Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a citizen of Somalia, was convicted of unlawful wounding and grand larceny. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) required the mandatory federal detention, without the possibility of bond, of certain deportable criminal aliens "when" those aliens were released from other custody. At issue was whether, as the district court held, defendant, a deportable criminal alien who was not immediately taken into federal custody upon his release from other custody, was exempt from section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention provision and therefore was entitled to a bond hearing. The court held that the BIA's interpretation of section 1226(c) in In re Rojas was reasonable, and must be afforded deference. Moreover, the Government's supposed failure to comply with a statutory immediacy requirement - when the statute did not specify a consequence for such noncompliance - did not bestow a windfall upon criminal aliens. Therefore, defendant remained subject to mandatory detention.

Defendants, all Somalis, were convicted, among other things, of the crime of piracy under 18 U.S.C. 1651 after they launched an attack on the USS Nicholas on the high seas between Somalia and the Seychelles. On appeal, defendants challenged their convictions and sentences on several grounds, including that their attack on the USS Nicholas did not, as a matter of law, amount to a section 1651 piracy offense. Because the district court correctly applied the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, definition of piracy as customary international law, the court rejected defendants' challenge to their Count One piracy convictions, as well as their mandatory life sentences. Defendants raised several additional appellate contentions which the court also rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences of each of the defendants.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for making, or aiding and abetting the making of, a false entry in a bankruptcy-related document. The charges arose from a fraudulent scheme directed by the co-defendant where the co-defendant established companies and maintained control over them by installing his associates as their nominal heads. The co-defendant then convinced individuals to invest in the companies through loans that he represented would be repaid in interest, but these companies in fact had no legitimate business activity and he misappropriated the invested funds for personal use. Defendant was the manager of one such company. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in failing to provide several requested jury charges, the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance, and the district court improperly refused to apply a mitigating role adjustment in sentencing. The court found defendant's arguments to be either without merit or noncognizable and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed for her 2010 federal convictions of social security fraud and aggravated identity theft. Defendant challenged the district court's application of the "vulnerable victim" enhancement in Section 3A1.1(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that there was no error in defendant's sentencing where defendant selected a disabled victim with full knowledge of that victim's vulnerability. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder and assault of his eight-year-old stepson. On appeal, defendant challenged his murder conviction and sentence. Among the issues defendant raised was a claim that the introduction of statements describing prior acts of abuse that the child made during a meeting with a social worker violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Applying Supreme Court precedent beginning with Crawford v. Washington, the court concluded that the primary purpose of the meeting between the child and the social worker was nontestimonial and therefore held that the admission of the child's statements did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. Finding no merit in any of defendant's other claims, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a Sunni Muslim currently incarcerated in a state correctional facility, brought this action alleging that prison officials violated the Religions Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by refusing to permit him to grow a one-eighth-inch beard in compliance with the requirements of his faith. Because the prison officials did not explain how a one-eighth-inch beard would implicate health or security concerns, they failed to satisfy their burden under RLUIPA of showing that the general grooming policy that they relied upon was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the gun and marijuana and subsequent statements to the police, alleging that the officers had illegally seized him when a detective asked him first to lift his shirt and then submit to a pat down search. The court held that, because a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have felt free to terminate the initial encounter with the officers, the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was reversed.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of ammunition by a felon. Defendant had entered a "no-contest" plea to a robbery charge in a prior, related prosecution in state court. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed procedural sentencing error because insufficient evidence supported the cross-reference to the robbery guideline. The court concluded that, although the Government could have presented sufficient evidence to support the cross-reference to the robbery guideline, the district court failed to resolve critical disputed issues of fact necessary to its application of the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines and the court's appellate review thereof. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the district court granting a motion for reduction of his sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). At issue was whether the district court erred in considering factors other than defendant's cooperation with police when determining the extent of a sentence reduction following the grant of the Rule 35(b) motion. The court concluded that the district court had full authority under Rule 35(b) and correctly considered factors other than the substantial assistance, such as defendant's criminal history, the violent nature of the crime of conviction, and the significant reduction defendant had already received to his advisory Guidelines range. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to traffic in more than 50 grams of crack cocaine and on three counts of distributing crack cocaine. On appeal, defendant contended that while the evidence could have supported a finding of his involvement in simple buyer-seller drug transactions, it did not support a finding that he participated in any conspiracy. Defendant also raised challenges against his sentence. The court held that a rational jury could find defendant guilty of participating in a conspiracy between him and a government informant during the period that the informant was not making controlled purchases for the government. Further, the court could not conclude that the record supported defendant's claim that the district court did not adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in reaching its sentencing decision. The court also rejected defendant's contention that his sentence was improperly enhanced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentence.