Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005 Anderson was charged with federal tax evasion (26 U.S.C. 7201) for tax years 1995 through 1999, while Anderson was an entrepreneur and venture capitalist involved in operating several international companies, including G & A, which generated hundreds of millions of dollars of income. The government alleged that because G & A was a “controlled foreign corporation,” he was required to recognize a share of its income on his tax return; that he fraudulently failed to do so; and thatAnderson had fraudulently underpaid his taxes by $184 million, 99% of which stemmed from G & A. He pleaded guilty with respect to two years and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment. In 2007 Anderson filed a petition to redetermine his tax deficiencies, 26 U.S.C. 6213(a). The Tax Court granted partial summary judgment to the IRS. The Third Circuit affirmed. Anderson’s conviction for tax evasion in 1998 and 1999 precludes him, by virtue of collateral estoppel, from contesting in civil fraud proceedings that G & A income was taxable to him in those years. The IRS’s concession of all deficiency and penalty issues for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 has no preclusive effect on those issues for 1998 and 1999.

In 2002 Murray pleaded guilty, in New Jersey, to traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. Later that year, in a Pennsylvania district court, he pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 95 months’ imprisonment, followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release. Both sentencing judges imposed special conditions of release that, for example, required him to register as a sex offender and to submit to unannounced searches of his computer. After Murray was released from prison in 2010, he moved to the Western District of Pennsylvania, which assumed jurisdiction for the remainder of his term of supervised release. Though Murray had not violated his existing supervised release conditions, the probation office sought to modify them to bring them in line with the conditions of release that are typically used in that district. The court granted the request and imposed several new, more stringent conditions, including a prohibition on possession of sexually-oriented material and a requirement to submit to workplace searches. The Third Circuit remanded the new conditions for an explanation of why they are no greater than necessary to satisfy the section 3553(a) sentencing factors.

Martorano was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole after pleading guilty, in 1984, to 19 counts related to the wholesale distribution of drugs. He appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court imposed an illegal general sentence; and that his undifferentiated sentence for conspiring to distribute drugs (21 U.S.C. 846) and supervising a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (21 U.S.C. 848) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Third Circuit rejected the arguments and affirmed, noting that, since 1988, the sentence has been reviewed by various district court judges and Third Circuit panels.

Powell’s cousin, Lassiter, testified that he and Powell engaged in robberies of college students and drug dealers in North Philadelphia in 2008. They decided their crimes were attracting too much attention and determined instead to rob business owners by following them from their stores to their homes. They targeted immigrant business owners in the belief that “Chinese people” would keep business proceeds at home because they did not use banks. They cased Star Wigs, owned by Y.B., a female Korean immigrant. The store sold merchandise from multiple out-of-state suppliers. They followed Y.B. to her home, invaded the house, beat the occupants, took credit cards, a handgun, jewelry, handbags, heirlooms, cash that belonged to Y.B.’s husband, receipts and petty cash from the business, and personal electronics. During a subsequent, similar robbery, the victim’s daughter called police, who were able to follow and arrest defendants in possession of stolen items. Powell was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for both robberies and sentenced to 697 months’ imprisonment and restitution of $20,762.55. The Third Circuit affirmed. The critical jurisdictional question under the Hobbs Act is the robbery’s effect on interstate commerce; where the robbery occurs is but one factor.

Stoerr pled guilty to bid rigging, 15 U.S.C. 1; conspiracy to provide kickbacks and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). The convictions stemmed from kickback payments that Stoerr solicited and accepted from sub-contractors in connection with environmental remediation projects managed by Sevenson, his employer from 1980 to October 2003. In total, the district court determined that the scheme resulted in losses of $134,098.96 to the EPA and $257,129.22 to Tierra. After Sevenson learned of the kickbacks scheme, it paid Tierra approximately $241,000 to compensate for its losses. It then commenced a civil action against Stoerr in state court to recover its losses, and sought restitution in connection with Stoerr’s sentencing, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, for reimbursement of the amount that it paid to Tierra. The district court denied Sevenson‟s request for restitution, instead ordering that Stoerr pay restitution to Tierra. The Third Circuit dismissed; as a non-party, Sevenson lacks standing to appeal.

In 2005 a house that had operated as an unlicensed bar was robbed by three men with guns. The men took cell phones and cash from patrons and were apprehended in the area shortly after the robbery, carrying some of the stolen items, and were identified by witnesses. Three defendants, Shavers, White, and Lewis were convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, witness tampering, and using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. The Third Circuit vacated Shavers’s and White’s witness tampering convictions and Shavers’s eight-year term of supervised release. The court affirmed the other convictions and Lewis’s sentence. The court upheld jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act stating that property crimes like robbery and extortion are, unlike possession of a gun in a school zone or gender-motivated violence, indisputably economic, and, in the aggregate, have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.

Philadelphia police officers entered a private residence without a warrant because they believed the house to be abandoned. Upon searching the house, they found Harrison sitting in a recliner with a gun, scales, pills, and cocaine base on the table next to him. The police took Harrison into custody, seized the gun, and obtained a warrant to seize the rest of the items. Harrison was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base and moved to suppress the physical evidence. The district court denied the motion; although Harrison, a tenant, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, the police officers were operating under the mistaken but reasonable belief that the house was abandoned. The Third Circuit affirmed. A house can be abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes; the officers did not make a mistake of law. Their mistake of fact was reasonable, based on their observations over several months that the house appeared unfit for human habitation. There was trash strewn about, the lawn was overgrown with weeds, and windows on both levels were either boarded up or exposed. The front door was left open, and the lock may have been broken.

Mitchell was convicted on charges related to his possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Mitchell’s motion to strike Juror 97, a police department employee, because the law does not categorically impute bias to coworkers of key witnesses in a trial. Under the circumstances, Mitchell’s right to trial by an impartial jury was protected adequately by inquiry for actual bias, and that inquiry yielded no evidence of actual bias. The court remanded for additional fact-finding with respect to Juror 28, a “close cousin” of the prosecutor. The law presumes bias in jurors who are close relatives of the parties in a case and the court did not elicit sufficient information on the nature of the relationship between the prosecutor and Juror 28.

From 1996 to 2001, while working as a licensed realtor, Mendoza helped borrowers obtain federally insured mortgages. He was charged with conspiring to fraudulently induce the Federal Housing Authority to insure mortgage loans, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1001. Mendoza’s counsel, Cavanagh, explained that he could avoid prison by pleading guilty, but did not apprise Mendoza that, as an aggravated felony, his crime would lead to mandatory deportation to his home country, Ecuador, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Prior to sentencing Mendoza learned from his Presentence Investigation Report that his conviction might result in removal. The district court sentenced Mendoza to two years’ probation and ordered him to pay $100,000 in restitution. As a condition of his probation, Mendoza was required to cooperate with immigration officials. The government instituted removal proceedings. After completing his sentence, Mendoza moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, to vacate his sentence and withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Based on DNA evidence found on furniture, McBride was charged with the murder of his wife 16 years after her disappearance. He was convicted and exhausted Pennsylvania state court appeals. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting McBride’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to certain references to his silence, in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent. There was at least a reasonable argument that trial counsel’s actions were within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance.”