Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Former Louisiana congressman, William J. Jefferson (defendant), was convicted of eleven offenses - including conspiracy, wire fraud, bribery, money laundering, and racketeering - arising from his involvement in multiple bribery and fraud schemes. Defendant appealed his convictions on several grounds: (1) that an erroneous instruction was given to the jury with respect to the bribery statute's definition of an "official act"; (2) that another erroneous instruction was given with respect to the "quid pro quo" element of the bribery-related offenses; (3) that defendant's schemes to deprive citizens of honest services did not constitute federal crimes; and (4) that venue was improper on one of his wire fraud offenses. The court affirmed each of defendant's conviction except his Count 10 wire fraud conviction and sentence, which the court vacated and remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

Oceanpro, a seafood wholesaler, and two Oceanpro employees, Timothy Lydon and Benjamin Clough, III, were convicted for purchasing untagged and oversized striped bass. Oceanpro and Clough were also convicted for giving a false statement to federal law enforcement officers during the course of the investigation of the crimes. On appeal, Oceanpro and Clough challenged the District of Maryland's venue for the false statement offense because the false statement was made at the offices of Oceanpro in the District of Columbia, not in Maryland. In addition, all defendants contended that the order of restitution to the States was improper because the States did not have a sufficient interest in the illegally caught fish so as to make them "victims" as was required for receiving the benefit of a restitution order. The court rejected both arguments, concluding that venue for the false statement charge was proper in the District of Maryland and that Maryland and Virginia's interest in striped bass was sufficient to make the States "victims" and therefore to justify an award to them of restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of falsely representing himself to be a U.S. citizen in violation of 18 U.S.C. 911 and of committing identity theft in relation to a false claim of U.S. citizenship in violation of 19 U.S.C. 1028A. At issue was what could constitute a claim of citizenship under section 911. The court held that the "cumulative context" provided a substantial foundation for the jury's conclusion of willful misrepresentation and the jury's verdict was consistent with decisions in other circuits that required a direct claim of U.S. citizenship to sustain a conviction under section 911. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed following remand for sentencing where defendant's convictions arose from his participation in a telemarketing sweepstakes scheme in Costa Rica. The court held that it need not resolve whether the district court erred in concluding that it was barred from reconsidering the Sentencing Guidelines calculation, because even if the court assumed that the district court erred in this respect, that error was harmless under the facts of the case. The court also held that, given the totality of the district court's statements, defendant's sentence was not improperly based on his decision to go to trial or as a result of his successful appeal of his original sentence. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed a complaint in state court against defendants, contending that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment against him and asserted several claims against them, including violations of his federal constitutional rights. Following defendants' removal to federal district court, the district court remanded the case to state court, in part based on plaintiff's status as a "three-strikes" prisoner due to his frequent legal filings. Because the court found that the district court lacked a statutory or legal basis to remand plaintiff's action to state court, the court reversed the order and reinstated plaintiff's complaint for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from convictions arising from his attempt to leave the United States carrying approximately $40,000 in United States currency, without reporting the currency to customs authorities. In denying his motion for a new trial, the district court acknowledged that it had erred in excluding certain testimony at defendant's trial, but concluded that the error was harmless. Because the court could not say, with fair assurance, that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict, the court must vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

Defendants, husband and wife, were convicted in a jury trial of two offenses related to their conduct of growing marijuana at their home in a rural area of West Virginia. Defendants raised three issues on appeal. The court concluded that the affidavit provided a sufficient basis to establish probable cause for issuance of the thermal-imaging search warrant. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion to suppress. The court could not say that the district court acted on an erroneous legal principle in determining that defendants' reason for personally using marijuana should be excluded from evidence. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the government's motion in limine. Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in determining that defendants failed to carry their burden of proving that they satisfied the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision denying application of the safety-valve provision.

Defendant was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed three errors in sentencing. Because the court concluded that pointing and presenting a firearm in violation of South Carolina Code 16-23-410 qualified as a crime of violence under the first clause of the Guidelines definition of that term, the court need not address defendant's argument that this offense did not qualify as a crime of violence under the second clause of the Guidelines definition. The court agreed with the Third Circuit that a sentence imposing an Alford plea qualified as a "prior sentence" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4A1.2. Because the court already concluded that the reasons given at the hearing adequately explained defendant's sentence, the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court's issuance of a written sentencing order failed to afford defendant an opportunity to respond to the basis for the variance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At issue was whether defendant's sentence was properly enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on the basis of three previous felony convictions when two of the convictions were for violation of Florida's "fleeing-or-eluding" statute, Fla. Stat. 3106.1935(2). Applying Sykes v. United States, the court held that the two convictions at issue qualified as predicate offenses under the residual clause in the ACCA and affirmed the judgment. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the ACCA's "residual clause" was unconstitutionally vague.

In July 1994, defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 210 months of incarceration, followed by a three year term of supervised release. In August 2010, defendant's probation officer filed a Notice of Violation, alleging six violations of the conditions of defendant's supervised release. Defendant subsequently appealed the judgment of the district court revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months of incarceration. Because the court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) when it admitted and relied on hearsay evidence at defendant's revocation hearing, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.