Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924. On appeal, defendant objected to the district court's application of the section 924(e)(1) sentencing enhancement, asserting that recent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions undermined the PSR's contention that his previous convictions were for Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) violent felonies. A divided panel of the court affirmed defendant's sentence, employing the "modified categorical approach" first announced in Taylor v. United States, for the purpose of analyzing prior offenses to determine whether they constituted ACCA violent felonies. Upon granting defendant's petition for rehearing en banc, the court vacated the panel opinion. When the court considered defendant's charging documents in their proper legal context, the court could not determine that he was convicted of violating N.C. Gen. State 14-202(a)(2). Consequently, defendant's indecent liberties offenses were not ACCA violent felonies.

Defendant, a Maryland attorney, was convicted of offenses related to a scheme to launder proceeds that he obtained from a client. On appeal, defendant challenged several counts of conviction for money laundering, as well as his obstruction of justice conviction, and the denial of his motion to sever the failure-to-file counts. The court affirmed the convictions for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever. The court reversed, however, defendant's conviction on the obstruction-of-justice charge for insufficient evidence. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing.

After defendant pled guilty to federal drug trafficking, the district court held that his prior state convictions for marijuana possession, for which he faced no possibility of imprisonment, was for an offense "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," triggering a sentencing enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841. This enhancement doubled defendant's minimum sentence. The court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case to the court for "further consideration in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder." A panel of the court then held that Carachuri did not require any change in the court's prior holding. The court voted to rehear the case en banc and subsequently vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a drug user and one count of possession of marijuana where he had moved to suppress the gun and drugs on the ground that the officer's frisk was unlawful. At issue was whether evidence seized during a street encounter between law enforcement and citizens was properly admitted into evidence during a subsequent criminal prosecution. The court held that the seizure of the evidence did not comport with settled Fourth Amendment principles, and therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal stemmed from the district court's grant of a motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In granting the motion, the district court reduced defendant's sentence for distribution of child pornography from 96 months imprisonment to one day. At issue was whether the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) because it did not base its grant of the motion on defendant's assistance to the government, but instead grounded the reduction solely on the court's concern that defendant would not receive his preferred medication while in prison. The court held that the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) by granting the motion based on factors other than the defendant's cooperation with the government. The court also held that the mere possibility that a change in treatment of the defendant's ADHD, based on the professional judgment of a prison's medical team, simply did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court further held that, because reconsideration of the motion by the original sentencing judge would inevitably invite speculation as to whether the medical issue continued to play a role in the ultimate ruling, the court ordered the case reassigned to a new judge on remand.

Petitioner sought habeas relief from his capital sentence for convictions of murdering a husband and wife, as well as robbing the husband. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether the State of North Carolina violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights by presenting to the jury evidence and argument that contradicted those presented in the trials of his co-defendants. The court affirmed the denial of the petition for habeas relief and held that, in light of the circumstances and the evidence presented at trial, the federal district court correctly determined that the state court's decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting; possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of firearms. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's convictions; whether the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence; and whether the court erred in continuing to poll the jury after one juror indicated that the verdict was not unanimous. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the government presented substantial evidence to support appellant's convictions on all three counts; that appellant's Rule 404(b) argument was without merit where there was no error in admitting the evidence of a prior arrest when the evidence was relevant to prove his knowledge and lack of mistake, as well as necessary to prove the element of intention; and that the district court's continued polling of the jury in this case was not reversible error where there was no objection to the continued polling, the district took great pains to avoid doing anything that the jury would perceive as coercive, and the district court gave a fair and balanced Allen charge when it instructed the jury to deliberate further.

After a nine-day trial, a jury found that police officers carrying out a search warrant for narcotics did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they performed a no-knock entry into a residence and fatally shot a woman with a gun therein. The woman's family and estate alleged that a variety of instructional and other errors tainted that verdict. The court held that the charge provided a complete and accurate statement of the law and afforded plaintiffs ample latitude to argue their case. The court concluded that, over the course of a nine-day trial, capable attorneys on each side thrashed out the propriety of the officers' actions before the body duly constituted to assess them, and the district court properly instructed that body in terms of the applicable standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding no other reason for reversal where there was neither instructional defects nor any other error undermining the verdict.

In consolidated appeals, the issues before the court concern the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, specifically the civil commitment provisions codified in 18 U.S.C. 4248. Invoking these provisions, the government initiated proceedings in district court seeking the civil commitment of respondents, all prisoners in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), because the government certified them as sexually dangerous persons. The district court collectively dismissed all nine proceedings under 18 U.S.C. 4241 and issued a dismissal order requiring the government first to release the prisoners from BOP custody, then obtain a commitment order under section 4241, and then finally seek a separate civil commitment order under the second category of persons eligible for certification under section 4248(a). The court held that the dismissal order approach to section 4248 was flawed where it departed from the plain meaning of section 4248(a); it erroneously read section 4248 in pari materia with section 4241; and erroneously invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance. Accordingly, and because the district court did not have the timely benefit of the United States v. Comstock and Timms v. Johns decisions, the court vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner appealed the Board of Immigration's ("BIA") decision that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal after he had amassed a substantial criminal record while in the United States. Petitioner conceded that he was removable for having been convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude but challenged the government's contention that an aggravated-felony conviction justified his removal. At issue was whether the BIA properly determined that petitioner had not satisfied his burden of showing that he was eligible for cancellation of removal. The court affirmed the removal and held that the BIA's ruling denying petitioner's request for relief from removal was faithful to the plain meaning of the statutory text governing eligibility for cancellation of removal and that petitioner's arguments to the contrary ignored Congress' burden-shifting framework.