Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Ottaviano, believing himself not bound by U.S. tax law, marketed his views to others through his company, Mid-Atlantic, which offered financial products he claimed would help others avoid taxation and have the government pay their debts. Ottoviano made many representations about himself and the financial products. Customers paid Mid-Atlantic $3,500 each ($5,000 if purchased jointly) to participate. After a trial at which he represented himself, Ottaviano was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371, eight counts of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1957, and two counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. 51. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting overwhelming evidence of guilt and rejecting arguments that the district court denied him a fair trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law when it cross-examined him and violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when it ordered him to leave the courtroom during a discussion about a letter he sent to the Treasury Secretary. View "United States v. Ottaviano" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals discovered that Gillette had not registered as a sex offender and was living in St. Croix with a teenage boy. They arrested him for violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901, and failure to register as a sex offender within 10 days of establishing residency in a state other than the state within which he was convicted, in violation of the Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 14072(g)(3) (repealed 2009). M.B., a 15-year-old boy, stated that he had been living with Gillette since he was about 12, and that they had been sexually involved. Agents learned that Gillette had also victimized M.B.’s younger cousin, A.A. The district court dismissed the federal counts for lack of evidence of interstate travel by Gillette after SORNA’s effective date and found that Gillette’s failure to register after relocating did not violate the Wetterling Act because the Virgin Islands is not a “State” as contemplated by that law. Gillette was convicted on local charges and sentenced to 155 years. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions: under these circumstances, the district court retained concurrent jurisdiction over the local charges after the federal charges were dismissed. View "United States v. Gillette" on Justia Law

Blair participated in the sale of guns. After his arrest, he pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A presentence report recommended that Blair be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Blair had pled guilty in Pennsylvania in 1987, to third-degree robbery in the form of “physically tak[ing] or remov[ing] property from the person of another by force however slight,” and to armed burglary. In 1991, he pled guilty to four counts of first-degree robbery. The 1991 charging documents state that, for each count, the “[f]elony committed or threatened” was “[a]ggravated [a]ssault.” The PSR recommended that each of the 1991 counts be treated as a separate criminal episode. Blair argued that his 1987 conviction was not for the generic offense of burglary required under ACCA; that “robbery by force however slight” is not a violent felony under ACCA; and that his 1991 convictions qualified as, at most, one violent felony because the charging documents did not conclusively establish that the crimes were “committed on occasions different from one another.” The district court determined that his 1987 convictions were for violent felonies and that the 1991 convictions “at a minimum” established three separate violent felonies and sentenced Blair to 180 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Blair" on Justia Law

Since September 11, 2001, efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency have included revising internal FBI guidelines. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), released by the Attorney General in 2008, authorizes FBI agents to engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when conducting proactive assessments of criminal and terrorist threats and allows the FBI to collect and map data related to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU launched an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI,” including a series of coordinated FOIA requests (28 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A)) seeking records related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data. One request targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought information concerning implementation of authority to collect information and map racial and ethnic demographics and behaviors in local communities. The FBI identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records, eventually released 312 pages (some of which were partially redacted), withheld 186 pages as duplicative, and withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure. The ACLU sought an injunction for release of the withheld records. The district court ruled in favor of the FBI. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the in camera procedure employed for determining whether reliance on FOIA exclusion provision was justified.View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey had a wave of pharmacy burglaries, many of which affected Rite Aid pharmacies. The FBI joined the investigation. A suspect emerged: an electrician, Harry Katzin, had recently been caught burglarizing a Rite Aid pharmacy; his brothers also had criminal histories that included burglary and theft. Over the following months, the Katzins were repeatedly seen outside pharmacies where phone lines had been cut. After consulting with the U.S. Attorney, but without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS tracker to the exterior of Harry’s van. Within days, state troopers stopped the van on a Pennsylvania highway. Local police notified the troopers that the Rite Aid closest to where the van had been parked had been burglarized. Inside the van, troopers found the Katzin brothers. From outside of the van, the troopers could see pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins. The police impounded the van and arrested the Katzin brothers. The district court suppressed the evidence found in the van. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that police must obtain a warrant prior to a GPS search and that the conduct in this case cannot be excused based on good faith. All three brothers had standing to challenge evidence recovered from Harry’s van. View "United States v. Katzin" on Justia Law

In 2004 Manuel pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and was sentenced to prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release. After his release from prison, Manuel repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release. At a parole revocation hearing in 2012, Manuel informed the district court that he wished to proceed pro se. The court engaged in a colloquy with Manuel and inquired into Manuel’s educational background, warned him of the dangers in representing himself, and asked several questions about the reason for Manuel’s desire to proceed pro se, before ultimately granting the request. Manuel presented witnesses at an adjourned revocation hearing, but the court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two consecutive 16-month terms of imprisonment. The Third Court affirmed. In the context of a hearing regarding revocation of supervised release, the appropriate test is whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived representation by counsel. The totality of the circumstances showed that Manuel made a knowing and voluntary decision to represent himself. View "United States v. Manuel" on Justia Law

A search of Ward’s possessions at Dulles Airport uncovered child pornography. After Ward’s arrest, agents searched his office at the Wharton Business School and found photographs and videos of Ward engaged in sex acts with minors (J.D. and R.D.). The pictures were taken in Brazil, where the boys lived. Ward’s email included communications with the boys. in which Ward requested that the boys engage in sex with other men chosen by Ward. Ward paid J.D.’s family. Attempting to acquire a visa for J.D. to visit the U.S., Ward made false statements. He was charged in Pennsylvania and Virginia federal courts, unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate the cases, pleaded guilty, and received a sentence of 15 years in Virginia. In Pennsylvania he pleaded guilty to shipping child pornography in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), false statements to a federal officials, 18 U.S.C. 1001, and inducing a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). While an appeal was pending, Ward maintained contact with J.D. and R.D., attempted to establish a relationship with their children, and attempted to use his attorneys to contact his victims for non-legal reasons. Ward indicated that he wished to make a statement at his resentencing hearing. The court insisted that his allocution be delivered under oath. Ward spoke about his contrition, his interest in rehabilitation, his struggle in accepting his homosexuality, his diagnosis of leukemia, and his hope that he would not die in prison. The court sentenced him to 300 months, with a fine of $250,000, explaining that the fine was within the advisory range and that the amount was a reasonable figure which Ward could pay. The court also ordered that Ward have no contact with minors, especially his victims’ children. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

Doreen Proctor’s body was found beside a Pennsylvania country road in 1992, shot in the head and chest, badly beaten, and stabbed repeatedly. She had been scheduled to testify that day as a witness against Tyler, the defendant’s brother, in state court, as a confidential informant in making four controlled buys of cocaine from Tyler and from three other individuals: Evans, Hodge, and Brooks. She had testified against the four at their preliminary hearing and her testimony at Hodge’s trial resulted in a conviction. After Proctor’s death, the remaining trials were halted. Defendant was acquitted of murdering Proctor, but convicted of witness intimidation and served a term in state prison. After his release, federal prosecutors charged him with witness tampering by murder and by intimidation, 18 U.S.C. 1512. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed. In 2009 the defendant filed a pro se motion, arguing that two recent Supreme Court decisions limited the scope of the witness tampering statute and rendered the acts for which he was convicted non-criminal. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to give defendant an opportunity to present evidence of actual evidence. View "United States v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Supreme Court held, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Three individuals, each serving a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for offenses committed as juveniles, sought authorization to file successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and 2255 to raise Miller claims. The parties agreed that Miller states a new rule of constitutional law, but Pennsylvania (the state in which two petitioners were convicted) argued that Miller was not retroactive; the federal prosecutor claimed that Miller was retroactive but that the other petitioner’s sentence satisfied the new Miller rule. The Third Circuit found that the petitioners had made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive and authorized successive habeas petitions. View "In re: Grant" on Justia Law

Investigation of Rabbi Fish began when Dwek, charged with bank fraud, informed law enforcement that several New York and New Jersey rabbis were laundering money through tax-exempt Jewish charities called gemachs. In a sting operation, Dwek approached Fish about laundering the claimed proceeds of fraudulent schemes. The “proceeds” were actually provided by the government. Fish participated in 12 money laundering transactions involving more than $900,000. Dwek would deliver bank checks made out to gemachs and rabbis and would receive cash in exchange, less a commission of about 10 percent. Fish gave Dwek SIM cards for his cell phone and warned Dwek to sweep his car and phones for detection devices and to use code when speaking to associates. In recordings made by Dwek, Fish stated that he had several money laundering connections, knew how much cash certain individuals had available at specified times, had met the “main guy” running the network, and that the cash came from the diamond and jewelry business. Fish pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The parties agreed that Fish’s total offense level would be at least 21; the government reserved the right to argue for a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated money laundering. The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Fish to 46 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fish" on Justia Law