Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant sought relief from a sentence of 240 months in prison, imposed as a result of his illegal reentry into the United States after being removed for a conviction of an aggravated felony. On appeal, defendant raised several procedural challenges to the sentence. The court held that the sentencing court committed no procedural error because the Guidelines did not expressly prohibit the triple counting of defendant's prior record; the court did not impermissibly count defendant's extensive criminal record when it imposed the upward variance justified under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the district court's upward departures were not procedurally defective; and the 240 month sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff's application for naturalization was denied by USCIS when USCIS determined that plaintiff's 2002 conviction in the District of Columbia Superior Court for distribution of cocaine in a drug-free zone qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101, which prevented plaintiff from establishing his good moral character and thus obtaining citizenship. Plaintiff contended that because his 2002 conviction was set aside under D.C. law, it had no operative effect and USCIS should not have considered it. The court held that plaintiff's conviction remained unchanged for immigration purposes despite the fact that the conviction was set aside on rehabilitative grounds. Because plaintiff's conviction was an absolute bar on obtaining citizenship, his naturalization application was properly denied.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the United States on her claim seeking money damages for alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000aa. Plaintiff, a photojournalist who claimed a special interest in covering protests, political demonstrations, and grassroots activism, was identified on a security camera as being present during a protest demonstration during the International Monetary Funds' annual spring meeting. Police officers executed a search warrant, believing it likely that plaintiff's residence contained evidence of suspected criminal activity that occurred during the protest. Plaintiff was never arrested or charged with any crimes relating to the incident. Plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the United States under the PPA and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States. The court agreed with the district court that there was probable cause to believe plaintiff conspired with a group of vandals or aided and abetted the offenses committed by the group. Accordingly, the court concluded that the United States was entitled to summary judgment based on the "suspect exception" to the PPA and affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador who had been granted LPR status, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to dismiss his appeal from an IJ's decision classifying him as an alien subject to removal under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The order of removal was based upon the IJ's determination that petitioner previously had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court concluded that the moral turpitude provision of the INA was not ambiguous and did not contain any gap requiring agency clarification, the court held that the procedural framework established in Matter of Silva-Trevino was not an authorized exercise of the Attorney General's authority. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and vacated the BIA's decision and the order providing for petitioner's removal.

An officer in the backseat of a marked car claims that he observed a car with a cracked windshield. The officers followed and pulled the car over. They observed defendant, a passenger in the rear, moving around in his seat and trying to climb over the front seats, despite commands to stop. During a pat-down, the officer felt a gun and yelled "gun." Defendant then struck an officer in the face with his elbow and turned to flee. Another officer clearly observed a silver firearm with a black handle in defendant's waistband. Defendant then punched an officer. They placed him under arrest and seized a .380 semi-automatic pistol. He was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court suppressed the evidence of the gun. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant's subsequent illegal acts did not purge the taint of the illegal stop. The gun was discovered as a result of the stop, not as a result of that conduct.

Defendant, an inmate at Hazelton, appealed his convictions and sentence for two counts of assaulting a correctional officer. On appeal, defendant raised several challenges. The court held that neither of the asserted indictment errors were grounds for reversal; the district court did not improperly sustain hearsay objections to defendant's testimony; and having concluded that defendant was properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. 111(b), the court also concluded that he was properly sentenced under U.S.S.G. 2A2.2.

Defendant was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and subsequently moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion and defendant entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to raise the Second Amendment defense on appeal. As part of defendant's sentence on the section 922(g)(1) conviction, the district court ordered that he repay the incurred court-appointed attorneys' fees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3006A(f). The court held that section 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to defendant and the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held, however, that because the district court did not comply with the statutory mandate here, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment requiring defendant to repay his court-appointed attorneys' fees and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant, the CEO of Maryland's Prince George's County Public Schools (PGCS), was convicted of several counts of honest-services fraud, tampering with evidence, and obstruction of justice. Defendant's convictions involved securing two public contracts for school products and services. On appeal, defendant raised several claims of error. The court held that, in light of the evidence and the general verdict, it could not conclude that the erroneous jury instruction at issue was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions of honest-services fraud (counts 6, 7, and 10). The court addressed each of defendant's challenges to his tampering and obstruction convictions, affirming convictions of evidence and witness tampering (counts 19 and 20) and obstruction of justice (count 22). The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing on counts 19, 20, and 22.

Plaintiff, presently incarcerated due to his conviction after trial for federal crimes of terrorism, and his mother, sued for legal and equitable relief based on plaintiff's prior military detention as an "enemy combatant." Plaintiff sought a declaration that defendants' policies were unconstitutional, an order enjoining his future designation as an enemy combatant, and nominal damages of one dollar from each defendant. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to imply a new cause of action for money damages against top Defense Department officials for a range of policy judgments pertaining to the designation and treatment of enemy combatants. The court also held that defendants have asserted a valid qualified immunity defense to defendant's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., claim. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendant lacked standing to seek an order enjoining the government from designating him as an enemy combatant. Therefore, finding plaintiff's claims to be without merit, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for attempted enticement, receipt of child pornography, and possession of child pornography. At issue was whether the district court properly applied two five-level enhancements and whether defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. The court held that for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 2G2.2 enhancement, the term "minor" could include an unidentified individual, provided that evidence showed the individual would be under 18 years of age. Accordingly, defendant's failure to identify a specific child at the outset did not diminish his danger to children or his first-hand involvement in the exploitation of the minor. Because the district court followed the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit regarding an issue on which the court had not ruled directly, - i.e., whether a district court could appropriately apply a five-level enhancement for sharing files through a PSP network - it did not commit plain error. Therefore, the court declined to reverse the application of the enhancement. The court further held that the sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered and properly weighed all relevant factors in determining defendant's sentence, the sentence was within the Guidelines range, and in light of the fact that defendant possessed particularly violent pornographic materials of very young children combined with the direct threat he posed.