Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1346, mail fraud ("traditional" fraud), 18 U.S.C.1341, and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, based on a defendant (city councilman) taking official actions in exchange for gifts. Their appeal claimed that the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Skilling v. U.S., affected the law of honest services fraud. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. While the evidence was sufficient to convict on each count, the Skilling decision made jury instructions on honest services fraud incorrect. The jury should have been instructed on a bribery theory but not on a conflict-of-interest theory. The error was not necessarily harmless; the law of honest services fraud depends on intent and finding intent requires a jury to make reasonable inferences. Evidence of honest services fraud overlapped substantially evidence submitted on traditional fraud

Defendants came to the FBI's attention because of a video taken to a store for copying; it depicted defendants shooting weapons and shouting jihad slogans. At trial, the government presented evidence of a plot to attack military bases: recorded conversations; testimony by confidential informants and agents who coordinated the 16-month investigation; videos of training in the Poconos; propaganda videos advocating violent jihad, including attacks against service members; and video of defendants purchasing automatic weapons. Defendants were convicted of conspiring to murder U.S. military personnel, 18 U.S.C. 1114 and 1117 and of firearm offenses. The Third Circuit affirmed most of the convictions, rejecting evidentiary and other challenges to the conduct of the trial. The court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. 1801) as amended by the Patriot Act, under which evidence was procured. The "significant purpose" standard of the Act reflects a balance between legitimate needs of government for intelligence information and protected rights of citizens. The court properly admitted certain out-of-court statements against a defendant under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The court vacated one conviction of attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)).

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony.

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846). The district court sentenced him to 70 months of imprisonment, classifying a crime he committed at the age of 16 as a prior felony conviction under the sentencing guidelines (4B1.2). Under New York law, an individual between the ages of 16 and 19 may be deemed an "eligible youth" if he is charged with a criminal offense and fulfills other specified conditions. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 720.10(1)-(2). If classified as an eligible youth, the court will vacate and replace the conviction with a youthful offender finding. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the conviction was an adult conviction, regardless of a subsequent "youthful offender" adjudication.

From 1996 until 2003, petitioner, a Columbian, laundered money for Colombian drug traffickers. He was arrested and agreed to cooperate with the FBI. Conviction and sentencing were deferred. He worked with the FBI from 2003 to 2007. In 2007, petitioner was arrested in Colombia for failure to pay a fine years earlier. He paid the fine, but remained in jail for 22 days. He claims that his arrest was to facilitate his murder by the paramilitary group targeted by his FBI work. When he returned to the U.S. he was arrested because FBI agents believed he was involved in money laundering outside of his cooperation. Petitioner pled guilty based on the 1999 transfers. DHS charged him as removable. An IJ and the BIA denied his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The Third Circuit remanded. The BIA must consider that an applicant can establish governmental acquiescence even if the government opposes the paramilitary organization that is engaged in torturous acts. The BIA must also consider that country conditions can, by themselves, constitute grounds for determining that an applicant would more likely than not be subjected to torture upon return to the country of removal.

Defendant, a licensed financial adviser, pled guilty to 34 counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344) based on his solicitation of bank clients to invest in speculative real estate transactions that he controlled, unrelated to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry known as "selling away." The Government accused him of collecting $1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006. The district court denied his motion to withdraw the plea when he claimed that his prior attorney, unprepared to go to trial, had browbeaten him. The court imposed a sentence of 180 months and $1.3 million in restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. With no evidence of actual innocence and the death of some of the government's elderly witnesses, there was no "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of the plea. Because defendant was an investment advisor when he initiated the fraud, the court properly applied a four-level enhancement at section 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified by defendant's lies concerning his guilty plea and his contact with witnesses.

Defendant, an apartment building owner convicted of bribery of building officials, (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2)), was sentenced to 34 months of imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed and remanded for resentencing. The district court provided thorough instructions as to the elements of bribery, defining "knowingly," "corruptly," and "willfully," and was within its discretion in denying a separate instruction on intent. The court correctly excluded testimony of a defense witness and limited defense cross-examination of certain witnesses. The court was within its discretion in holding that defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of prior knowledge of a change of testimony. In sentencing, the court did not follow the correct order of steps set forth in "Gunter," did not compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its Guidelines range nor did it meaningfully consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct (18 U.S.C. 3553 (a)(6).

Defendant was the fiancee of the leader of a Philadelphia drug distribution ring responsible for selling a large amount of cocaine and cocaine base (crack) from 1998 to 2005. In 2005, the couple used drug money to purchase a new home, which was titled in defendant's name. When her fiancee was charged with drug trafficking and firearms offenses, defendant was charged with money laundering in purchasing the house, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She appealed her conviction. The Third Circuit vacated. The evidence was not sufficient to establish knowledge of a design to conceal on defendant's part. Defendant lied about her income and had the property titled in her name, not to hide her fiancee's involvement (which was obvious), but to get around his bad credit and purchase the house.

Brothers were convicted of distributing crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)), conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of the distribution of crack cocaine, Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and possessing of a firearm in furtherance of a Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 824(c)). One was also convicted on two counts arising from his escape (18 U.S.C. 751(a)). Each was sentenced to 47-1/2 years in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court should have granted one defendant's motion to sever because of the two additional escape and drug charges against his brother; that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions for use of a firearm in furtherance of drug distribution in the weeks before May 31,2007; that the court erred by permitting the government's drug trafficking expert, o testify; that there was insufficient evidence of an effect upon interstate commerce to support convictions under the Hobbs Act; that the court should have granted their motion for a new trial in light of the fact that the prosecution withheld impeaching Brady material concerning a confidential informant.

Delaware's death penalty statute calls for lethal injection but does not mandate use of a particular drug, Del. Code tit. 11 sec. 4209(f). Death row inmates challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a 2011 change in the protocol, brought about by nationwide shortage of sodium thiopental. The district court declined to reopen a challenge to a previous protocol and to stay a pending execution. The Third Circuit affirmed. The purpose of the protocol is to render the inmate unconscious before execution and there was no affirmative evidence that pentobarbital, used under the 2011 protocol, fails to do so. The court was not required to consider the comparative risks of known and available alternatives.The district court acted within its discretion in finding that the use of pentobarbital did not create a demonstrated risk of severe pain.