Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bistrian, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, filed 108-page complaint with 114 pages of exhibits, alleging that, while he was awaiting sentencing on wire-fraud charges, prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they flubbed the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, Bistrian contends he repeatedly requested help, but no preventive measures were taken. Later, one of the inmates against whom Bistrian had cooperated, along with others, beat him while they were together in a locked recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon attacked Bistrian in the recreation pen. Bistrian also claimed that certain of the 447 days he spent in segregation violated his substantive due process, procedural due process, and free speech rights. After the district court ruled on motions, six counts survived against 28 defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. Counts that survived include: deliberate indifference to medical needs; substantive due process violations by failure to protect and by punitive detention; procedural due process; and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. View "Bistrian v. Levi" on Justia Law

Garrus was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 2001. At sentencing, the judge increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9714, the “three strikes” law. To do so, the judge made a finding that Garrus had previously been convicted of burglarizing an occupied building, when, in fact, he had only pled guilty to, and been convicted of, second degree burglary (which, under Pennsylvania law, necessarily requires that the burglarized building was unoccupied). In a habeas petition, Garrus argued that this judicial fact-finding violated the Supreme Court's 2000 holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, requiring that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court denied the petition on the basis that the highest state court determination upholding the sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Third Circuit reversed. The state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was objectively unreasonable. View "Garrus v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Ware and Stratton, convicted of offenses involving crack cocaine, moved for reductions in their sentences following a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to crack cocaine offenses. Ware’s conviction included counts of conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of crack with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. Ware was found to be responsible for 1.17 grams of crack. Stratton was convicted on counts including distribution of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school. He was found responsible for 5.9 grams of crack. Stratton was granted a downward departure based on over-representation of criminal history. Ware’s sentence was reduced from 128 months to 84 months, but a different judge denied Stratton’s motion to reduce his sentence from 188 months. The Third Circuit reversed as to Ware and affirmed as to Stratton. The Sentencing Guidelines amendments at issue do not apply to defendants who, like Ware and Stratton, were originally sentenced on the basis of variances (Ware) or departures (Stratton) from a guideline range not affected by the amendments. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law

While conducting an undercover online investigation of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, officer Erdely was able to connect to a computer sharing child pornography files. Erdely obtained a court order to identify the IP address that had shared the files. The address was registered to Cunningham’s deceased mother. During a search, the only working computer was found in Cunningham’s bedroom. Cunningham admitted to searching for and downloading child pornography. At trial, the district court allowed the government, over Cunningham’s objection, to show the jury videos containing seven different video clips totaling approximately two minutes as a sample of the child pornography that gave rise to the charges. Cunningham was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment and 20 years’ supervised release following his conviction for receipt and distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. The district court abused its discretion, not only by failing to review the videos prior to admitting them but also by allowing all of those videos to be shown to the jury, because the highly inflammatory nature of two of them clearly and substantially outweighed their probative value pertaining to the crimes charged. The errors were not harmless.

Atlantic, a New Jersey pipe foundry, and four of its managers were convicted of conspiring to commit environmental pollution and worker safety violations, attempting to cover up or impede federal investigation of those violations, and violations of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251) and the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7413(c)). Defendants illegally pumped contaminated water into storm drains that drained into the Delaware River; unlawfully burned 50-gallon drums of paint waste in a cupola and emitted the fumes into the air; and attempted to cover up work-related accidents at its facility, one of which resulted in the death of an employee who was run-over by a forklift. The district court imposed sentences of 70, 41, 30 and six months’ imprisonment on the managers and applied the Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. 3571(c)(1), rather than the CWA and CAA, and fined Atlantic the maximum penalty of $500,000 per violation on conspiracy, four counts of obstruction, eight CWA counts, and one CAA count for a total fine of $8 million. It also sentenced Atlantic to 4 years’ probation, with a court-ordered monitor to ensure regulatory compliance. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the sentences.

Following his convictions for wire fraud and failure to appear at trial, the district court ordered Craig to pay $12,411 in restitution and a $300 special assessment. The government sought to satisfy the order from $16,342 it had seized previously from Craig. Craig filed a motion (FRCP 41(g)) for return of the remaining $3,631. The government argued that the balance should be applied to an unsatisfied restitution order entered by another court. The court denied the motion. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the court lacked authority to order the transfer of funds to another district. The district court returned the money, but denied Craig’s request for interest. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 2465: does not entitle a convicted criminal to interest on an award of excess funds returned to him after he satisfies a restitution order.

Newark detectives were watching a building in connection with a crime that occurred at another location, two months earlier. They did not have a description of anyone involved and had no information whatsoever about Navedo. After watching an interaction between Navedo and Pozo, the officers thought that Pozo had a gun. The officers approached and identified themselves and clearly saw that Pozo had a gun. Pozo threw it into his bag and ran. As one officer chased Pozo, Navedo ran up the stairs to his home with another officer pursuing him into the building. As Navedo opened the door to his apartment, he was tackled by the officer, who testified that he handcuffed Navedo, then observed a shotgun, rifles, and ammunition on the floor. The court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Navedo and that Navedo’s flight elevated the reasonable suspicion to “probable cause for arrest and justified entry” under the theory of hot pursuit. The Third Circuit vacated. The police had no reason to suspect that Navedo was involved in criminal activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and investigate, not arrest.

In 2003, Berberena pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of powder cocaine with intent to distribute. The district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 210-262 months but varied downward to impose a sentence of 150 months. In 2006, Gayle was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; possession of crack with intent to distribute; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The district court calculated a range of 168-210 months for two counts, but varied downward to 120 months. Because one count carried a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence, the court sentenced him to 180 months. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act changed the threshold quantities of crack that trigger mandatory minimum sentences. Berberena and Gayle moved for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court applied a policy statement that generally prohibits a reduction below the low end of a prisoner’s new range, even if the prisoner originally received a below-Guidelines sentence. Berberena’s motion was denied. Gayle’s motion was granted in part. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority, violated separation-of-powers principles, and failed to comply with APA notice-and-comment requirements.

In 1986 Munchinski was convicted of two counts of first-degree homicide and two counts of second-degree homicide arising out of a pair of murders that occurred in 1977 in Bear Rocks, Pennsylvania. Munchinski later discovered that prosecutors had withheld from his counsel almost a dozen articles of exculpatory evidence. After unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction relief several times in state and federal court, Munchinski filed a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244 & 2254(d), arguing that the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady, when it declined to grant Munchinski post-conviction relief. The district court granted habeas relief. The court equitably tolled the statute of limitations for some untimely claims; excused certain procedural defaults, finding that applying the procedural default doctrine would effect a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied Brady. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the scope of the Brady violations was “staggering.” Munchinski demonstrated actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

Roye, a 58-year-old native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. in 1984 as the spouse of a citizen. In 1992, he pled guilty to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child by having sexual intercourse with his eight-month old daughter. The trial judge sentenced Roye to six to 20 years’ imprisonment but strongly recommended transfer into a psychiatric facility. Fourteen years later, DHS charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An Immigration Judge found that Roye granted for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ emphasized testimony indicating “that mentally ill detainees and prisoners are often sexually and physically assaulted in the Jamaican prison system because of the nature of their mental illness” and that Roye will be homeless in Jamaica due to a lack of family ties. The BIA ordered immediate removal. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA must review the conclusion that the evidence demonstrates that Roye’s persecutors will physically and sexually abuse him in a manner that rises to the level of torture under the CAT, and decide whether Jamaican public officials will consent to or acquiesce in such abuse.