Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants are MB, a registered investment adviser, and people affiliated with MB. A fraudulent scheme was perpetrated by Bloom while he was an employee and officer of MB, through a hedge fund called North Hills that Bloom controlled and managed outside the scope of his responsibilities at MB. Bloom was arrested and indicted in New York in 2009 on charges relating to the Ponzi scheme, by which time most of the money invested in North Hills was gone. Investors filed suit, alleging: controlling person liability under Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act; negligent supervision; violations of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5; violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law; and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with respect to MB on the claims for violations of Rule 10b-5 and the state UTPCPL, and otherwise affirmed. View "Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

Denny, an inmate at the Fairton, New Jersey, Federal Correctional Institution, was punished with 60 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit after a “shank” was found in a vent between the cell he shared with another inmate and another cell. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation. Denny sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241 arguing that prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from contraband. The mere discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in that cell possessed the contraband. View "Denny v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Wilson pleaded guilty to drug charges. The plea agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence except if the government appealed, the sentence exceeded statutory limits, or the sentence unreasonably exceeded the sentencing guideline range determined by the district court. Wilson was sentenced to 65 months’ imprisonment with six years of supervised release. The Third Circuit enforced the waiver and affirmed the sentence. In 2011, Wilson was released from prison and began supervised release. Three months later, his Probation Officer sought to modify the terms and conditions of his supervised release to include participation in a mental health program. The district court held a hearing and took testimony about a number of bizarre incidents and about Wilson’s grandiose ideas and acts of unconventional behavior. Wilson also testified. The court ordered that Wilson’s conditions of supervised release be modified to add the condition that he undergo a mental health assessment and, if necessary, participate in an approved mental health treatment program. The Third Circuit affirmed after finding that appeal was not barred by the waiver. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tying him to the crime. The testimony of Robles, Johnson’s friend, that Johnson had confessed guilt to him, was pivotal. Johnson filed multiple petitions under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, unsuccessfully claiming violations of Brady v. Maryland. He then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed, noting that it was not until discovery in Johnson’s federal habeas case that previously undisclosed evidence was uncovered, showing that, at the time Robles testified, he was under investigation for his role in a shooting, an assault, and multiple shots-fired incidents. Robles, who was never charged with any crimes despite repeated dealings with police in investigations involving guns and drugs, supplied police with information concerning an unrelated crime when his own involvement in an assault came under investigation. The jury never heard the impeachment evidence because when Johnson sought discovery of information concerning any criminal activity of Robles, charged or uncharged, the District Attorney who prosecuted Johnson represented to the state court that it had no information or police reports naming Robles as a suspect. View "Johnson v. Folino" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted of drug-related offenses. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review. Jenkins timely filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, which the trial court denied. He timely filed notice of appeal, but the superior court granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw and affirmed denial of his petition on November 10, 2009. On December 2, 2009, Jenkins filed a pro se pleading with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entitled, “Motion to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, and for the Appointment of Counsel.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court notified the Superior Court that Jenkins had filed a petition for allowance of appeal, but, on December 16, issued notice, stating that his pleading failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure unrelated to timing. Jenkins perfected his pleading on December 29, but, on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court denied his pleading without opinion. On May 7, 2010, Jenkins filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court, sua sponte, raised the issue of timeliness and ultimately dismissed as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Jenkins is eligible for statutory tolling of AEDPA’s limitation period. View "Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands" on Justia Law

Diallo was arrested and pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing 15 or more counterfeit credit cards with the intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3). At his sentencing hearing, the government argued that although the actual loss attributed to Diallo’s conduct amounted to $160,000, he should be assessed a 16-level enhancement for an intended loss amount of over $1 million but not more than $2.5 million, which was based on the Secret Service agents’ determination of the aggregate credit limit of all of the compromised credit card numbers, and a four-level enhancement for over 50 victims, based on the number of financial institutions that had issued the credit cards numbers. The district court accepted the government’s arguments on intended loss and the number of victims, resulting in a total offense level of 27 and a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment and ultimately sentenced Diallo to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated. For purpose of Section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, the intended loss of a credit card fraud is not, in every case, the credit card’s credit limit. View "United States v. Diallo" on Justia Law

Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and 500 grams or more of powder cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). The district court sentenced her to 12 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Because Huff had spent more than a year in prison awaiting trial, supervised release began in July 2008. In August 2010, the probation office informed the court that Huff had violated conditions of supervised release. Huff waived a hearing and agreed to home detention for three months. In April 2011, the probation office filed a second report after Huff was charged with driving under the influence, endangering the welfare of children, improper vehicle child restraint, public drunkenness, and failure to stop at a red light and stated that Huff had been non-compliant with other terms of supervision. The court sentenced her to 10 months’ incarceration with no subsequent supervised release. Huff filed notice of appeal in December 2011, but was released from custody in August 2012. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. A litigant who is unconditionally released from custody must show that she will suffer collateral consequences from the supervised release revocation to present a live case or controversy. View "United States v. Huff" on Justia Law

Castro, a high-ranking Philadelphia Police official, was indicted for extortion involving violence. He was convicted of making a false statement to federal agents (18 U.S.C. 1001) and acquitted of conspiracy to commit extortion (18 U.S.C. 894). The jury hung on remaining counts. To avoid retrial, Castro pled guilty to conspiracy to commit extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951); the plea agreement contained an appellate waiver. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 18 months for false statements and 60 months for conspiracy. Castro appealed, arguing that, because the money came from the FBI as part of a sting operation, he told the literal truth when he denied having received money from the alleged victim. He also argued that the court lacked authority to deny the government’s motion for a decrease in his offense level under the sentencing guidelines and that, in imposing a sentence 19 months higher than the guidelines range, the court failed to adequately account for his record of good works. The Third Circuit vacated the false statements conviction, holding that application of the waiver against the sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument would, in these unusual circumstances, work a miscarriage of justice and that there was no evidence that Castro made a false statement. View "Unted States v. Castro" on Justia Law

Tucker was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and related drug and firearms offenses. He pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He represented himself at the plea and sentencing hearings, with standby counsel. The government asserted that Tucker was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) based on three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses.” Tucker conceded a 1995 violent felony but argued that two state drug convictions did not qualify. The government asserted that both convictions involved cocaine, and, under Pennsylvania law, carried a maximum sentence of 10 years. Tucker argued that neither conviction had required a finding as to the particular drug and that the government could not show that either conviction was for an offense carrying a maximum sentence of 10 years or more. The government introduced the certified court record for one conviction and, for the other, charging documents, jury instructions, and transcripts of the post-trial sentencing hearing and a pre-trial charging conference. The district court found that both convictions were for cocaine and and sentenced Tucker to 15 years. The Third Circuit vacated. None of the documents submitted “actually required” finding conspiracy to sell cocaine in order to convict. View "Unted States v. Tucker" on Justia Law