Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After guard mistakenly gave Taylor, an inmate convicted of drug and weapons charges, an extra razor blade, Taylor created a shank. Subsequently, in an exercise yard with Bistrain, Taylor construed Bistrain’s comment as a threat. After Bistrian was handcuffed, Taylor, not yet handcuffed, slashed his face, arms, and legs with the shank. Guards used pepper spray but did not subdue Taylor until they tossed a flash grenade into the yard. Taylor told guards that he had to get Bistrian before Bistrian got him. Taylor was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3) and sentenced to an additional 120 months. Taylor attempted to show justification and claimed that the prosecution was racially motivated because he was charged for this assault, on a white victim, but had not been charged for an earlier assault on black inmates. The Third Circuit affirmed. By including “without just cause or excuse” in the statute Congress did not intend to convert justification, a common-law defense, into an element for which the government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Just cause is an affirmative defense to a section 113(a)(3) violation; defendant bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.

Borrome, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, and, since 1996 a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. pled guilty in 2002 to violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399d, prohibitions on unlicensed wholesale distribution of prescription “drugs” in interstate commerce. He was sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment followed by four months’ home confinement. In 2010 he was served with a notice of removal and the IJ reasoned that because Borrome’s offense involved unauthorized distribution of a Schedule II controlled substance (Oxycontin ), it is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) pursuant to the “hypothetical federal felony test,” so that Borrome was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of violating any law “relating to a controlled substance.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Borrome has been removed from the United States. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that violation of the FDCA wholesale distribution provisions does not constitute an aggravated felony and that those laws are not laws relating to a controlled substance.

A jury found Claxton guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, but the district court entered a judgment of acquittal on the ground that there was not enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Claxton knowingly participated in the conspiracy. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for sentencing. The court noted evidence that Claxton repeatedly did that organization’s bidding, that he was entrusted to help transport large sums of money, that he visited the place where that money was laundered, and that he frequented the place where the organization’s drugs were stored and its business discussed. The totality of those circumstances was more than enough to allow the jury to rationally decide beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty.

Booker participated in a bank robbery with co-conspirators. After being arrested on unrelated charges, he provided incriminating statements to the police. Booker moved to suppress these statements as violations of his Miranda rights. The district court denied his motion. Before trial, Booker requested that he be allowed to proceed pro se. The court conducted a hearing and warned him of the consequences of self-representation. While articulating the potential sentences facing him, the district court erred and misstated one of the relevant mandatory minimums (stating it was five years and not 25 years). Booker was convicted of all charges. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. In light of the court’s error, Booker’s waiver of counsel was not voluntary and knowing.

Figueroa admits that he sold heroin to an undercover officer, who returned later and purchased cocaine and heroin. During the second purchase, the officer saw what appeared to be a gun tucked into Figueroa’s waistband. It was dark and he only saw a few inches of the object. Officers then stopped the car driven, and owned, by Figueroa’s girlfriend. Figueroa was in the front passenger seat. Officers removed both from the car, opened the glove compartment, and recovered a handgun. Both occupants denied knowledge of the firearm. No forensic evidence connected either to the firearm. The jury convicted on the drug counts, but was split on the charge of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). After releasing the jury, the judge changed courses, asked that the jury be held, and had them deliberate a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The jury convicted and Figueroa was sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for possession by a felon. The Third Circuit affirmed. Reconvening after declaring a mistrial on Count III did not violate Double Jeopardy or subject the jury to outside influences.

In 1993 Vasquez was sentenced to 262 months for heroin offenses. In 1996, he was sentenced to 14 months, to run consecutively, for possession of a prohibited object. His projected release date is October, 2012. The Second Chance Act, which applies, increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and requires the Bureau of Prisons to make individual determinations that ensure that placement is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of success and to provide incentives for participation in skills development programs. Vasquez’s team recommended a 151-180 day placement in a Residential Re-entry Center. Vasquez had not regularly participated in educational programs during his incarceration. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the BOP failed to comply with the reentry initiative and improperly added a factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been considered for incentives that were never properly implemented. The district court rejected the petition. Vasquez was not merely challenging construction of the Second Chance Act or implementation of the reentry initiative; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. There was no abuse of discretion in how the factors were balanced with goals of the Act.

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress.

In 2002, Thompson was indicted on two counts, and pled guilty to one, of distributing fewer than five grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)). Because he had two prior felony convictions, he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Had Thompson not been classified as a career offender, his Guidelines range would have been 46 to 57 months, but he was sentenced to 151 months, the bottom of the range for career offenders. After the United States Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses, Thompson moved to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). He conceded that Third Circuit precedent (United States v. Mateo, 2009) foreclosed his argument, and the district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that Mateo remains valid in light of Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).

Defendant communicated with a detective who was posing as a 15-year-old girl on a social networking website. In response to defendant's question, the detective stated that she was 15 years old. Defendant raised sexual topics during communications online and by cellular telephone, masturbated in front of "Ashley" on his webcam, and discussed arrangements to meet in person, including whether he should buy condoms. He was arrested at the place arranged for the meeting. Convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), he was sentenced to 121 months' imprisonment and 25 years of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenged to the sufficiency of the evidence that defendant believed he was communicating with a minor and an argument that the government's remark that defense counsel would "certainly present evidence" violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The district court properly calculated the sentencing range, based on masturbation constituting "sexual contact" for the purpose of the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(b)(4)(A).

In 2008, defendants, then 18 and 16 years old, accompanied by a group of other young Shenandoah residents began partying and drinking, then encountered Ramirez and became engaged in an argument with him that involved racial slurs. The incident escalated to the savage beating of Ramirez, who died two days later as a result of injuries he sustained. They were acquitted of all but minor state charges and each served six months. Following public outcry, they were convicted of criminal violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3631, which penalizes actions taken against an individual on account of his race, color or national origin, and with the specific intent to intimidate the victim or others like him from exercising their right to housing free of discrimination. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to a jury instruction that the government was not required to prove that issues of race and occupancy were the only motivations in beating Ramirez. The court also rejected claims that double jeopardy barred the federal trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction under 3631.