Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Reyes was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery of a grocery store, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)1; using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)t. He appealed only his Hobbs Act conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Reyes filed a pro se habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court appointed counsel and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Before the court ruled, Reyes sought to amend his petition, to add claims under the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. In Alleyne, the Court clarified that, under the Sixth Amendment, “‘any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime” and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. The district Court denied Reyes’ petition and his request to amend. While appeal was pending, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Winkelman, finding that the new rule of criminal procedure announced by the Supreme Court in Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Waterman was a Pennsville, New Jersey police officer from 2006 until his resignation in 2011. In 2008, Waterman disclosed to a supervisor that he had downloaded videos containing child pornography to his home computer. FBI agents were informed, opened an investigation, and interviewed Waterman in 2010. Waterman stated that the computer he used to view child pornography crashed and that he threw out the hard drive in 2008. In 2010, Waterman’s superior asked him to remain in the office to talk to the chief of police. Waterman went to his patrol car and his superior found him there, breaking apart a circuit board. After searching the vehicle, officers recovered a pried-open damaged hard drive, a screwdriver, and a hammer. Asked whether this hard drive contained child pornography, Waterman responded that there was a chance that it did because he had two hard drives, one of which he threw out. The hard drive was beyond repair. Waterman pled guilty to destruction, alteration or falsification of records in a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C. 1519. The district court found sufficient evidence that Waterman destroyed the hard drive after he learned of the FBI investigation. The court applied a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2J1.2(b)(2) for substantial interference with the administration of justice, resulting in a sentencing range of 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment. Without the enhancement, Waterman’s Guidelines range would have been 12 to 18 months. The court noted Waterman’s military service, work ethic, and dedication to his children and imposed a sentence of 15 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Waterman" on Justia Law

Erdely was investigating online distribution of child pornography when he discovered a computer on a peer-to-peer network sharing 77 files that he suspected contained child pornography. With information available to anyone, he found the Internet protocol address (IP address) through which it connected to the internet. Searching publicly available records, Erdely determined that the IP Address was registered to a Comcast subscriber and obtained a court order. Comcast gave Erdely the Neighbor’s name and Pittsburgh address. Erdely executed a warrant. None of the Neighbor’s computers contained child pornography or the file-sharing software; his wireless router was not password-protected. Erdely deduced that the computer sharing child pornography was connecting without the Neighbor’s knowledge. With the Neighbor’s permission, Erdely connected a computer to the router for remote access. Later, while working in Harrisburg, Erdely learned that the computer was again sharing child pornography on the Neighbor’s IP address. Erdely determined the mooching computer’s IP address and MAC address, which belonged to an Apple wireless card. Erdely had not discovered any Apple wireless devices in the Neighbor’s home, so he decided to use a “MoocherHunter” mobile tracking software tool, which can be used by anyone with a directional antenna. Not knowing which residence the signal was coming from, Erdely proceeded without a warrant. From the sidewalk the MoocherHunter’s readings were strongest when aimed at Stanley’s apartment. Erdely obtained a warrant for Stanley’s home. When officers arrived, Stanley fled, but returned and confessed that he had connected to the Neighbor’s router to download child pornography. Erdely seized Stanley’s Apple laptop and recovered 144 images and video files depicting child pornography. Stanley was charged with possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed. Use of the MoocherHunter was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Sara sued the City of Newark and Police Officer Borrero, alleging that Borrero, who had an extensive disciplinary history and who was off-duty at the time, stopped Sara for alleged unsafe driving. Borrero then entered her car and attacked Sara, threatened a bystander who tried to intervene, charged Sara with attacking an officer, and held her without counsel for 12 hours. A jury found that Borrero and the city were liable and awarded $2,700,000 in compensatory damages. The district court remitted Sara’s award to $750,000 and informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the quantum of her compensatory damages. A second jury was convened and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Instead of addressing the city’s new motion for remittitur, the court entered a final order, vacating the second jury’s verdict and the earlier order of remittitur, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court should resolve the city’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict, but stating that it saw little merit to any of the arguments on appeal. View "Lesende v. Borrero" on Justia Law

Responding to a dispatch, Pennsylvania State Trooper Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the Carman home to search for a man who had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey plates. Arriving at the Carman residence, the troopers bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. In a suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, the Carmans challenged Carroll’s warrantless entry onto their’ property. Carroll argued that he did not violate the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” encounter. The district court denied the Carmans’ judgment as a matter of law on their unlawful entry claims; a jury found that Carroll acted reasonably. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the back of the property and did not begin his visit at the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement dd not apply. The court affirmed the jury verdict regarding the unlawful seizure claim; there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably. View "Carman v. Carroll" on Justia Law

In 2011 Cadapan, a citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent U.S. resident, was convicted of indecent assault with a person less than 13 years of age, indecent assault without consent, corruption of minors, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than three months nor more than 23 months and supervised probation for 36 months, In 2012, Cadapan was granted parole and was transferred to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security, which charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who, after admission, was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) and with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien convicted of a crime of child abuse. He argued that the Pennsylvania statute for indecent assault encompassed conduct that could not be considered sexual abuse of a minor under the federal statute. The Immigration Judge rejected this argument. The BIA dismissed Cadapan’s appeal. The Third Circuit dismissed and also rejected an argument that the statute did not apply because Cadapan had not been admitted to the U.S. as not having been raised below. View "Cadapan v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Harris consumed large amounts of drugs and alcohol to celebrate his birthday, then joined friends at a Pittsburgh bar. Harris brandished a gun as he walked around the bar, swaying from side to side. His actions were recorded by the bar’s video cameras. Patrons called 911 and identified Harris. When Officer Perry arrived, Harris was standing outside of the bar with the gun in his hand. With the help of other officers, Perry arrested Harris and seized the gun. Perry testified that Harris uttered nonsensical things as they arrested him. Harris was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). At a hearing to determine whether Harris could plead nolo contendere, Harris testified that, on the night in question, he was so intoxicated that he did not remember anything after arriving at the bar. Perry testified that Harris was too intoxicated to be interviewed. The district court watched the video; Harris admitted he was the man in the video. The government suggested that the court accept the nolo contendere plea. The court agreed and subsequently sentenced Harris to the statutory maximum of 120-months on count two, with a 4-level increase for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony and a 2-level increase for possessing a stolen firearm. The court denied requests for a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The Third Circuit affirmed, while stating that a nolo contendere plea does not automatically preclude a court from granting a reduction under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2008 Smith, Norman, White, and Merin were sentenced for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 371. Each was also convicted of one or more substantive counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and multiple counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A, based on their participation in a conspiracy to defraud banks. On direct appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, but vacated the sentences and remanded for consideration in light of a holding that account holders who suffer only temporary losses are not victims for purposes of the victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2) and recalculation of a criminal history level. On resentencing, the court reduced the term of imprisonment as to each one, imposed the same special assessment, maintained or lowered the term of supervised release, and confirmed the existing orders of restitution against White, Norman, and Merin, but increased Smith’s order of restitution by $9,000, from $68,452 to $77,452. The Third Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision to allow additional evidence regarding the number of victims, finding that the defendants were not prejudiced, but vacated the order of restitution. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, people who had taken the prescription diet-drug combination Fen-Phen began suing Wyeth, claiming that the drugs caused valvular heart disease. A 2000 settlement included creation of the Fen-Phen Settlement Trust to compensate class members who had sustained heart damage. Claims required medical evidence. Attorneys who represented certain claimants retained Tai, a board-certified Level 2-qualified cardiologist, to read tests and prepare reports. Tai read 12,000 tests and asserted that he was owed $2 million dollars for his services. Tai later acknowledged that in about 10% of the cases, he dictated reports consistent with the technicians’ reports despite knowing that the measurements were wrong, and that he had his technician and office manager review about 1,000 of the tests because he did not have enough time to do the work. A review of the forms Tai submitted found that, in a substantial number of cases, the measurements were clearly incorrect and were actually inconsistent with a human adult heart. Tai was convicted of mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment, and was ordered to pay restitution of $4,579,663 and a fine of $15,000. The Third Circuit rejected arguments that the court erred by implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its “willful blindness” jury instruction and applying upward adjustments under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a position of trust and use of a special skill, but remanded for factual findings concerning whether Tai supervised a criminally culpable subordinate, as required for an aggravated role enhancement. View "United States v. Tai" on Justia Law

Detectives Riley and Cunningham conducted a 10-week undercover investigation of Mitchell. On five separate occasions, an informant made controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Mitchell and officers covertly tailed Mitchell to establish his residence. They followed him to various residences, including his mother’s home and a home owned by his wife and ultimately applied for a search warrant for his wife’s residence. Detectives executed the search warrant and recovered 4.5 ounces of cocaine; drug packing paraphernalia, including three plastic bags with a white powdery residue and small plastic bags commonly used for packaging crack cocaine; approximately $6,415 in cash; and, underneath the mattress, a loaded firearm. Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(2); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). The district court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the detectives acted in good faith in relying on the warrant. Mitchell was convicted and the Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law