Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of marijuana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3). At issue was whether defendant's section 922(g)(3) conviction violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Although the court concluded, by applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, that Congress had an important objective for enacting section 922(g)(3) to reduce gun violence and might have reasonably served that objective by disarming drug users and addicts, the court nonetheless found that the government failed to make the record to substantiate the fit between its objectives and the means of serving that objective. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was indicted on the charge of possessing a firearm while being a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant, an African American, moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the U.S. Attorney's Office selected him for prosecution under a federal-state law enforcement initiative known as Project Exile because of his race, in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. On appeal, defendant requested that the court reverse the district court's order denying his motion for discovery and remand the case for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The court held that defendant failed to make a credible showing that a similarly situated defendant of another race had evaded prosecution under Project Exile in order to obtain discovery on his selective prosecution claim and that defendant had failed to carry his burden of producing some evidence to make a credible showing of both discriminatory effect and intent. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of nine criminal counts related to his membership in the gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Defendant appealed, among other things, his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C) for aiding and abetting witness-tampering murder. The court held that, although the district court based its section 1512(a)(1)(C) jury instructions on the court's decision in United States v. Harris which - while this appeal was pending - was abrogated by the Supreme Court's decision in Fowler v. United States, the court concluded that the error in instructing the jury was harmless. Finding no error in regards to defendant's remaining claims, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Defendant subsequently challenged the district court's jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) to impose a second prison sentence for violations of his supervised release after the district court effectively revoked his supervised release and imposed a prison sentence in a prior hearing. The court affirmed and held that the district court had jurisdiction to hold the September 17 violation hearing and to impose the 12 month sentence for supervised-release violations arising from defendant's state convictions.

Petitioner appealed the district court's decision to abstain, on the basis of Schlesinger v. Councilman, and dismiss without prejudice his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the U.S. Army's exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over him. The court held that the district court was well within its discretion in applying Councilman abstention and dismissing without prejudice petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court remanded, however, for correction of an error in the judgment because, although the district court applied Councilman abstention and dismissed the petition without prejudice, the judgment erroneously indicated that the district court granted the Army's summary judgment motion on the merits.

Defendants, husband and wife, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and dispense, and to possess with intent to distribute and dispense, methamphetamine. On appeal, defendants contended that the protective sweep of their residence was unconstitutional and husband contended, separately, that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. The court held that the articulable facts, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts made by law officers, and construed in the light most favorable to the government, were more than sufficient to justify the protective sweep. The court held, however, that husband's prior North Carolina conviction was not a predicate offense and therefore, did not qualify as a prior felony conviction for purposes of the career offender provision. Accordingly, the court vacated husband's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

The government appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing its action to civilly commit respondent as a "sexually dangerous person" under 18 U.S.C. 4248. The district court held that the statute as applied to respondent violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution and respondent cross-appealed. The court reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the government's commitment action; the district court did not err in concluding that section 4248 was a civil statute and thus was not subject to the various constitutional safeguards placed on criminal proceedings; nor did it err in relying on this court's precedent that section 4248's requirement that proof of past conduct by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt" was appropriate; and circuit precedent also foreclosed respondent's argument that section 4248 could not be invoked because his criminal sentence included post-incarceration supervised release. However, the district court erred in finding that, as applied to respondent, section 4248 deprived him of equal protection and due process of law. The case was remanded for the district court to determine on the merits whether respondent met the section 4248 criteria.

This case arose out of the federal government's initiation of civil commitment proceedings against respondent via a certification that he was a "sexually dangerous person" under 18 U.S.C. 4248, enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Act). Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the government had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was sexually dangerous under the Act. The court held that the district court's application of the statutory standards to the evidence was not erroneous and its factual findings represented a permissible and reasonable interpretation of the evidence presented at the hearing. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that respondent was not sexually dangerous within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the government's commitment action.

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibited a person who was subject to a domestic violence protection order issued under certain specified circumstances from, inter alia, possessing a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce. The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of scrutiny for defendant and similarly situated persons. The court held that section 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), as applied to defendant, satisfied the intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing his Second Amendment challenge to such a statute where the government had carried its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the substantial government objective of reducing domestic gun violence and keeping firearms out of the hands of persons who were currently subject to court order. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in the course of a police search of his person. The police search included an officer's use of a knife to cut a sandwich bag containing suspected narcotics off defendant's penis, an act performed at night on a public street. The court concluded that the manner in which the search was conducted was unreasonable and, therefore, that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was vacated and the case remanded.