Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An FBI Agent and others were in an unmarked car with tinted windows, at a Newark intersection, as part of a drug investigation. People scattered when the vehicle arrived, but the agent saw Smith across the street, staring into the vehicle. Smith disappeared, but returned a minute later. As Smith passed under a light, the agent saw a handgun. As Smith approached, the agent called out that he had a gun. Smith was arrested. Officers recovered a semi-automatic handgun, but no drugs were found on Smith. Smith confessed that he had been on the corner and that he had a gun, but claimed that he retrieved the gun in self-defense because there had been a shooting nearby two weeks earlier involving a similar car. Smith was indicted for threatening a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) & (b); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court admitted evidence under Rule 404(b) that, two years earlier, Smith had engaged in a drug transaction at the same corner. The Third Circuit vacated the convictions, holding that admission of the prior conviction violated the requirement that the proponent of such admission set forth a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that because the defendant committed offenses before, he is more likely to have committed this one. View "Unted States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dillon and Lollis were convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack and 500 grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; use of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court imposed a prison sentence of 262 months for two counts and 60 months for another, to be served consecutively, with five years of supervised release--the minimum under then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. The crack guidelines were amended in 2008 and 2011. Dillon’s sentence was reduced, first to 270 months, and then to time served. Dillon served 28 months more than called for by amended guidelines. While on supervised release, he was arrested when Lollis’s car, in which he was riding, was found to contain more than 65 pounds of marijuana. The court noted that under U.S.S.G. 7B1.4(a), the recommended sentence was four to 10 months, but imposed a term of 24 months: one month at Count 1, 11 months at Count 2, and 12 months at Count 4, with supervised release for 59 months. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The erroneous multiple-terms sentence was prejudicial due to its implications for a hypothetical second revocation of supervised release. View "United States v. Dillon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Shotts was charged with a string of burglaries. Following his arrest, Shotts offered to assist in an investigation into corruption at the county prison and the District Attorney helped secure Shotts’ release on bail. Once released, Shotts engaged in another crime spree and was charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, criminal conspiracy, receiving stolen property, passing bad checks, criminal trespass, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person, driving under the influence of alcohol, and with three probation violations. Because Shotts had made confessions, his attorney pursued a plea deal, but did not request discovery of police records. The Commonwealth offered a plea deal with a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The judge commented that the sentence seemed high, given Shotts’ assistance with the corruption investigation. Shotts rejected the deal and entered a general guilty plea, confirming that his lawyer had explained the maximum sentences. Despite evidence of Shotts’ cooperation and his earlier statement, the judge sentenced Shotts to 30½ to 133 years. Following state collateral review, during which Shotts had five different lawyers, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted. The Third Circuit affirmed on the merits, but stated that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s determination that Shotts’ claim was defaulted because he failed to raise it when first represented by new counsel was “an exorbitant application of an otherwise independent and adequate state rule” that cannot bar federal review. View "Shotts v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

Flemming, convicted in 2004 of possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 841(b)(1)(C), and two firearm counts, had a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Because he had two prior controlled substances convictions, he was classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), so that his Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months. The court granted a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, based on “reliable information . . . that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes” and sentenced Flemming to 175 months in prison (115 months plus a 60 month term for one of the firearm convictions). The Third Circuit affirmed. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, lowering by two the base offense levels for most crack-cocaine offenses. It later made the amendment retroactive. Flemming moved for a reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c). The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. Individuals who were designated as career offenders under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and 3 and were granted a downward departure under 4A1.3 are not eligible for resentencing. View "United States v. Flemming" on Justia Law

Kluger and Bauer were charged as conspirators in an insider-trading scheme in which Robinson was the third participant. The conspiracy spanned 17 years and was likely the longest such scheme in U.S. history. Kluger entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit securities fraud; securities fraud; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 371, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff(a); 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), and 18 U.S.C. 2. The plea agreement did not include a stipulation as to the guidelines sentencing range. The district court imposed a 60-month term on Count I and 144-month custodial terms on each other count, all to be served concurrently, thought to be the longest insider-trading sentence ever imposed. After a separate hearing on the same day, the court sentenced Bauer to a 60-month term on Count I and 108-month terms on each other count to be served concurrently. Robinson, who was the “middleman,” in the scheme, pled guilty to three counts and was sentenced to concurrent 27-month terms. Robinson’s sentence was far below his guidelines range of 70 to 87 months but the prosecution sought a downwards departure because Robinson was cooperating in its investigation and prosecution. The Third Circuit upheld Kluger’s sentence. View "United States v. Kluger" on Justia Law

Moreno, born in Mexico in 1971, was adopted by a U.S. citizen at age nine. New Mexico issued a birth certificate, indicating a birth place of Mexico. In the 1990s, Moreno was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and of false imprisonment. In 2006, she was deported, after an immigration judge, the Board of Appeals, and the Fifth Circuit found that she was not a U.S. citizen. She returned to the U.S. in 2007 and obtained a passport, listing her place of birth as New Mexico. In 2008, the passport was confiscated by Border Patrol, but it was never revoked. She was released pending investigation. In 2011, DHS informed her that she was not a citizen. When she arrived in St. Thomas after a cruise, she told immigration officers that she was a U.S. citizen and presented her New Mexico driver’s license and a copy of her U.S. passport. Moreno was charged with falsely representing herself to be a citizen, 18 U.S.C. 911. On the night before trial, the government disclosed a DHS report concluding that the passport was valid but recommending investigation into her citizenship. Moreno did not accept a continuance. The district court did not admit the documents into evidence, finding that the non-exculpatory information had been previously disclosed. The court also declined to admit an FBI report, listing her citizenship as “United States,” and rejected an argument that the passport was conclusive evidence of citizenship. Moreno was sentenced to 29 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that under 22 U.S.C. 2705, a passport constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if issued to a U.S. citizen. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law

Ciavarella and another state court judge, Conahan, received $2.8 million in three years from a commercial builder, Mericle, and an attorney and businessman, Powell, during the “Kids for Cash” scandal in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania . Ciavarella committed hundreds of juveniles to detention centers co-owned by Powell, including many who were not represented by counsel, without informing the juveniles or their families of his conflict of interest. The judges, aware that they were under investigation, met with Mericle and Powell to coordinate their stories in 2008. Powell was wearing a recording device, exposing the judges’ efforts to obstruct justice. The judges pled guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy in exchange for an agreed 87-month sentence. Noting that the stipulated sentences were significantly lower than the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for the offenses, the district court rejected the plea agreement; the judges withdrew their pleas. Ciavarella proceeded to trial, was convicted of racketeering, honest services mail fraud, money laundering conspiracy, filing false tax returns, and several other related crimes and was sentenced to 336 months’ imprisonment, restitution, forfeiture, and a special assessment. The Third Circuit remanded for modification of the special assessment for mail fraud, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial judge was biased. View "United States v. Ciavarella" on Justia Law

Turner, the author of Tax Free!, instructed readers to escape income taxation by using common law trust organizations (colatos), and established FAR to assist in implementing colatos. In 1991, Turner enlisted Leveto, the owner of a veterinary clinic, as a FAR member. FAR created Center, a foreign colato, and appointed Leveto as the general manager and Turner as a consultant. Leveto “sold” his clinic to Center, which “hired” Leveto as its manager. Leveto continued to control the clinic, but stopped reporting its income. Center did not pay taxes because it distributed the income to other foreign colatos, which, Turner claimed, “transformed” it to untaxable foreign source income. Leveto began to market Tax Free! In 1995, the IRS began a criminal investigation. In 2001, Turner and Leveto were charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS by concealing Leveto’s assets, 18 U.S.C. 371. Turner moved to exclude recorded conversations between Leveto and an undercover agent and foreign bank records seized from Leveto’s office and residence. The district court admitted the conversations, reasoning that they furthered an unindicted conspiracy to impede tax collection efforts, and held that the government properly authenticated the foreign bank documents. Turner was convicted, sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay $408,043 in restitution, without any findings about his ability to pay. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Each defendant was convicted of a cocaine base (crack) related offense. The government moved for a downward departure due to substantial assistance by each. The district court granted the departure and sentenced the defendant below the statutory mandatory minimum. Shortly thereafter, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) became law, and the United States Sentencing Commission approved Amendment 750, a retroactive amendment, which lowered the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses. Defendants moved to further reduce their sentences. Although the qualifying amount of cocaine base necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence has been increased, the government argued that the duration of the statutorily required minimum sentence has not changed so that the defendants are still subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. The district courts denied defendants’ motions. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that defendants, who are convicted of crack cocaine offenses and whose original sentences were below the mandatory minimum applicable to them because of substantial assistance to the government, are not barred for policy reasons from seeking a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). View "United States v. Savani" on Justia Law