Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, arrested for violating a township public intoxication ordinance, argued that the law was superseded by or contrary to the New Jersey Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation Act. The judge dismissed the charge. Plaintiff's federal suit, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law, was dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not provide a remedy because the ordinance under which plaintiff was arrested is not unambiguously invalid.

Following an altercation concerning auto repairs, plaintiff, an African American, found damage to his car and was threatened by a garage employee; he called 911. Garage employees also called 911. When officers responded, plaintiff and defendant, a white officer, had a verbal altercation about whether defendant was responding as he would respond to a white victim. Defendant handcuffed plaintiff, placed him in the patrol car, and spoke to the garage employees without questioning plaintiff. He arrested plaintiff and one of the garage employees. Plaintiff was acquitted. The garage employee apparently entered a plea of no contest. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, a jury awarded plaintiff $80,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. The district court overturned the verdict and entered judgment for defendant. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show unlawful seizure, equal protection violations, and that the defendant lacked probable cause for the vehicle search that followed towing of plaintiff's car.

In 1985, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, terroristic threats, and kidnapping, and sentenced to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. While a state post-conviction petition was pending, a video was released, showing the prosecutor instructing colleagues to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief. Defendant's second state petition was rejected as untimely. After an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court granted habeas corpus. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. Although timely objection is a prerequisite to a "Batson" claim, even for cases decided before Batson, the defense did raise a timely objection. The response that it was impossible to determine the race of jurors and that counsel did not have to give reasons for peremptory challenges was refusal to conduct equal protection analysis, not a finding of fact entitled to deference. The state Post Conviction Relief Act time bar was not regularly followed or firmly established at the time of defendantâs procedural default in 1996; the district court properly allowed an evidentiary hearing despite that default. The defendant established a prima facie Batson violation that the state did not rebut, but the court held that remand for analysis of other evidence relevant to intentional discrimination is preferable to overturning a 25-year-old jury verdict which the state has upheld against numerous challenges and which was predicated on substantial evidence, merely because it would be possible to infer discrimination in jury selection.

The Bureau of Prisons denied the inmate's request to choose his own cellmate. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, finding the claim without merit.

Defendants were charged with possessing and passing altered currency (18 U.S.C. 472), possessing false or fictitious items (18 U.S.C. 514(a)), and conspiring to do the same (18 U.S.C. § 371). One pled guilty, the other was acquitted of the 514 charges and convicted on the others. The district court imposed a sentence of 20 months incarceration, consistent with a presentence report calculation using a base offense level of 9 and adding an 8-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2B5.1(b)(1) based on a the value of the counterfeit items being between$70,000 and $120,000, the loss the defendant intended to cause. The defense argued that the guideline calls for use of the "face value of the counterfeit items," in this case, $400, the bills used by the defendants for demonstration. The Third Circuit vacated. The guideline does not reflect the nature of the offense in this case and a step-two or step-three upward departure would have been appropriate to reflect the seriousness of the offense, but the guideline does not authorize a departure based on the intended loss.

Arrested in 1986 for sex crimes against children and terrorist threats and incarcerated since then, the defendant was granted a new trial by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1992. He was sentenced to 10 to 20 years imprisonment by Northampton County, with credit for time served, and 10 to 20 years by Lehigh County, to be served concurrently. The Lehigh court stated that he would be given "credit ⦠as required by law for all time spent in custody." The Lehigh commitment form effectively granted credit by designating the date of the sentence as 1986. The designation violated state law because credit had already been applied in Northampton County. Recognizing that the defendant was not entitled to double credit, in 2005 the Department of Corrections changed the release date from 2006 to 2011. State courts rejected the defendant's challenges. The federal district court granted a petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. Rejecting due process claims, the court stated that the state made record-keeping mistake and then corrected it, which is not "conscience-shocking." The defendant's expectation of being released on a particular date did not amount to a constitutionally-protected liberty interest.

The defendant committed an armed robbery and another shooting within two weeks in 1993 and was ultimately sentenced by one county to 50 years imprisonment, with parole eligibility after 16 years and 8 months, to run consecutively with a 10-year sentence imposed in another county. The New Jersey state appeals court held that the defense attorney's failure to move for consolidation fell below what was expected of "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment, but was not prejudicial. The federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Third Circuit affirmed, applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The state court reasonably concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by ineffective counsel, because he had declined a plea offer that was as good as any he could reasonably have received if the cases had been consolidated. The state court decision was not contrary to and did not involve unreasonable application of federal law.

The defendant, a dual-citizen of the U.S. and Iran and a chemical engineer, marketed a dynamic software program to Iranian actors and agreed to provide Iranian entities with technology for construction of chemical plants, with a goal of converting Iran into a chemical powerhouse. His efforts included contacting President Ahmadinejad to unveil his plan to help Iran, with respect to the United States' "cruel and tyrannical" treatment of the Iranian people. He was convicted on 10 chargesâfour counts stemming from violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), three counts of making false statements, and three counts of bank fraud and sentenced to a four years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the IEEPA and Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations. The law meaningfully constrains the President's discretion and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's operation does not fall within the informational-materials exemption of the Act. The regulations are not unconstitutionally vague.

The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. 841(a)) and two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. 924(c)) and sentenced to 480 months. The Third Circuit vacated one of the firearm convictions as not supported by a separate predicate offense. On remand, instead of subtracting the 120-month sentence associated with that conviction, the district court engaged in de novo sentencing and imposed a sentence of 400 months. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The original sentences were interdependent and the appeals court did not instruct otherwise, so de novo resentencing was appropriate, but no new pre-sentencing report was prepared and the record is ambiguous. The court directed the district court to consider evidence of post-incarceration rehabilitation.

The defendant appealed his sentence for receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A): 60 months imprisonment followed by 20 years of supervised release. The defendant had more than 700 images on his computer, some of prepubescent girls, and was also convicted of assaulting his step-daughter. After holding that the defendant had not waived his appeal by untimely filing, the Third Circuit affirmed the duration of the 20-year supervised release term, noting the relatively short term of imprisonment, and a prohibition on association with minors other than family. The court vacated and remanded a 20-year prohibition on internet use, except with pre-approval of a probation officer, reasoning that such a prohibition affects many areas of modern life and that the objectives may be accomplished by monitoring and filtering.