Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of producing a false identification document that appeared to be issued by or under the authority of the United States government in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(1). Defendant subsequently appealed. The court concluded that: (1) as applied to defendant, section 1028(a)(1) was not unconstitutionally vague; (2) the district court properly instructed the jury to use a "reasonable person standard" to determine whether defendant's ID "appeared to be" government-issued; (3) the Government produced sufficient evidence that defendant produced the ID, and that venue was proper, such that the district court properly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; and (4) it was not necessary to charge defendant with "aiding and abetting" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2(b). Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a stop-and-frisk in a deserted gas station parking lot in the wee hours of the morning. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion and held that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop-and-frisk.

Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of three offenses related to his possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the search warrant that led to his arrest was invalid; that a jury instruction involving the term "obscene" was erroneous because it lacked a knowledge requirement; and that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held, pursuant to United States v. Leon, that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The court also held that the district court did not give the jury an erroneous instruction because the jury was not required to find that defendant knew that the images at issue were obscene. The court further held that defendant's sentence was not unconstitutional where the harshness of defendant's penalty reflected the gravity of his crimes and, as the district court correctly noted, the severity of defendant's sentence was based on his recidivism. The ten-year sentence for Count Two was also proportional to other sentences because this sentence was mandated by statute. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to 90 months' imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court erred in sentencing defendant when it applied a two-level enhancement "if any person was physically restrained to facilitate the commission of the offense or to facilitate escape" under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The court held that the district court properly applied the enhancement where the two bank tellers ordered to the floor at gunpoint were prevented from both leaving the bank and thwarting the bank robbery.

Defendant was convicted of several offenses related to the sale of cocaine base to a government informant (Jackson) and subsequent efforts to have Jackson murdered. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal with respect to the conspiracy to distribute and possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute count and concluded that the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had a continuous buy-sell relationship with Maryland suppliers to bring their drugs to market in Virginia. The court also concluded that the district court did not err when it denied defendant a jury instruction on entrapment where a fellow inmate (Johnson) was not a government informant at the time that the discussion about doing away with Jackson began and there was ample evidence in the record from which a jury could find that defendant was predisposed to prevent Jackson from testifying. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to solicitation to commit murder for hire where the record showed that defendant clearly wrote to his many girlfriends seeking help in his murder for hire scheme. The court further concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a separate trial on this count. The court finally concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's Motion for Change of Counsel and the district court did not abuse its discretion by improperly considering his prior felony conviction when calculating his sentence. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit securities registration violations, securities fraud, and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, and nine counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on defendant's motion in limine and when regulating the testimony of two expert witnesses during trial. Because the relevant legal regimes were complex, it assisted the jury to have them explained. The court also concluded that the district court acted well within its broad discretion in admitting lay opinion testimony of two co-conspirators under Rule 701. Defendant's challenges to two other rulings by the district court made during trial did not merit extensive discussion and were rejected. The court further concluded that defendant's sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of knowingly possessing three firearms following a misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), pursuant to a plea agreement that reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. At issue was whether defendant's conviction under section 922(g)(9) survived his as-applied constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment. The court held that the government had carried its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the substantial government objective of reducing domestic gun violence and keeping firearms out of the hands of persons who have been convicted of a domestic violence crime and persons who have threatened the use of a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the court held that, on defendant's as-applied challenge under the Second Amendment, section 922(g)(9) satisfied the intermediate scrutiny standard and the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of having used and carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence recovered in search of his residence and statements he made to the police. The court concluded that the district court properly found that the search warrant was issued based on probable cause supplied by an officer's warrant affidavit. The court also concluded that the officers' traffic stop and detention of defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the court rejected defendant's remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

A jury convicted defendants of various drug related offenses. As part of their sentences, the district court ordered defendants to forfeit assets connected to their drug crimes pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 853. On appeal, defendants sought vacature of the district court's orders of forfeiture. The court rejected defendant Martin's argument that the government's pre-trial actions with respect to her property violated the civil forfeiture statute where Martin did not dispute that the evidence produced by the government, independent of the property, was sufficient to justify the criminal forfeiture. The court also held that because the Rule 32.2 deadline, as it then existed, was most persuasively understood as a time-related directive rather than a jurisdictional condition, and because defendants were indisputably on notice at the time of sentencing that the district court would enter forfeiture orders, the court refused to vacate the district court's tardy forfeiture orders.

Defendant was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At issue was whether defendant's prior convictions for breaking and entering the "Sunrise-Sunset Restaurant" and the "Corner Market" under Virginia's non-generic burglary statute qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The district court found that they did not. The court disagreed and found that the language of the relevant indictments mandated that the prior convictions were based on entries into buildings or structures. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.