsel was reasonable and defendant showed no prejudice arising from that appointment. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict on all three counts. View "United States v. Griffiths" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his sentence after pleading guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. Defendant argued that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because at the time of defendant's interstate travel, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250 and 42 U.S.C. 16911, was not applicable to pre-Act offenders such as lot. The court concluded that the Final Rule postdates defendant's travel to Vermont and was therefore not applicable; because the court found that the Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART) Guidelines validly extended SORNA's applicability to pre-Act offenders, the court need not decide whether the Interim Rule had the same effect; and defendant's constitutional claims were without merit. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit error by imposing an eight-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(b)(1)(C) for commission of a sex offense while in failure-to-register status. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lott" on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to charges of transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's determination that his prior state court conviction for Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 130.60(2) subjected him to increased penalties under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2) because it constituted a prior conviction under a state law "relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." Applying the categorical approach, the court had little trouble concluding that defendant's prior conviction subjected him to enhanced sentencing. The court carefully considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, arguing that his due process rights were violated because a hearing impairment allegedly prevented him from exercising his Sixth Amendment rights to, inter alia, be present, assist in his defense, and confront witnesses against him. The court held that the Sixth Amendment requires reasonable accommodations for hearing-impaired criminal defendants during judicial proceedings and that such accommodations must be commensurate with the severity of the hearing impairment. Where a criminal defendant does not notify the district court of the impairment, however, he was only entitled to accommodations commensurate with the degree of difficulty that was, or reasonably should have been, clear or obvious to the district court. In this case, the court held that defendant received accommodations commensurate with the degree of difficulty that was, or reasonably should have been, clear or obvious to the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Crandall" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm following a bench trial on stipulated facts. Defendant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by denying the defense of entrapment by estoppel where a defendant charged with violating a federal crime must show reliance on the advice or authority of federal officials or agents to invoke the defense. In this instance, defendant argued that his federal prosecution was precluded by representations made to him in connection with state and local government programs offering "cash for guns." The court concluded that the district court correctly held that on the facts averred by defendant he would be unable to assert an "innocent possession" defense; there was probable cause to arrest and frisk defendant; defendant's state conviction for robbery in the third degree qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA; and defendant's remaining arguments were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Miles" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry into the United States after he was deported because of an aggravated felony conviction. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the government failed to prove his physical departure from the United States on March 7, 1992 airline flight from JFK Airport to Kingston, Jamaica. The court held that a properly executed warrant of deportation, coupled with testimony regarding the deportation procedures followed at that time, was sufficient proof that a defendant was, in fact physically deported from the United States. In this instance, the warrant of deportation specifically indicated that the immigration officer "witnessed" defendant's departure, and set forth the date, flight number, and time it was affected. Further, defendant stipulated that he signed the warrant and that it contained his fingerprints. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the board of directors of Goldman Sachs, appealed his conviction for three counts of securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff, and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. The prosecution arose out of a multiyear government investigation of insider trading at Galleon which included court-authorized wiretaps of Galleon's founder's cell phone. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by admitting statements of a coconspirator, recorded in wiretapped telephone conversations to which defendant was not a party where the statements were admissible both as nonhearsay statements in furtherance of the conspiracy and under the exception for statements against penal interest. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding relevant evidence offered by defendant. Accordingly, the court found defendant's arguments on appeal were without merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a forfeiture order in connection with a conviction for, inter alia, three counts of mortgage fraud (Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine). At issue was whether the district court erred by ordering forfeiture on Count Seven under a statute which, while applicable to Count Seven, was onlly charged in the indictment in connection with Counts Eight and Nine - an oversight that was not corrected by the Government or the district court before or during sentencing. The court concluded that forfeiture was limited to that authorized by the statute listed in the indictment, even if greater forfeiture would have been authorized by a different statute, where the government fails to invoke the harsher forfeiture provision prior to or during sentencing; 28 U.S.C. 982(a) authorizes forfeiture of the full amount of the loans fraudulently obtained in Counts Eight and Nine, without an offset for any portion of the loan that has been repaid; and 28 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(c), the only forfeiture provision charged in Count Seven, permitted an offset for that portion of the loan that was repaid with no loss to the victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the forfeiture order on Counts Eight and Nine, and remanded with instructions to vacate the forfeiture order on Count Seven. View "United States v. Annabi" on Justia Law