Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Delaware State Police obtained search warrants for Pavulak’s email account and workplace after receiving information that he was viewing child pornography on his workplace computers. Evidence was seized, he was convicted of possessing, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and attempting to produce child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), attempting to entice a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and committing crimes related to his status as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment on the attempted-production conviction and to 120 months’ imprisonment on the remaining counts. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the evidence should have been suppressed. The warrants were supported by an affidavit that pointed to Pavulak‘s prior child-molestation convictions and labeled the images, which had been reported by informants, simply as child pornography. No further details concerning the images content appeared in the affidavit, which was, therefore, insufficient to establish probable cause for child pornography, but the officers reasonably relied on the warrants in good faith. View "Unted Smith v. Pavulak" on Justia Law

Thomas and Frett had a gun fight at Frett’s apartment. Both sustained wounds and were hospitalized. Thomas was discharged on May 16; on May 21, six masked gunmen entered the hospital and shot Frett to death. Investigation revealed that they entered through an employee entrance with an employee “swipe card.” The records system showed that Knight, an admissions clerk, accessed Frett’s records hours before he was killed. Knight’s cell phone records indicated that she had telephone conversations with Thomas’s brother, Milligan, that evening. Knight stated that she had no prior knowledge of the shooting and that she did not remember accessing records to ascertain the room number, but admitted that Milligan was her boyfriend. Confronted with phone and system records, Knight admitted the truth and was charged with making false statements to a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1621(1), and conspiring in Frett’s murder. She was acquitted on the false statement and conspiracy charges, but was convicted on three perjury charges and sentenced to 36 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court admitted irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence and erroneously sentenced her under a USSG provision that applies only to perjury in respect to a criminal offense. View "Unted States v. Knight" on Justia Law

Muhammud pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. 846); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. 924(c)); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction. He was sentenced to 90 months. He did not file a notice of appeal within 10 days of entry of the final judgment, as then required by Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(i), but about a year later filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting several bases of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court enforced the waiver and dismissed the petition. Muhammud filed, pro se, a notice of appeal with respect to dismissal of the 2255 petition. The Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. More than two years after his sentencing, Muhammud filed a notice of appeal. The government, mistakenly believing that he was appealing denial of his 2255 petition, moved to enforce the waiver but failed to assert untimeliness of an appeal from conviction. The Third Circuit denied an appeal, holding that the government could initially raise untimeliness in its merits brief to the appeals court. View "United States v. Muhammed" on Justia Law

Kouevi lived in Togo. From 2001- 2005, Kouevi conspired to fraudulently obtain “diversity visas,” 8 U.S.C. 1153(c)), for at least 34 people through the American Embassy in Togo. The head of the scheme, Afolabi, paid fees for persons who were eligible for the diversity lottery and assisted them with their paperwork, requiring the applicants to falsely represent that others were their spouses or children, so that those individuals could obtain visas. Kouevi was responsible for false documents and tutoring participants to prepare them for Embassy interviews. Afolabi helped Kouevi fraudulently obtain his own visa and paid his costs to come to the U.S. The Department of Homeland Security arrested Afolabi for bringing young girls to the U.S. and forcing them to work at hair braiding salons, 16 hours a day, 6 to 7 days a week, for several years, without pay. They were also subjected to beatings and rape. Kouevi was convicted of conspiracy to commit visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, and visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a) and 2, and sentenced to 26 months imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his conduct was not criminalized by the part of the statute he was indicted under. View "United States v. Kouevi" on Justia Law

In 2002, Turlington pled guilty to conspiring to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846). In 2004, the district court sentenced him to 84 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release, less than one-third of the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation. In October, 2008, Turlington began supervised release. In September 2009, he was charged with driving under the influence; in December, New Jersey police observed Turlington engaging in three hand-to-hand drug transactions. When they approached and announced themselves, Turlinton attempted to flee and threw a loaded handgun to the ground. Police searched Turlington and found $245 in cash and a plastic bag of cocaine. Turlington pleaded guilty to possessing a weapon while committing a controlled dangerous substance crime. The New Jersey Superior Court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with any federal sentence. Turlington admitted to possessing the handgun and drugs; the district court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to 60 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Turlington" on Justia Law

Giles was a prisoner in the Delaware penal system. Campbell worked at the Sussex Correctional Institution. Giles brought excessive force and deliberate indifference claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against officers, including Campbell, based on a confrontation during Giles’s transfer to Sussex and against others regarding his medical treatment after the incident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants, including Campbell, on the basis of qualified immunity, held a bench trial, and entered judgment in favor of remaining defendants. The Third Circuit remanded the summary judgment. On remand, the Delaware Department of Justice, which had represented defendants, notified the court that Campbell had died in July 2006. Giles moved to substitute the administratrix of Campbell’s estate as a defendant. Neither the suggestion of death nor the motion to substitute was served on the estate. The district court denied the motion to substitute, holding that Giles’s claim was not pending under Delaware law and was extinguished. Giles proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. The Third Circuit vacated denial of the motion to substitute, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the estate. View "Giles v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 2005 Weatherspoon was charged with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base. In 2006 he pled guilty and was sentenced to 120 months, under a binding plea agreement. A few years later, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment which reduced Weatherspoon's Guidelines range. In 2011, the Third Circuit rejected Weatherspoon's first motion for a sentence reduction because he was sentenced pursuant to a binding plea agreement. The district court denied a subsequent motion, based on an argument that he is nevertheless eligible for a reduction because under the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), the sentence contained in his plea agreement was based on‖ the Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

In 2005 Weatherspoon was charged with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base. In 2006 he pled guilty and was sentenced to 120 months, under a binding plea agreement. A few years later, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment which reduced Weatherspoon's Guidelines range. In 2011, the Third Circuit rejected Weatherspoon's first motion for a sentence reduction because he was sentenced pursuant to a binding plea agreement. The district court denied a subsequent motion, based on an argument that he is nevertheless eligible for a reduction because under the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), the sentence contained in his plea agreement was based on‖ the Sentencing Guidelines. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

Begin pled guilty on charges related to his use of the internet and a cellular phone to send sexual messages and photographs to a minor in order to persuade her to have sex with him and was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, a 30-month upward departure from the top of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Begin argued that his sentence was unreasonable based on the asserted disparity between his sentence for attempting to induce statutory rape and the lower maximum sentences for actually committing statutory rape under state and federal law. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of that argument. The claim has colorable legal merit, so that, upon appropriate findings of fact, the district court would be within its discretion to accept the argument and to factor it into the ultimate sentence. View "United States v. Begin" on Justia Law

In 1989, Copenhefer was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats. As to the murder conviction, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, making a death sentence mandatory. The court imposed the death sentence and consecutive sentences totaling 20 to 40 years on remaining counts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A trial court denied a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act; the Supreme Court again affirmed. In 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted habeas relief from the death sentence on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was required to find that Copenhefer’s lack of a prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the original sentence. The court rejected additional claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory that the victim lingered before dying and that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove female jurors. View "Copenhefer v. Horn" on Justia Law