Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Stinson’s scheme began in 2006 when he founded a fund, Life’s Good, with an alleged purpose to originate mortgage loans. Stinson advertised a “risk free” 16 percent annual return to investors with individual retirement accounts. He hired telemarketers to “cold call” potential investors and later produced a fraudulent prospectus and worked through investment advisors. Stinson did not use investors’ money to make mortgage loans, but diverted it to various personal business ventures that employed his family and friends without requiring them to work. In 2010, the SEC initiated a civil enforcement action. Stinson was charged with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; filing false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1); obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1505; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The SEC’s analysis showed that Life’s Good solicited $17.6 million from at least 262 investors and returned approximately $1.9 million. Many individuals lost retirement savings. Stinson entered an open guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to 400 months and ordered restitution of $14,051,246. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the court erroneously applied U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(15)(A), which increases the offense level by two points when “the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions.” The enhancement applies only when financial institutions are the source of a defendant’s gross receipts. View "United States v. Stinson" on Justia Law

Verde, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. After several DUI convictions, he was sentenced to more than two years in prison. In 1998, Verde was charged with removability as an “aggravated felon.” He appeared before an immigration judge with seven other Mexican nationals, was deported, returned, and was removed for a second time in 2000. In 2011 the removal order was reinstated and he was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The government dropped that charge and allowed him to plead guilty to use of a false Social Security number, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B). He was sentenced to time served and supervised release. Verde filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to be reinstated as a permanent resident or to be granted cancellation of removal, arguing that his initial removal was a gross miscarriage of justice because of procedural shortcomings and that, because the Supreme Court has decided that a DUI conviction is not an aggravated felony, his conviction was not a valid basis for original removal. The district court dismissed Verde’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1101, eliminated habeas relief in district courts for aliens challenging orders of removal. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Verde-Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen of the United States" on Justia Law

Quinn, charged with aiding and abetting Johnson in an armed bank robbery, claimed that when he drove Johnson to the bank, he did not know that Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint. Johnson, who was awaiting sentencing, refused to testify. The district court refused Quinn’s request to immunize Johnson so he could testify. His statement to police that Quinn was not aware of the planned robbery was excluded as hearsay. Quinn was convicted and sentence to 147 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by postponing sentencing to induce Johnson not to testify. Quinn also argued that the court erred by not exercising its authority to immunize Johnson’s testimony. Rejecting that claim, the court stated that courts lack that authority, as immunity is a statutory creation reserved to the Executive Branch. If the accused can show a due process violation, a court has authority to vacate a conviction. View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Clark pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment with five years of supervised release. Clark successfully moved for a reduction of sentence (to 100 months) under 18 U.S.C. 3582. The government later moved for another reduction under FRCP 35(b). Clark’s sentence was reduced to time served and he began supervised release in November 2009. In 2012, Clark’s probation officer alleged and Clark admitted that Clark had left the judicial district without permission, had been a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over in Iowa, and “was found to be in possession of $20,000 cash.” Clark requested house arrest instead of incarceration because he had not been arrested or charged with any crime. Noting other misconduct, including traffic citations, failure to make payments on fines arising from those citations, failure to make payments on a bank loan, and a drug test indicating the presence of marijuana, the court sentenced him to 13 months of imprisonment followed by 47 months of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the record did not show meaningful consideration of the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

FBI Agents conducted undercover investigations using GigaTribe, a peer-to-peer file-sharing program. A user, Boys4me2010, allowed the agents to access his files, including child pornography. Boys4me2010 implied that he was sexually involved with a child and gave the child’s name. The agent identified one of Boys4me2010’s folders with the child’s name. The agents traced Boys4me2010’s IP address and identified Finley. A Pennsylvania agent executed a search warrant for Finley’s apartment. He found no one inside, but found a running computer. He moved its mouse, identified a GigaTribe account with the name Boys4me2010, and saw images that Boys4me2010 was sharing, including an image of a boy sitting on a green couch that was in Finley’s apartment. Finley’s computers held about 30,000 videos and images of child pornography. Convicted of production, receipt, distribution, and possession of material depicting sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), (e); 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); and 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2), Finley was sentenced to 50 years. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to admission of the videos. The court limited the danger of unfair prejudice by cautioning prospective jurors about the disturbing nature of the images and admitting only a small proportion of the seized images, and did not err by instructing the jury that a sleeping child can “engage in” sexually explicit conduct. The sentence did not violate Double Jeopardy. View "United States v. Finley" on Justia Law

Ashurov, a Tajikistani citizen, entered the U.S. under a visitor’s visa in 2007 and later sought a student visa. The application required submission of Form I-20, the school’s petition to sponsor a student. Ashurov stated that he planned to study English as a Second Language at the CMG School. CMG certified the form and Ashurov signed it without an oath, as required. The application was granted. In 2009 and 2010, Ashurov presented identical forms. In 2010, federal authorities determined that CMG was not providing students the required 18 hours of weekly in-class instruction. The school was closed and its designated official indicted. A jury convicted Ashurov under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), which punishes a person who “knowingly makes under oath, or ... under penalty of perjury ... knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any ... document required by the immigration laws ... or knowingly presents any such ... document which contains any such false statement or which fails to contain any reasonable basis.” The district court granted an acquittal, finding that the oath requirement applied to both the “knowingly makes” and “knowingly presents” clauses and, alternatively, applying the rule of lenity. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is “grievously ambiguous.” View "United States v. Ashurov" on Justia Law

Ball, an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to her medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ball, pro se, asked to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Third Circuit determined that she is not eligible for IFP status and denied her motion for appointment of counsel, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 110 Stat. 1321 Ball had accrued three “strikes” under the PLRA and was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Ball v. Famiglio" on Justia Law

Washington’s friend, Taylor, worked at Dollar Express in 2000. Taylor observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no guards, cameras, or other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor met at Waddy’s home to plan the robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove the group to the store. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered, carrying tools to open the safe, and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington heard the shots, ran into the store, and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with items to sell. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. After learning that police had designated him a person of interest, Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify in exchange for a sentence of 55 to 110 years. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy for his participation as the driver. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained a conditional federal writ of habeas corpus, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried nontestifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause; the redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers were patrolling an area where drug deals are common. They spotted a Jeep with Davis and Blackshear inside; the engine was running. Davis and Blackshear reached toward each other with “body motions [that] were consistent with the exchanging of narcotics in a narcotics transaction.” Seeing the officers, Davis and Blackshear had “expressions of shock,” and tossed something into the backseat. They exited the Jeep and quickly walked away without closing a door. The officers stopped the men and patted them down for weapons, but found wads of cash in their pockets. An officer saw a handgun through the open door. They arrested Davis and Blackshear, returned to the Jeep, and spotted a shopping bag in the backseat. It was open and contained a white substance. A drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers obtained a warrant and recovered 10 cell phones and shopping bags with 740 grams of cocaine distributed among smaller Ziploc bags. As evidence that Davis recognized the cocaine in the Jeep, the government proved that he had two prior cocaine convictions. The Third Circuit vacated Davis’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), noting that the government never proved that the cocaine from his past was similar in appearance, quantity, or form. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rodriguez and Diaz triggered suspicion of the Drug Enforcement Administration by purchasing last-minute one-way airplane tickets from San Juan to Philadelphia, using cash, checking no luggage, and holding no carry-on baggage. They proceeded to the baggage claim after deplaning, where they met Cordero and retrieved suitcases that had distinctive markings. As agents watched, they loaded the cases into one vehicle and got into another. The vehicle containing the suitcases was searched; the cases each contained 12-13 kilograms of cocaine, for a total retail value of $5 million. Despite taking evasive actions, the other vehicle was stopped. Cordero had thrown the memory chip from his phone out of the window before being pulled over. Diaz was carrying $456 in cash, Rodriguez had $33 in cash, and Cordero had $1,173 in cash. Rodriguez and Diaz were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and aiding possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Diaz entered a guilty plea and testified against the others. The district court overturned a verdict finding them guilty, stating that the evidence only showed that Rodriguez knew that he was being entrusted with a suitcase which could contain a “wide variety of contraband items.’” The Third Circuit vacated, declining to apply a “strict standard,” as it has in prior cases, and employing “the proper deferential standard.” View "United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez" on Justia Law