Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Winkelman brothers, have a “long and protracted litigation history” involving challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought while in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit denied certificates of appealability. The current motion, to reinstate their direct appeals, argued that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, Alleyne v. U.S. that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit denied the motion, which it characterized as “successive.” A successive section 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The Supreme Court may have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne, but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” View "United States v. Winkelman" on Justia Law

Woronowicz was convicted of four counts of willful failure to file tax returns and was sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment with 1 year of supervised release. He failed to comply with the terms of supervised release, resulting in an additional three months’ imprisonment. Woronowicz failed to surrender. After being arrested, Woronowicz consented a search of his residence. Agents discovered counterfeit currency with a face value in excess of $207,000. About 90 percent of the bills were completed on only one side and $20,000 worth were completed on both sides. Agents also discovered materials used to manufacture counterfeit currency. Woronowicz pleaded guilty to the one count of counterfeiting. The district court applied a 12-level enhancement to the Guidelines range, under section 2B5.1(b)(1)(B) based on its calculation of the face value of the counterfeit currency as exceeding $200,000. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Woronowicz" on Justia Law

Vega pled guilty to multiple counts of crack cocaine possession and distribution, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. In 2004, the district court sentenced him to 108 months imprisonment on the drug charges and a mandatory 60 months, to be served consecutively, on the firearm count. The Sentencing Guidelines called for 97-121 months on the drug charges; the gun offense carried a mandatory consecutive sentence of 60 months, 18 U.S.C. 24(c)(1)(A)(I). At the time, the drug charges also carried a mandatory minimum penalty of 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). This ought to have led to a range of 120-121 months, but the mandatory minimum was not requested by the government. In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act lowered mandatory minimum penalties for distributing crack cocaine. Under the new guideline (made retroactive, effective November, 2011), the offense level for Vega’s drug offenses would be 30. With relevant adjustments already established, this would lead to a Guideline range of 78-97 months rather than 97-121 months. The district court found that sentence reduction was blocked by operation of the 120 month mandatory minimum sentence that should have been, but was not, applied to his case. The Third Circuit reversed, acknowledging that the case presented an interaction of complex statutes, policy statements, and confused prior proceedings, creating a difficult, perhaps unique, pattern. View "United States v. Ortiz-Vega" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Bautista, a legal permanent resident, was ordered removed from the U.S. as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The IJ found him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his New York conviction for attempted arson constituted an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, finding that the arson conviction fell within the definition of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). The Third Circuit granted a petition for review. The attempted arson conviction is not an aggravated felony with respect to collateral immigration consequences. Applying the categorical approach, the New York statute under which Bautista was convicted does not match the elements of 18 U.S.C. 844(i), the corresponding federal statute, which requires a connection to interstate commerce. View "Bautista v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S." on Justia Law

Airport customs officers intercepted a UPS package containing heroin. The address handwritten on the package was “18 Walnut St. Union Town PA.” The electronic manifest gave the address as “59 Millview Dr. Uniontown.” When the two conflict, UPS delivers to the electronic address. Agents repackaged the heroin, using the Millview address and enclosing a beeper to indicate when the package was opened. They obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the Millview address, the home of the mother of Dutrieville’s child, to be executed once the package was inside the home. An undercover agent delivered the package to Dutrieville. Two minutes later the beeper activated. Agents announced their presence, and, receiving no response, entered the home. They took Dutrieville into custody and searched. In a bedroom, agents found the heroin. In the master bedroom, they found the empty package, the beeper, Dutrieville’s cell phone and overnight bag, and unused stamp bags (often used to package heroin). They found digital scales and other drug paraphernalia in the living room. Dutrieville admitted that he had been staying at the home with consent, although he was the subject of a Protection From Abuse Order that could not be overridden by consent. Dutrieville was charged with attempted possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a substance containing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). After denial of his motion to suppress, Dutrieville entered a conditional guilty plea. The Third Circuit affirmed that, because he was prohibited from entering the home, he lacked standing to challenge the search. View "United States v. Dutrieville" on Justia Law

Glenn was convicted of the murder of Griffin and is currently a Pennsylvania prisoner. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought collateral review in state courts, then sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to grant a mistrial after an eyewitness proffered contradictory testimony, opting instead to strike the entirety of the testimony and provide cautionary jury instructions and that his trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to strike other evidence in the record that referred to that witness’s identification of Glenn as the murderer. View "Glenn v. Dist. Attorney Allegheny Cty." on Justia Law

Brooks, Edwards, and John-Baptiste were convicted served as law enforcement officers: Brooks and Edwards with the Virgin Islands Police Department and John-Baptiste with the Virgin Islands Port Authority. The Third Circuit affirmed their convictions of conspiracy under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); conspiracy and extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) & (2); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846; distribution of and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and, under Virgin Island law, conspiracy, extortion, solicitation and receipt of a bribe, and conflict of interest, and kidnapping and false imprisonment, but on cross-appeals, reversed acquittals on certain counts.View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The client was the target of a grand jury investigation into alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The grand jury served a subpoena on the client’s former attorney and the government moved to enforce this subpoena and compel testimony, under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The client sought to quash the subpoena by asserting the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. After questioning the attorney in camera, the district court found that the crime-fraud exception applied and compelled testimony. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the correct standard in determining whether to conduct an in camera examination of a witness, requiring a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. The court did not abuse its discretion in applying that standard, in determining procedures for the examination, or in ultimately finding that the crime-fraud exception applied. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

During Banks’ supervised release for a bank fraud conviction, he was arrested for conspiring to steal or create more than 75 fraudulent checks. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349), and to violating conditions of his supervised release. He stipulated to a Grade A violation of supervised release. The plea agreement stated that that the prosecution “cannot and does not make any representation or promise as to what guideline range may be found by the sentencing judge, or as to what sentence Richard Banks ultimately will receive.” Banks acknowledged his voluntary waiver of any right to challenge the sentence imposed “if that sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 14 and the sentence for the Violation Petition falls within or below the Guideline range set forth.” Banks substantially cooperated with the government, resulting in a number of convictions. After granting a 6-level downward departure for cooperation, the court imposed a term of 18 months for the bank fraud, but denied requests for the same downward departure, and for a concurrent term, on the supervised release violation. The court ordered 33 months’ imprisonment for the violation, to be served consecutively. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the appellate waiver was inapplicable to the situation. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law