Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration officials “shall take into custody any‖ deportable alien who has committed various crimes” when the alien is released from detention for those crimes, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1). The Act requires officials to hold such aliens without any possibility of release while awaiting removal. Sylvain, a citizen of Haiti, entered the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1988. He has been convicted of more than 10 drug-related crimes and served a three-year prison sentence for making and selling cocaine. He was convicted for unlawfully possessing a weapon and for criminal mischief. Sylvain was last arrested in 2007 for possessing drugs. He pled guilty and received a conditional discharge. Under New York law, a conditional discharge does not require imprisonment or probation. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials arrested him in 2011, concluding that he was deportable and subject to mandatory detention, although he was last in custody four years earlier. The district court granted his petition for habeas corpus, finding that mandatory detention did not apply. Sylvain received a hearing, paid bond, and is not in custody. His next removal hearing is in 2014. The Third Circuit reversed; mandatory detention does not require immediate detention. View "Sylvain v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

From 1990 to 1995, Thomas directed an enterprise that transported marijuana from California to Pennsylvania. Thomas’ wife was murdered in 1995. He fled to Jamaica. In 1998, he was indicted on 33 counts, based on his marijuana enterprise. In 2001, Thomas was arrested in the United Kingdom. He contested a provisional extradition warrant until 2005. He was convicted and sentenced to 420 months imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, in 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. As a federal prisoner, Thomas could move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence within one year from denial of certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f), but during that period, Thomas was temporarily in state custody, convicted of murdering his wife. Three weeks before the section 2255 deadline, he moved (pro se) for an extension of time. The district court denied the motion. Thomas appealed, but never filed an actual 2255 motion. He sought a certificate of appealability (COA), restating that he had been in state custody without access to legal materials, and asserted “a Batson challenge … Prosecutorial Misconduct for knowingly withholding material evidence of Petitioner’s innocence … and Jury Misconduct.” The Third Circuit granted a COA, finding that the issues were worthy of review. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2000, cab driver DeJesus suffered multiple fatal gunshot wounds during a robbery while his taxi was parked at a Harrisburg intersection. After a joint trial with Eiland and Mitchell Court, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Eley of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Eley was unsuccessful in direct appeal and seeking post-conviction relief in state courts. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that his non-testifying co-defendants’ confessions were admitted against him in violation of the Confrontation Clause under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The court rejected an argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions in violation of the Due Process Clause. View "Eley v. Erickson" on Justia Law

In 2000 Ross was convicted of first degree murder in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Ross was unable to obtain a state appellate court review due to extraordinary circumstances attributable to his attorney’s extreme neglect of his case, including missing deadlines for filing document, failure to communicate with Ross, and the attorney’s misleading statements when he did communicate with Ross. The court denied his motion for appointment of a new attorney. Ross’s mental health issues, limited education, and limited cognitive ability magnified his problems and his status as an inmate placed structural obstacles in his path. Ross subsequently brought this habeas corpus case, charging that because his attorney wrongfully abandoned him, he lost his appellate rights in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations barred the action as untimely, the district court found that equitable tolling of the running of the statute was warranted because Ross had been diligent in pursuing his state court appellate remedies but that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control frustrated this attempt. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ross v. Varano" on Justia Law

Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall’s opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law

Zabielski robbed PNC Bank. Footage from security tapes demonstrates that Zabielski was not disoriented.‖ He approached the teller with a note that read: “$10,000,” stating only that he needed the money within two minutes. The teller noticed a bulge in Zabielski‘s jacket pocket, and thought that he might have a gun or a knife. She gave him $4,767. Zabielski told people about the robbery. His mother convinced him to return the money. He mailed $3,790 to the bank. Images from security cameras were provided to local media, and Zabielski was identified. He initially lied, but a year later pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). With a two-level enhancement for making a threat of death (USSG 2B3.1(b)(2)(F)), an offense level of 21, and a criminal history category of I, Zabielski‘s advisory Guidelines range was 37 to 46 months. Zabielski objected to the enhancement and requested a downward variance, claiming that he suffered from bipolar disorder and had resumed treatment since the robbery. The district court rejected his arguments, but imposed a sentence of 24 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that application of the enhancement was harmless error and that Zabielski‘s sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Zabielski" on Justia Law

A parole officer, knowing that Benjamin‘s license was suspended, observed Benjamin driving. He organized a search of the house where Benjamin lived with Esprit. In the bedroom, agents found hearing and eye protection, targets, a postcard with Benjamin‘s name and address, a handgun trigger lock, ammunition, car titles in the name of Burch, a Burch driver‘s license, an identification card for Benjamin, Benjamin‘s social security card, and receipts on an auto loan for Burch. Agents found a notebook that, according to expert testimony, contained illegal drug information, and a digital cooking scale. There was a loaded handgun in the basement, with Esprit’s permit. In ceiling joists, agents found 6.62 grams of cocaine base and 326.93 grams of marijuana. Benjamin was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 20 years. The Third Circuit remanded with respect to sentencing on the firearm conviction, but otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statutes, and to rulings allowing references to his parole. View "United States v. Benjamin" on Justia Law

Under the “Hyde Amendment,” a district court in criminal cases may award to a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation expenses, if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds special circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The district court denied such an award in a case involving four counts of conspiring and attempting to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. 951(a) & 2 (Hobbs Act), and two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to promote and facilitate bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) & 2 (Travel Act). The government alleged that Manzo, a candidate for mayor of Jersey City, sought cash payments from Dwek, an informant posing as a developer, and that, in exchange, Manzo indicated he would help Dwek with matters involving Jersey City government. The district court dismissed each Hobbs Act count because Manzo was not a public official at the time of the conduct. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court later held that receipt of something of value by an unsuccessful candidate in exchange for a promise of future official conduct does not constitute bribery under the New Jersey bribery statute and dismissed all remaining charges. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of fees. View "United States v. Manzo" on Justia Law

Gilliam was fatally shot outside a Pittsburgh bar in 1997. Grant was convicted on the testimony of one witness, who based his identification on clothing. The witness was apparently granted leniency with respect to a parole violation in exchange for testimony; the criminal history of the witness was not disclosed to or discovered by the defense. Others, who had been present and who stated that Grant was not the shooter, were not called as witnesses. There was no physical evidence tying Grant to the crime. The state court denied Grant’s petition for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding for the first time that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be raised in the first instance in post-conviction proceedings. Grant then filed an unsuccessful pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541. The federal district court denied his habeas petition. The Third Circuit remanded, directing the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the ineffective assistance claim.View "Grant v. Lockett" on Justia Law

The Federal Trade Commission secured a judgment of $10,204,445 against Sussman and his co-defendants and equitable relief, based on abusive debt collection activities. Sussman subsequently entered a safe deposit box and removed coins that had been “frozen” in connection with the earlier action; he was then convicted of theft of government property, 18 U.S.C. 641, and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1503(a) and sentenced to 41 months on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a $15,000 fine and a $200 special assessment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a clam that Sussman should be afforded a new trial because a portion of the trial transcript is unavailable, apparently because a court reporter lost the transcript. The court upheld the admission into evidence of redacted documents from the FTC’s prior civil case and jury instructions on the elements of obstruction of justice and Sussman’s theory of defense. View "United States v. Sussman" on Justia Law