Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Five years after Eric Wilson fully served his sentence for a Virginia state rape conviction, he filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge his conviction. To satisfy the statute's jurisdictional requirement that he be "in custody" at the time he filed his petition, Wilson alleged that the sex offender registration requirements of Virginia and Texas law impose sufficiently substantial restraints on his liberty so as to amount to custody. The district court dismissed Wilson’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because he had fully served the sentence for his rape conviction, he was no longer "in custody," as required by statute. Upon review of the matter, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed its decision.

On October 6, 2009, Defendant-Appellant Douglas Chappell was stopped for speeding by a U.S. Park Police Officer. In an attempt to avoid a speeding ticket, Defendant falsely told the officer that he was a Fairfax County Deputy Sheriff. In fact, Defendant had not been employed by the Fairfax County Sheriff's Office for approximately one year. The officer asked Defendant for his law enforcement credentials, and Defendant replied that he had left them at home. He then produced his Virginia driver's license, pointing out that the license photo depicted him in uniform. In order to verify Defendant's employment, the officer called the Fairfax County Sheriff's Office, which requested an employee identification number. When asked for his employee identification number, Defendant made one up. He subsequently admitted his lie and was arrested for impersonating a police officer. Defendant appealed his subsequent conviction, and on appeal, asked the Fourth Circuit to hold the statute under which he was charged as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit declined the invitation and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In this appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions of three defendants who were tried together on charges relating to the murder of certain government witnesses, the murder of a coconspirator, and numerous other narcotics and firearms-related offenses arising from the defendants' involvement in a drug-trafficking organization in Baltimore. Among the several issues presented, the Court considered: (1) the district court's decision to empanel an "anonymous jury," in which biographical information about prospective jurors was withheld from the parties and their counsel; and (2) the admissibility of hearsay statements of a murdered government witness under the "forfeiture-by-wrongdoing" exception to the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. Upon review of the trial court record, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining juror anonymity, and that the challenged hearsay statements were admissible based on the defendants' conduct leading to the witness' death. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court on these and all other issues presented.

Following a jury trial in Maryland, Petitioner Charles Lee Smoot was convicted and sentenced to prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Petitioner contended that his possession of the firearm was legally justified, or, in the alternative, that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury was misinstructed on an essential element of the offense. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Petitioner's challenges to his conviction, and another to his sentence, and affirmed.

Petitioner Jose Barahona, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") which affirmed his ineligibility for a "special rule" cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (the "NACARA"). Petitioner contended that the BIA erred by deeming him ineligible for NACARA relief because he had provided material support to a terrorist organization in the early 1980s by allowing anti-government Salvadoran guerrillas of the so-called "FMLN" (the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Libercion Nacional) the use of the kitchen of his Salvadoran home. Upon review, the Court rejected Petitioner's contentions and denied his petition for review.

Defendant-Appellant Mirna Del Carmen Gomez, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to unlawful reentry of a deported alien after an aggravated felony conviction. Although she agreed with the statement of facts submitted by the government in support of her guilty plea, Defendant objected to the government's assertion that her prior conviction for child abuse under Maryland law amounted to a crime of violence for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) sentencing enhancement. According to Defendant, because the relevant portion of the statute did not contain a division between forceful and nonforceful conduct, the district court could not use the modified categorical approach to determine that her prior child abuse conviction was a crime of violence. The district court employed the modified categorical approach to determine that Defendant's child abuse conviction constituted a crime of violence and added sixteen levels to her base offense level. Thereafter, the district court calculated her Guidelines range to be forty-one to fifty-one months, but made a downward variance and sentenced her to twenty-four months' imprisonment. Because the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to the indivisible provision at issue was in error, it vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant-Appellant Sean Theodore Brehm, a citizen of South Africa, pled guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, on condition that he be allowed to challenge through appeal the jurisdictional basis of the indictment underlying his conviction. The grand jury accused Defendant of stabbing a British subject, "J.O.," during an altercation at Kandahar Airfield, while both men were employed with private contractors supporting the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. On appeal, Defendant argued that the indictment's reliance on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was misplaced, in that the statute (which Defendant admitted was valid on its face) could not be applied to him in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Defendant also asserted that the government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between him and the United States to support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, pointing out that, prior to his arrival in Virginia as an accused, neither he nor his victim had ever set foot in this country. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges to his conviction and affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant-Appellant Mantel Mubdi entered a conditional guilty plea to drug and firearm charges, reserving the right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The district court sentenced him to 300 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers who stopped his car lacked probable cause to execute the stop. Alternatively, Defendant argued that the officers unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop to conduct an open-air canine sniff of his car. Finding no error, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Dwayne Durham was charged and jailed in southwest Virginia for more than three months before the prosecutor realized that this was a case of mistaken identity and rectified the error. As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against, inter alia, Officer David L. Horner, alleging a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, plus a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The district court awarded summary judgment to Horner on the basis of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff contended that Horner was not entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on and utilized unverified information to set "forth a chain of events that would lead to the indictment and arrest of the wrong individual." Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff was unable to establish that his seizure was "pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause," and he could not show the essential constitutional violation underlying a 1983 claim. Because there was, as a matter of law, probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and detention, his state law malicious prosecution claim failed too.

Defendant Ivan Teleguz was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Virginia. He appealed the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing to develop his claim of actual innocence, which, under "Schlup v. Delo," (513 U.S. 298 (1995)), would allow the district court to address Defendant's procedurally defaulted constitutional claims. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a sound and thorough analysis of Defendant's "Schlup" gateway innocence claim as required by the Court's decision in "Wolfe v. Johnson," (565 F.3d 140, 163 (4th Cir. 2009)), and remanded the case for further proceedings.