Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In April 2010, the government jointly tried Anthony Fleming and Tavon Mouzone, members of the gang "Tree Top Piru" (TTP), in an eight-day jury trial. The grand jury charged both Fleming and Mouzone with conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise (RICO conspiracy), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). It additionally charged Fleming with committing two drug offenses: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base; and (2) distribution of and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base. The jury convicted both Fleming and Mouzone of the RICO conspiracy charge, finding that distribution of crack cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and robbery were conspiracy objectives. It declined to find that murder or conspiracy to commit murder was a conspiracy objective. The jury also convicted Fleming on both drug charges. The district court sentenced Mouzone to 240 months' imprisonment, running concurrent with a previous Maryland state court sentence, and it sentenced Fleming to three concurrent sentences: 240 months' imprisonment on the RICO conspiracy charge and life imprisonment on each drug-related charge. Mouzone and Fleming alleged several district court errors on appeal. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no reversible error and therefore affirmed.

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction.

Defendant William Davis pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon for which he received a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). Both in his plea agreement and at his plea hearing, Defendant was advised incorrectly that he faced a maximum sentence of only ten years. Defendant contended on appeal that this error constituted a breach of his plea agreement and asked the Fourth Circuit to order that he receive the ten-year sentence described incorrectly as his statutory maximum. Defendant also challenged the district court’s conclusion that he qualified for the ACCA sentence enhancement. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit held that the failure to properly advise Defendant of his statutory maximum sentence was not a breach by the government. Under these circumstances, however, the Court was unable to conclude that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his fifteen-year sentence. The Court therefore declined to enforce Defendant's appeal waiver and considered his alleged sentencing errors. Finding no merit in those claims, the Court affirmed.

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry, Defendant Francisco Bonilla received an enhanced sentence based on a prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because his state conviction under Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a)(3) did not satisfy the definition of generic burglary under "Taylor v. United States," (495 U.S. 575 (1990)). Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant-Appellant Jermaine Mobley pled guilty to possession of a prohibited object in prison. The sentencing court thereafter found Defendant to be a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a sentence of thirty-seven months. On appeal, Defendant challenged his sentence, maintaining that the court erred in ruling that his offense of conviction constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement of the Guidelines. The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's contention and affirmed his sentence.

Appellant David Michael Worley appealed his 100-month sentence for (methamphetamine manufacture and distribution) and special conditions imposed on supervised release, arguing that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to explain its imposition of the conditions. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 100-month sentence, but reversed the district court's imposition of special conditions one, six, and fourteen. Accordingly the case was remanded for further proceedings on all remaining special conditions.

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the right recognized in "Padilla v. Kentucky," (130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)) is a new right that has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review so as to enable Defendant-Appellant Shahzad Mathur to file a timely motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his guilty plea for drug trafficking. When Defendant, an alien residing in the United States, pled guilty in 2007 to conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in 2008 and received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, his lawyer failed to advise him of the immigration-related consequences of his plea, such as possible deportation, telling him "not to worry" about such consequences. After pleading guilty, however, the Department of Homeland Security initiated deportation proceedings against Defendant based on his plea. Almost three years after his conviction, the Supreme Court handed down Padilla, and relying on that decision, Defendant filed a section 2255 motion seeking to vacate his plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding it untimely. It concluded that Padilla was not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant's 2255 motion was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 2255(f).

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Albert Burgess, Jr. of two felonies involving the receipt and possession of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The district court sentenced Burgess to a term of 292 months' imprisonment, and to supervised release for life. The district court also ordered that Burgess pay, among other things, restitution of $305,219.86 under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act for losses suffered by "Vicky," a child victim portrayed in pornographic material in Burgess' possession. Burgess challenged both his convictions and sentences on appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his convictions and all aspects of his sentences, except the district court's award of restitution to the victim. Because the district court did not make specific findings regarding the elements of restitution, the Court vacated the restitution award and remanded the case to the district court for a calculation of the loss Burgess proximately caused the victim.

Appellants, eleven inmates in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this action against members of the Virginia Parole Board in their official capacities. The Inmates contended the Board adopted policies and procedures with respect to parole-eligible inmates imprisoned for violent offenses that violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. Most notably, they asserted that the Board implemented an unwritten policy of denying parole to persons incarcerated for violent offenses. The district court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Inmates appealed. Because the Fourth Circuit agreed that the complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish a plausible entitlement to relief under either a due process or ex post facto theory, the Court affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant G. Martin Wynn, a professional engineer with the engineering firm of Talbert & Bright, Inc., was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud, in violation based on his performance of services to Oconee County, South Carolina, in connection with its project to extend the runway at the Oconee County Regional Airport. Instead of procuring a required permit for the runway extension project from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC"), Defendant cut a valid permit off of an older set of plans prepared for a previous airport project and fraudulently attached that permit to the plans for the runway extension. He then mailed the fraudulently permitted plans to Oconee County and later emailed them to the DHEC. Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to 12 months and 1 day in prison and ordered him to pay Oconee County $118,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the offenses had they been properly presented to the jury. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of the amount of loss found for purposes of sentencing and ordering restitution. Finding no abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented against him was sufficient to support his conviction, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.