Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Napolitan was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 78 months, which the court ordered to run consecutively with a sentence Napolitan was already serving on a separate state offense. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting a claim that two government witnesses testified falsely at trial, but vacated the sentence. On remand, the district court must make a finding as to whether the government met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant perjured himself. If the record also provides support for findings that a false statement was material and willful, the U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1) and 3C1.1 enhancement must be applied. View "United States v. Napolitan" on Justia Law

Pittsburgh detectives Emery, Smith, and Adametz were on patrol in an unmarked cruiser when they spotted Caldwell and Tigney walking side-by-side. When the car turned left, Emery observed Caldwell remove a firearm from his waistband and hold it behind Tigney’s back. Emery stopped the cruiser, jumped out, ran to the rear of the car, drew his weapon, and yelled: “Police. Drop the gun.” Caldwell released the firearm, letting it fall to the ground between Tigney’s legs. The other detectives placed the two in handcuffs. Caldwell insisted that he was not the one who had been holding the gun. Smith testified that he saw Caldwell “brandish” the weapon and later drop it behind Tigney’s back. Adametz testified that his view of Caldwell was obstructed, but that both of Tigney’s hands were visible and empty when the gun fell. Caldwell was a convicted felon, not permitted to possess a firearm. The detectives transported him for processing. Tigney falsely identified himself and was released. Tigney later told officers that the gun had fallen from his pants and that Caldwell did not know about the gun, but subsequently asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Caldwell appealed, claiming that the court erroneously admitted evidence that he had prior convictions for unlawful firearm possession and improperly excluded a Tigney’s out-of-court statement. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that admission of Caldwell’s prior convictions was improper. View "United States v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Smith pulled his car off the road in Emporium, Pennsylvania, pretending that it was disabled. He flagged down a bank manager, Whiting, who agreed to drive Smith to a repair shop. Smith had been waiting for Whiting. He wanted revenge because the bank had initiated foreclosure proceedings on his house. Smith drew a gun, stolen from his brother-in-law, and directed Whiting to drive to the bank, saying that she and another bank employee were “going to pay.” Smith directed Whiting to the bank’s parking lot, but Whiting continued past the lot because she feared he would kill her there. Slowing down, she unfastened her seat belt and rolled out of the car without serious injury. Smith abandoned the car and, fleeing on foot, hid the gun beside a creek. He was arrested a month later. He was convicted of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119; brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j) and sentenced to 171 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court wrongly concluded his crimes qualify for the enhancement for abduction and that Whiting’s car was not “taken, damaged, or destroyed,” for purposes of the loss enhancement under the Guidelines. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

At the sentencing hearing following his conviction for his sixth illegal reentry after deportation, Mejia made a mitigation argument, based on his cooperation with the government in providing information about a homicide and prostitution ring. Sentenced to 78 months, he did not object to the court’s failure to rule on the request for variance or point out the court’s failure to explicitly address or give further consideration to that argument. He later appealed, arguing that the court committed procedural error by failing to give meaningful consideration to that argument. The Third Circuit, en banc, announced a “new rule.” Unless a relevant objection has been made earlier, a party must object to a procedural error after the sentence is pronounced in order to preserve the error and avoid plain error review. View "United States v. Flores-Mejia" on Justia Law

Cruz was arrested for assaulting, resisting, or impeding Social Security Administration employees and two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal on Count I, and a jury returned guilty verdicts on Count II and Count III. After the court received the pre-sentence investigation report, the prosecution successfully moved for a determination of competency. A Federal Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist concluded that Cruz was mentally incompetent and suffered from schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type. After a hearing, the court concluded that Cruz was incompetent and found that he could not proceed with sentencing. A second report concurred with the diagnosis, noted Cruz’s ongoing refusal to take anti-psychotic medication recommended by BOP personnel, concluded that without medication Cruz would remain incompetent, and stated that “there is a substantial probability that [his] competency can be restored with a period of” forced medication. The prosecution obtained an order authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz against his will. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the Supreme Court decision, United States v. Sell (2003), and reasoning that the government can have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to proceed with sentencing. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

In 1993, Branch entered a Newark building, inhabited by drug dealers and addicts, just before Mosley was fatally shot. When the police arrested Branch the next day, he had the gun that shot Mosley. Branch testified that he went to the building to retrieve $50 that he had paid for fake cocaine. He encountered a lookout, and, though he claims to have been unarmed, insisted on going inside. Inside, Branch saw several people and asked who had supplied the fake cocaine. Lee produced a gun and told Branch to get out. Branch claims that in the ensuing scramble, Lee’s gun discharged, that Lee dropped her gun, and that he grabbed it and ran out. Branch called two witnesses who confirmed his account. The state called several witnesses who indicated that Branch went to the building to rob its occupants and killed Mosley. All of the witnesses had long criminal records. The arresting officer testified that Branch ran, fought him, and tried to pull a weapon. Despite apparent reservations, the jury convicted Branch. After state appellate proceedings and two remands, the trial court sentenced Branch to life for aggravated manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed. After unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Branch unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that it could not find any justification for trial counsel’s failure to call two potential witnesses; if they had testified consistently with their pretrial written statements, there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would not have favored the prosecution. The state courts’ conclusions were unreasonable applications of federal law, so the district court was required to hold a hearing to ascertain reasons for not calling the potential witnesses. View "Branch v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thornhill pled guilty to bank fraud and was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2007-2008, she was the subject of three petitions alleging violations of terms of supervised release and was again arrested for bank fraud. The district court considered her history of psychiatric issues, of sexual abuse by a family member and resultant placement into foster care, and of domestic violence in her marriage. With a guideline range for bank fraud of eight to 14 months, the court sentenced her to one day of imprisonment and five years of supervised release with nine months of monitored home detention. The sentence for the release violations was concurrent. Within seven months Thornhill admitted to allegations in two more petitions: tampering with her electronic monitoring transmitter and testing positive several times for marijuana. The judge imposed a within-guideline term of nine months and 24 months of supervised release. In 2009 she pled guilty to another bank fraud and was sentenced to 24 months, with four years of supervised release. Thornhill admitted to the allegations of a sixth petition, in 2013, but the probation officer acknowledged that she had witnessed her brother’s murder and had to cope with the murder of her son and another son’s serious injuries. The judge acknowledged her tragic circumstances, but referred to her need for a controlled environment, and imposed a total term of 36 months in prison with no supervised release. Thornhill argued that the judge erred by failing to articulate reasons for rejecting the guideline range, by failing to indicate how, he considered the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and by failing to respond to mitigation arguments. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the judge’s familiarity with Thornhill’s repeated violations of supervised release and “measured treatment of her violations.” View "United State v. Thornhill" on Justia Law

Powell, a former Pennsylvania state inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law when it revoked its decision to release him to a community correctional center. The DOC conceded that the revocation was based on an improper calculation of Powell’s sentence. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Pennsylvania inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of release to a community correctional center. View "Powell v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Travillion was indicted in 2004 on charges under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), related to drug trade in the Pittsburgh area. He argued that he was not a member of either conspiracy in two counts and that the drug at issue in one possession charge was heroin, not crack. Travillion was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Travillion then filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence by adjusting the advisory Guidelines down two levels. He alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to effectively investigate and cross-examine government witnesses; failing to effectively investigate facts made known to him by Travillion constituting the only realistic defense; failing to adequately advise Travillion of the risk in his testifying on his own behalf; and failing to adequately object to the conviction on two separate counts that comprised the same conspiracy, exposing Travillion to double jeopardy. The district court denied relief, noting that while counsel’s performance may have been deficient on certain issues, Travillion was not prejudiced, as the evidence presented against him was “overwhelming.” The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Travillion" on Justia Law

Mayorga, a native of El Salvador, entered the U.S. as a teenager in 1988 because of the then on-going civil war in El Salvador. He applied for asylum in 1995, and has had work authorization since then. He married a U.S. citizen and has five children under the age of 15, all U.S. citizens. In 2010, Mayorga pled guilty to engaging in the unlicensed business of firearms dealing, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), and was sentenced to 46 months in prison. When he was released, the Department of Homeland Security served Mayorga with notice of removal proceedings, alleging two grounds: under 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled, and having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). At his hearing Mayorga contested his removability for having been convicted of a CIMT and applied for cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ denied each application, reasoning that if Mayorga’s crime was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, he would likely be ineligible for cancellation of removal under the “person of good moral character” requirement, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(B). The BIA upheld the decision. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Mayorga would suffer a serious adverse consequence if his crime were found to be a categorical CIMT, and that his challenge was therefore justiciable. Mayorga’s crime was not categorically a CIMT.View "Mayorga v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law