Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. As part of a plea agreement, defendant waived his right to appeal "any sentence." During defendant's subsequent incarceration, the government filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), seeking to reduce his sentence in light of his assistance to the government in prosecuting an unrelated case. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed. Because the court concluded that it was within the scope of defendant's appellate waiver, the court dismissed the appeal.

A jury convicted defendant, the "Commander" of the American National Socialist Workers' Party, on four counts (Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6). Counts 1, 5, and 6 were for transmitting interstate commerce - by email, U.S. Mail, and telephone - threats to injure or intimidate individuals in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c). Count 3 was for violating 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1) for intimidation of individuals to "influence, delay, or prevent the[ir] testimony." The government subsequently appealed the district court's judgment of acquittal on Count 6 and its refusal to apply the sentencing enhancement for vulnerable victims on Count 3, and defendant appealed the district court's refusal to grant his Rule 29 motion as to Counts 1, 3, and 5 and to sustain his objection to Count 3 based on constructive amendment of the indictment. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on the Rule 29 motions as well as to all four counts, and affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts 1, 3, and 5, but vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court applied an incorrect standard in deciding whether to consider an enhancement for victims' vulnerability.

Defendant appealed his conviction in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The court held that, in light of its review of defendants' specific arguments and based on the totality of the surrounding circumstances, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements; the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the third indictment because defendant was first arrested for the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in the Eastern District of Virginia and that arrest was for the same charges for the same conduct listed in the operative third indictment; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Government's motion in limine to exclude defendant's expert witness. Therefore, finding no error, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful importation of heroine and defendant subsequently appealed his sentence. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and that the government's failure to timely object to the PSR should have precluded the court's consideration of the government's objection to application of the safety valve. The court also rejected defendant's challenges to the district court's denial of relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Defendant bore the burden of proving that he had provided truthful and complete disclosure to the government, but he presented no evidence compelling such a conclusion. The district court committed no error when concluding that defendant's international-clothes-buying story was false, and that conclusion provided a proper basis for the court's rejection of defendant's claim that he was entitled to sentencing under the safety valve. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (Count 1), three counts of attempted enticement of a minor (Counts 6-8), and nine counts of witness tampering (Counts 3-5 and 9-14). Defendant subsequently appealed his convictions and sentence. The court held that defendant's claim for improper venue was without merit where defendant conducted at least some of his activity from the Eastern District of Virginia; the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions on Counts 6-8; and the district court did not err by denying defendant the right of a meaningful allocution before pronouncing sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant challenged the use of his presentence report (PSR) to determine the circumstances surrounding two prior violent-felony convictions for sentencing purposes. The court found it was plain error for the district court to use the PSR's discussion of the circumstances surrounding these two convictions in applying the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), enhancement. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentence hearing on this issue.

After defendant was indicted for two drug trafficking crimes, he filed a motion to suppress the cocaine discovered in and taken from a secret compartment in his vehicle, alleging that the search of the vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the motion on the ground that the search exceeded the scope of defendant's consent. Because the court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards for determining whether law enforcement officers had consent to search defendant's vehicle and, in any event, whether they had probable cause to search it, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his convictions for willfully and knowingly making a false statement on a passport application after he prepared, signed, and submitted passport applications for his three stepsons and listed himself as the children's father. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Bronston literal truth defense did not entitle defendant to judgment as a matter of law; in the context of an application for a United States passport, the word "father" was not fundamentally ambiguous; the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant understood the inquiry made by the passport application as the Government itself did and answered the question posed falsely; and the district court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proposed instruction regarding the lack of statutory definition of the word "father." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The State sought reversal of the district court's judgment granting a writ of habeas corpus to petitioner. In granting the writ, the district court vacated the sentence of death imposed after petitioner's conviction of first degree murder. The district court concluded, inter alia, that the state courts of North Carolina unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, in rejecting petitioner's claim that his attorney on direct appeal failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court's decision granting petitioner's petition ran contrary to the deference that federal courts were required to afford state court decisions adjudicating the merits of habeas corpus claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment granting the petition on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment, rejecting petitioner's Brady v. Maryland and Atkins v. Virginia claims.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced on two counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition while subject to a domestic violence protective order in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8). Defendant appealed the district court's determination that his convictions under section 922(g)(8) did not violate the Second Amendment. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. But because it was plain error to convict and sentence defendant on two separate counts for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition under section 922(g)(8), the court reversed defendant's conviction as to count two of the indictment, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing.