Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On July 7, 2003 and again four days later on July 11, Rutherford robbed the DePativo Chiropractor Center (DCC) in Philadelphia. DCC also had offices in New Jersey. Each chiropractor often worked in more than one office per day. Among its services, DCC provided its patients with medical products purchased from manufacturers around the country. The armed robberies occurred while the chiropractors were present. In addition to having to reschedule appointments, the doctors and staff became frightened, had a new security door system installed, and, eight months later, closed the office, apparently because the doctors and staff were still too frightened to continue working at that location. The other offices remain open. Rutherford was convicted of interference with interstate commerce by robbery, under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery, under the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. 2; and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 509 months’ imprisonment: 125 months on the robbery counts and 384 months on the firearm counts, to run consecutively. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Rutherford’s robberies affected interstate commerce. View "United States v. Rutherford" on Justia Law

In 1985 the bodies of an eight-year-old boy and his seven-year-old sister were found in the basement of a New Jersey apartment building, in which Halsey, then age 24, lived with their mother. The children had been sexually assaulted and mutilated. The killer was ultimately determined to be their next-door neighbor, Hall, who had a record for attempted sexual assault. Hall asked the police whether he would be locked up, but was not considered a suspect at the time. Halsey had an arrest record, but no history of incarceration. Halsey had a sixth-grade education and was “Mildly Mentally Retarded.” Halsey, who had previously worked at the apartment building, was at his new job at another location when he learned about the murders. He returned home and was taken to the police station, where he was isolated in an interview room, accused of the murders, told he had failed a polygraph examination (he had actually passed), and confronted with false evidence. After being interrogated for several days, in a state of great fear, he signed a document purporting to be his confession, with details that investigators must have inserted because Halsey could not have known them. He was convicted, and sentenced to life. He was released 22 years later, after it was clear that he had not committed the offenses. Halsey filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. An officer who fabricates evidence to obtain a conviction violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. Without the false confession, there would not have been direct evidence linking Halsey to the crimes so that the prosecutor would not have had cause to prosecute Halsey. View "Halsey v. Pfeiffer" on Justia Law

Bencivengo, former Mayor of Hamilton Township, New Jersey, was convicted of violating, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and section 2, and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(1) and (3) and section 2, premised on the New Jersey bribery statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.2, for accepting money from Ljuba in exchange for agreeing to influence members of the Hamilton Township School Board to refrain from putting the School District’s insurance contract up for competitive bidding. Ljuba, the district’s insurance broker and a friend of Bencivengo’s, personally earned between $600,000 and $700,000 in commissions from insurance contracts with the district in 2011 alone. Bencivengo, facing financial difficulties , persuaded Ljuba to have her husband write a check with a memo line that the check was for a “cherry bedroom set” and to give him money during a trip to Atlantic City so that it would appear that he won the money gambling. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of double jeopardy and a challenge to the conduct of the judge. View "United States v. Bencivengo" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip in 2005, the DEA began monitoring calls between a confidential informant and Velazquez, tracked co-defendants, recovered nine kilograms of cocaine, and arrested the two co-defendants. An arrest warrant issued for Velazquez in August 2005. The DEA declared Velazquez a fugitive and turned his apprehension over to the U.S. Marshals, which entered Velazquez’s information in the Warrant Information Network. An assistant U.S. attorney sent a copy of the warrant to Velazquez’s counsel, who stipulated that he received it. Neither that attorney nor Velazquez appeared at the arraignment. From November 2005 until November 2010, authorities checked the National Crime Information Center eight times to see if any agency had encountered Velazquez. A DEA agent checked with the U.S. Attorney’s Office annually to make sure the office was still willing to prosecute, ensured that the warrant was still active in the NCIC, and contacted the Marshals Service to ask if they had new information. He put Velazquez on the “Most Wanted” section of the Philadelphia DEA website, but not on the Los Angeles site, where authorities believed Velazquez was living. No law enforcement agency visited addresses identified in 2005 or returned to the home of Velazquez’s brother; no one contacted his parents, his attorney or the Los Angeles agent; and no one searched commercial or other governmental databases. Velazquez was apprehended in 2011, in California on an unrelated narcotics charge. The district court denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the four-factor test from two Supreme Court decisions. View "United States v. Velazquez" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania troopers responded to a domestic disturbance involving someone “under the influence … waving a loaded firearm … dragging his daughter.” The daughter’s friend relayed information the daughter was sending by text message. The dispatcher advised that the father was believed to be White, who previously had resisted arrest. Arriving at the home, the troopers saw two individuals behind a mud room screen door. Guns drawn, the troopers ordered them out. White emerged and walked unsteadily, leading the troopers to conclude he was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. As instructed, White went down on the ground, was handcuffed, and subjected to a pat down search. White did not have any weapon. White’s adult daughter, Samantha, emerged. Given her size and apparent victim status, the troopers decided not to handcuff Samantha. A trooper opened the door and seized two guns from the floor just inside the mud room. He walked through the home with Samantha, finding no other person but observing gun cases and a burnt marijuana cigarette, none of which he seized. An officer advised White of his Miranda rights. White stated he was a gun collector, owned firearms, had been carrying guns because he believed people were trying to kill him, and had shot at animals earlier that day. Weeks later, after obtaining a warrant based on the seized firearms, police seized 91 firearms. Indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), White unsuccessfully moved to suppress all firearms and inculpatory statements. The Sixth Circuit remanded for further proceedings regarding reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 1986 when the United States sought an injunction under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997, and entered into a Consent Decree, under which the Virgin Islands would attempt to remedy the conditions at Golden Grove Correctional Facility with respect to unreasonable fire safety risks, physical violence by other inmates or staff, adequate sanitation, and medical care. The district court entered several additional orders when conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan. In 2011, the Virgin Islands sought to terminate prospective relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), (e). The court concluded that all but one of the orders entered after the 1986 Consent Decree constituted prospective relief under the PLRA and did not include the findings required under the statute. The court ordered a hearing to determine whether “prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right at Golden Grove … and, if so, to ensure that the prospective relief is narrowly tailored to that violation in the manner required by the PLRA.” Gillette, a prisoner at Golden Grove, was denied leave to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the United States adequately represents Gillette’s interests and that others will be prejudiced if intervention is permitted. View "United States v. Territory of VI" on Justia Law

Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers’ email addresses by programming servers to search for the user’s Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this “shortcut” and wrote a program, the “account slurper,” to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it.”View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law

Thomas was in custody pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines. He was assigned to a small unit with an upper level open to the lower level, housing minimum and medium security detainees. The facility has four or five fights reported every day; 20-30 are estimated to be unreported. Thomas had a reputation as a bully, known for stealing food. One day Thomas found about 12 angry inmates outside of his upper level cell. A verbal dispute ensued. Officer Martinez was with the crowd; Officer Wilde was on the lower level. Martinez said something about locking everybody down. The inmates laughed, but did not disperse. Inmate Santiago yelled, “come down here and take stuff from me.” Thomas began to walk to the lower level. Within seconds after he arrived, Santiago struck Thomas. Martinez restrained Santiago, but another inmate struck Thomas. Martinez was immediately next to Thomas yelled for everyone to lock down. The inmates complied. Three to four minutes had passed between the beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence on the lower level. Inmates stated that the officers could and should have stopped the argument. Thomas suffered a concussion and loss of sight in one eye. Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, The district court granted the county summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding genuine issues of material fact concerning deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack of such training had a causal relationship to Thomas’s injuries.View "Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty." on Justia Law

Cooper was convicted of rape in Oklahoma in 1999 and paroled in 2006, before enactment of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250; 42 U.S.C. 16901. He complied with sex offender registration laws in effect at the time. After enactment of SORNA, Cooper moved to Delaware in 2011. He did not register in Delaware, nor did he inform authorities of his new address. He was convicted of failing to comply with SORNA sex offender registration requirements. On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the provision of SORNA in which Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that it found “delegation of this important decision curious at best,” but not an unconstitutional abdication. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Abbott was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), among other charges. His sentence included a 15-yearmandatory minimum for violating the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court found that three of his previous convictions were “serious drug offenses” under the ACCA. Abbott’s attorney did not object. Abbott challenged an unrelated portion of his sentence on direct appeal. The Third Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. Abbott filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that his attorney at sentencing was ineffective for failing to contest the use of his prior conviction for possession with the intent to distribute, under 35 PA. STAT. 780-113(a)(30), as an ACCA predicate offense. The district court denied the petition without a hearing, finding that the sentencing court properly employed the modified categorical approach. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Pennsylvania statute is “divisible,” so that use of the modified categorical approach was proper. The statute can be violated by the possession of and intent to distribute many different drugs, the types of which can increase the prescribed range of penalties, so the statute includes several alternative elements. View "United States v. Abbott" on Justia Law