Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After police conducted a controlled buy, through a confidential informant, defendant was convicted of cocaine distribution and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the district court violated defendant's constitutional rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 by questioning prospective jurors on the record, at sidebar outside his presence. The court properly denied his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant and properly imposed an upward variance.

Singh, born in Jamaica, has been a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. since 1975, married a U.S. citizen and raised three children. In operating a construction firm that bid on public works projects as a Minority Business Enterprise, Singh accepted kickbacks for falsely certifying that his business was serving as a subcontractor on government projects when, in fact, another did the work. When the company filed for bankruptcy in 2005, the scheme came to light. Singh was charged with failing to disclose all of the company’s accounts receivable on the bankruptcy petition, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). Singh pled guilty and agreed to restitution in the amount of $54,418.08. He was sentenced to 10 months. DHS initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Immigration Judge entered an order of removal, which the BIA affirmed, finding that conviction under 152(3) categorically involves fraud and that the restitution order established that the offense caused loss to the trustee exceeding $10,000. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the statute requires actual, not merely intended, loss. The court rejected an argument that 152(3) is a perjury offense that must meet the requirements for perjury-based aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(43)(S).

Two U.S. Army Reserve officers, deployed to Iraq in 2003 to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority, were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.371, for participating in a bid-rigging scheme that involved directing millions of dollars in contracts to companies owned by an American businessman. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish participation in the conspiracy; to denial of a motion to suppress; and to denial of immunity for a co-conspirator.

Defendants were convicted of a series of carjackings, an attempted robbery, and the murder of a security guard. One was sentenced to life imprisonment and consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive prison term of 15 years on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to the federal sentences. Three others were sentenced to life imprisonment on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive 15-year prison term on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to federal sentences. Each was fined $50,000. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, faulty jury instructions, insufficiency of the evidence, and double jeopardy. After examining 18 U.S.C. 924 (c) and (j) the court stated that Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative punishment when a killing occurs in connection with a predicate offense, including crimes of violence and drug trafficking. A "Title III" recorded conversation (18 U.S.C. 2510) admitted at trial was not testimonial, and not subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.

In 1977 defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. He was released in 1992, and, still on parole, was accused of inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter. He was convicted; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections recommended that his sentence include participation in a sex offender treatment program. He has been repeatedly denied parole based on refusal to participate. He claims that the program requirement that he admit committing the sex crime for which he was convicted would amount to self-incrimination and would have compromised his then-pending appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to address whether petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Even assuming that refusal to participate was the sole reason for denying parole, the actions of the Board did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of the program is not simply to gather information and an inmate has no right to parole. Penalties that merely alter the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amend

Defendant pled guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, and was sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. She began supervised release in 2007, but violated conditions. After first modifying the conditions, the district court revoked supervised release. She served about three months, was again released, and again violated conditions. The court modified the conditions to include four months of home detention with electronic monitoring. Violations continued; the court again revoked supervised release and sentenced her to 19 months' imprisonment and supervised release, with six months to be served in a halfway house, and six to be served under home detention. She violated again conditions. The district court concluded that the maximum term was not reduced by the aggregate length of previously-served revocation imprisonment and imposed what it viewed as the statutory maximum: 24 months' imprisonment, without supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term under 18 U.S.C. 3583. Defendant argued that home detention counts as imprisonment, because 3583(e)(4) states that home detention "may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration."

Defendant pleaded guilty to two crimes involving sexual exploitation of minors. After the plea agreement was signed, the probation office recommended a five-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.5(b), which applies to defendants who "engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct." The agreement referred to other USSG provisions, but not to criminal history enhancements. Defendant conceded the applicability of the enhancement in the district court, which imposed a sentence of 216 months. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentence, rejecting an argument that the government breached the plea agreement by requesting the enhancement and a request for resentencing to a range of 108 to 135 months' imprisonment.

Serving a life sentence for murder, petitioner exhausted state appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. The petition was not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Allegedly "new," exculpatory evidence of witness tampering and the identity of the "actual shooter" was known to petitioner in 1994. Petitioner did not establish his diligence or extraordinarily burdensome circumstances and the evidence did not establish actual innocence.

Defendant accepted $1,000 and Mets tickets for helping a consulting company obtain a contract with the county for temporary employment of individuals for clean-up after a 2006 flood. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The presentence report recommended a sentence of 15 to 21 months' imprisonment. USSG 2C1.2(a)(1) set the base offense level at 11; the report added two levels under 2C1.2(b)(1) because the offense involved more than one gratuity and four levels under 2C1.2(b)(3) because the offense involved a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position. It subtracted three levels for acceptance of responsibility (3E1.1). The district court imposed a sentence of 15 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Defendant could not hire or fire; could not bind the county; could not act officially on the county's behalf; had administrative, not policymaking, duties; and reported to superiors, who reported to County Commissioners. The high-level government official enhancement was not applied to his superior, also implicated in the bribery scheme. Defendant was, however, responsible for the human resource department.

Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder after a third trial concerning a 1996 shooting death. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act, then sought federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted prior testimony from an unavailable government witness, even though petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness with newly-discovered impeachment evidence. Petitioner had a full opportunity for cross-examination at his second trial. The court also rejected claims based on the judge questioning a juror in camera, without petitioner present.