Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
Unted States v. Golson
A postal inspector intercepted a parcel on suspicion of narcotics trafficking because the return address was fictitious. The inspector knew that drug traffickers often bring narcotics from Mexico into Arizona and mail them to the east coast. A trained narcotics canine detected the presence of narcotics in the parcel. Agents gathered information about the recipient address and obtained a warrant. The parcel contained 20 pounds of marijuana. The agents held the parcel for four days and planned a controlled delivery of a reconstructed parcel, containing a GPS locator. Golson identified himself by the false name given on the parcel’s address and accepted the package. After receiving a signal that the package had been opened, agents conducted a search of the house pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant and found several guns and ammunition, 704 packets of heroin packaged for distribution, 40 grams of raw heroin, a cutting agent, packaging material consistent with drug distribution, a heat sealer, heat sealable bags, a scale, rubber examination gloves, and masks. The district court rejected a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that there was probable cause for the anticipatory warrant, that the delay was reasonable, and that the search was a state search so that FRCP 41(b) did not apply.View "Unted States v. Golson" on Justia Law
Collins v. Sec’y, PA Dep’t of Corrs.
Collins, a Pennsylvania prisoner convicted in 1993 of first-degree murder, appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. The court certified two questions for appeal: whether Collins was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel “inadequately prepared for trial and completely failed to conduct any investigation, including into the ballistics evidence” and whether trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, combined with alleged errors of the trial court, cumulatively caused him prejudice. The Third Circuit affirmed, while expressing “serious doubt that trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation.” In light of the uncontroverted evidence presented against Collins at trial, the state court’s determination that Collins failed to show he suffered prejudice was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington, which sets the standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Collins also did not exhaust his claim of cumulative error, which was, therefore, procedurally defaulted. View "Collins v. Sec'y, PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law
Sharif v. Picone
Sharif, an inmate housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit, punched a corrections officer. Sharif claims that C.O. Picone punched Sharif first. Picone testified that once he was struck, he attempted to protect himself and that C.O. Potance, who was helping Picone retrieve dinner trays, attempted to restrain Sharif. Sharif asserted that once Picone began to hit him, Potance and C.O. Pinto entered his cell and joined in the attack by choking him. Following the altercation, Sharif was handcuffed and moved to a “suicide cell.” He continued to cause commotion and was moved to a restraint chair. Sharif contends that while he was in the restraint chair, he was punched repeatedly by unnamed corrections officers, observed and permitted by Lieutenant Kospiah. Sharif was charged with aggravated assault, entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was convicted as charged. Sharif filed an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and moved to exclude evidence of his nolo contendere plea under Rule 410. The court admitted the evidence when Sharif took the stand and denied wrongdoing. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that Sharif’s credibility was already “suspect” and that the plea was, therefore, of minimal relevance.View "Sharif v. Picone" on Justia Law
United States v. Brown
It is a violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16901, for individuals convicted of certain sex crimes to travel in interstate or foreign commerce and knowingly fail to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). A conviction involving sex will not lead to classification as an offender under SORNA if “ [a]n offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of [SORNA] ... if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim,” 42 U.S.C. 16911(5)(C). Brown was charged with failing to register under SORNA based on his conviction for third degree lewd molestation in Florida. He registered when he moved to New York, but failed to register when he later moved to Pennsylvania. Brown pled guilty, but the district court sua sponte expressed doubt that Brown was a “sex offender,” given that his Presentence Investigation Report indicated he was 17 years old and his victim was 13 years old at the time they engaged in the consensual sex that was the basis of the conviction. Citing “the interests of justice” the court withdrew its approval of Brown’s plea. The Third Circuit ordered the indictment reinstated, noting that Brown stipulated that he was more than 4 years older than his victim at the time of the offense. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law, U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Jones
Erie police officers Onderko and Baney responded to a call. As they approached in their marked cruiser, they spotted Jones, running from the bar. Onderko knew Jones from a prior arrest and both were aware that Jones had an outstanding arrest warrant. Onderko exited the car and Jones took off running.” Onderko pursued on foot, yelling, “stop you’re under arrest.” As Onderko closed in, he saw that Jones was reaching in his waistband, but could not discern what Jones was reaching for. Baney saw Jones retrieve a handgun from his waistband. Onderko tackled Jones. At that moment, Baney shouted, “Gun!” and the handgun flew out of Jones’s hand. In tackling Jones, Onderko suffered serious injury, but Jones escaped and continued fleeing. Baney then shot Jones with his taser, finally subduing him. Police recovered Jones’s firearm. Jones, a convicted felon, admitted that he had the gun and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Jones appealed his 120-month sentence, arguing that his prior conviction for a second degree misdemeanor charge of “Fleeing or Attempting to Elude [a] Police Officer” under Pennsylvania law was not a crime of violence, that that his conduct in this case did not support enhancement for assault on a police officer, and that the court erred by presuming his guidelines range to be reasonable. The Third Circuit remanded, noting that the officer was unaware of the gun at the time, so that a six-level enhancement was inappropriate.View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law, U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
USA v. Blaine Handerhan
A joint undercover investigation determined that a single computer was sharing 1400 images or video files of child pornography. Pennsylvania State Police learned that the computer was located in the home of retired police Lieutenant Handerhan. A search warrant was executed and his computer was seized. It contained more than 6,000 images and video files of child pornography, including images of pre-pubescent children and images depicting sadomasochism and bondage. Forensic analysis revealed that Handerhan had configured a file sharing program to distribute the images. Charged with distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(A) and 2252A(2)(a), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(A), Handerhan pled guilty to one count of possession. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the distribution charge and recommended that he receive a three-level offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer calculated a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. Sentenced to 96 months, Handerhan argued that the court erred by failing to explicitly address his request for a downward departure based on mental health issues and meaningfully consider factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including arguments regarding the unreasonable nature of U.S.S.G. 2G2.2. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence reasonable, but “reminded” the district court that motions seeking departure should be formally decided. View "USA v. Blaine Handerhan" on Justia Law
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Criminal Law, U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Grimes
Grimes, a former professor of engineering at Pennsylvania State University and the owner of three research companies, pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957, based on his fraudulent conduct involving federal science grants. The plea agreement in indicated that his advisory sentencing range under the USSG would be 41 to 51 months and contained a waiver of Grimes’s direct and collateral appeal rights. Grimes and his attorney signed acknowledgements that they had read the agreement and that the plea was voluntary. During his plea colloquy, Grimes discussed the agreement with the judge and acknowledged that no one could guarantee how the court would sentence him. The district court sentenced Grimes to 41 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The Third Circuit rejected Grimes’s argument that his appellate waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it contained a waiver of his right to collaterally challenge his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence that did not exempt Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Grimes claimed that he could not have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his appellate rights because his trial counsel faced an inherent, actual conflict of interest in negotiating and advising him on the waiver. View "United States v. Grimes" on Justia Law
Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.
Orabi, an Egyptian citizen, was admitted to the U.S. in 1990. He became a lawful permanent resident without conditions in 1996. In 2010, he was convicted, in federal court, of conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with access devices, possession of counterfeit access devices, possession of counterfeit and forged checks, and aggravated identity theft, and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. Appeal to the Second Circuit is pending. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on conviction for an aggravated felony. Orabi notified DHS and the Immigration Court that he was appealing the conviction, and DHS moved to withdraw the removal charge. At a subsequent removal hearing, Orabi appeared pro se. Following an ambiguous exchange, removal charges were reinstated, although there is no documentary evidence that Orabi withdrew his appeal. Orabi was ordered removed. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Third Circuit reversed. A conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived. View "Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law
Estate of Arrington v. Michael
Andrea and Aaron lived together with their infant son from 2007 until 2009, when Andrea obtained an order of protection that described Aaron’s history of violence, including incidents of choking, slapping, and giving Andrea a black eye. Aaron had a criminal history that included check fraud, intimidation of another woman with whom he had a child, and shoplifting as a juvenile. He had also been charged with “indecent assault/rape” but found not guilty. Aaron’s father, Michael, a police officer, was aware of his son’s history and that two of Aaron’s children had died under mysterious circumstances while in his custody (he later confessed to killing them). Aaron had a room in his father’s home, drove his father’s truck, and received mail at his father’s address. Five days after the order issued Aaron returned to Andrea’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up.” An arrest warrant for Aaron issued. While Michael was on vacation, Aaron went to his home, found a copy of the criminal complaint against him, drank a bottle of 99-proof alcohol, ransacked the house and found his father’s service-issued gun, then used it to kill Andrea. Aaron was later killed by police, outside his father’s house. Andrea’s estate sued Michael for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Michael’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, with instructions to dismiss, finding that Michael’s conduct fell within the immunity established by the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 922(z)(3). View "Estate of Arrington v. Michael" on Justia Law
George v. Rehiel
George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law