Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Club security flagged down officers and explained that Joseph had tried to “pass” counterfeit $100 bills. The officer did not inspect the bills but asked Joseph for identification and whether he tendered them at the bar. Joseph acknowledged that he tendered the bills and explained that he had obtained them when he cashed his pay check at a racetrack. Shining his flashlight on one of the bills, an officer saw a discrepancy in the bill’s security features: the president’s face in the bill’s watermark did not match the face printed on the bill. Joseph was arrested and searched at the scene. Officers found 14 more counterfeit $100 bills in Joseph’s pocket. After waiving his Miranda rights, Joseph provided a Secret Service agent with several incriminating text messages from his cell phone and confessed to attempting to pass the counterfeit bills. Indicted under 18 U.S.C. 472, Joseph unsuccessfully moved to suppress the bills, the text messages, and his confession. The Third Circuit rejected an appeal of his conviction, finding that Joseph had not preserved his argument that probable cause to arrest was absent because the officers had insufficient evidence to establish his intent to defraud at the time he passed and possessed the counterfeit bills. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer’s Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish.” Elonis’s supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having “keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder” that their son “should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

The U.S. Coast Guard had received information from the U.S. DEA, which learned from British Virgin Island law enforcement, which learned from Grenadian law enforcement, that the U.S.-registered vessel“Laurel” might be smuggling illegal narcotics. The Laurel, under the command Benoit, who has dual citizenship with the U.S. and Grenada, was intercepted in international waters. Coast Guard officers conducted a routine safety inspection, which the Laurel passed. They unsuccessfully attempted to conduct an at-sea space accountability inspection; rough waters made areas of the vessel inaccessible. Officer Riemer questioned Benoit and his crew, Williams, about their destination and purpose. Benoit gave inconsistent answers. Riemer conducted ION scan swipes; none came back positive for any explosive, contraband, or narcotics. The Laurel was directed to a U.S. port, where a canine boarded and alerted to narcotics. Still unable to access the entire vessel, officers directed Benoit to sail the Laurel to St. Thomas to enable a Vehicle and Container Inspection System (VACIS) search for anomalies in the vessel, which revealed anomalous masses. A Customs officer drilled a hole and found a substance that field-tested as cocaine. Officers cut a larger hole, revealing an area filled with brick-like packages. Laboratory tests revealed the bricks were cocaine hydrochloride with a net weight of 250.9 kilograms. After denial of two motions to suppress, Benoit and Williams were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)); aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and attempted importation of cocaine. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Benoit" on Justia Law

Carter pled guilty to conspiracy to use and produce counterfeit credit cards and armed robbery, resulting in a U.S.S.G. range of 121 to 130 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Carter to 45 months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release, which began in November 2009. In June 2010, based on allegations of sexual conduct toward the 13-year-old daughter of Carter’s girlfriend, Carter pled guilty in state court to misdemeanors and was sentenced to five years’ probation. In October 2011, Carter was arrested for attempting to use stolen credit cards. He pled guilty to access device fraud and was sentenced to 9 to 23 months’ imprisonment. In revoking Carter’s supervised release, the court calculated the applicable range, U.S.S.G. 7B1.4 (2011), categorizing the credit card fraud as a Grade B violation, and, over Carter’s objection that he never touched the girl, found that Carter’s conduct amounted to a forcible sexual offense, a “crime of violence” and a Grade A violation of supervised release. The court sentenced him to 37 months’ imprisonment, four months above the Guidelines range, to run consecutively to any state sentence, stating that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless whether the sexual assault was a Grade A or B violation. The Third Circuit affirmed. Regardless of the charge, a court may consider a defendant’s actual conduct in concluding that he has violated the terms of supervised release. The court should have set out Carter’s specific crime of violence, but, because it provided an alternate basis for Carter’s sentence, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a), requires courts to furnish legal counsel to criminal defendants “financially unable to obtain adequate representation.” Konrad was appointed a federal defender based on information he provided in a financial disclosure affidavit. At sentencing, the district court found discrepancies between Konrad’s presentencing report and his financial disclosure and, after a hearing, found that Konrad had $70,463 in two individual retirement accounts so he was not financially unable to pay the cost of legal representation. Konrad had failed to disclose the value of his home , had significantly under-reported income, and had reported the value of the retirement accounts inaccurately. The court ordered Konrad to repay $6,000. The Third Circuit affirmed; individual retirement funds and jointly-held bank accounts can be available funds within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act and the court acted within its discretion in ordering Konrad to repay the market value of his legal representation rather than the hourly rate paid to an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act. View "United States v. Konrad" on Justia Law

Figueroa joined the Camden police force in 2003. In 2008, he was transferred to a new Special Operations Unit created to target guns, drugs and violence with his regular partner, Bayard. In 2011, Figueroa and Bayard were charged with a series of civil rights violations concerning falsification of evidence in drug cases. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242, Figueroa was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court erred by admitting the out-of-court statement of co-defendant Bayard; by excluding, as cumulative, police reports that Figueroa offered into evidence; by allowing improper expert opinion testimony from a prosecution fact witness on issues of constitutional law; and by refusing to give the jury a requested instruction concerning specific intent. The court properly applied the drug distribution sentencing guideline to the civil rights violations after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Figueroa was involved in distribution of narcotics. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

In 1998 Keitel was convicted of first degree murder, third degree murder, aggravated assault, and five counts of recklessly endangering another person. His aggregate sentence was life imprisonment plus 35-70 years of imprisonment. Keitel’s appeals of the conviction and sentence were unsuccessful, as were his efforts to seek relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. While an appeal was pending, Keitel died. His family wanted to pursue the appeal to clear his name. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, View "Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz" on Justia Law

Small, a New Jersey state prisoner, is paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting 14 incidents involving use of excessive force, denial of medical treatment, and confiscation of his personal wheelchair and its replacement with one without leg rests. He claims that without his personal chair he was unable to brush his teeth, shower, and sometimes left to lie for days in his own excrement. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing grievances, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that a judge may resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without participation of a jury and that that Small knew of, and was able to access, the prison’s grievance procedures, but that Small did adequately exhaust remedies with respect to two incidents. View "Small v. Whittick" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law

Rojas, a 22-year old citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. in 2003 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2009, Rojas pled guilty to possessing drug paraphernalia and was assessed a fine and court costs by the Pennsylvania state court. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings for having violated a law “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Rojas argued that the offense that constitutes the basis of removal must involve a substance defined in section 802 of Title 21. The BIA ordered Rojas removed. The Third Circuit, en banc, remanded. In a removal proceeding under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the government must show that the conviction for which it seeks to remove a foreign national involved or was related to a federally controlled substance. In this case, the Department failed to meet its burden. View "Rojas v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law