Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and the district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(5) based on the government's proof that the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine. Defendant argued that the enhancement was not applicable because he did not know that the methamphetamine he possessed was imported. The court affirmed the sentence and held that the enhancement applied irrespective of whether defendant knew that the possessed methamphetamine had been unlawfully imported.

Defendant, mayor of Ball, Louisiana, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States in connection with major disaster benefits in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1040. On appeal, defendant argued that the government violated the plea agreement by advocating for a higher loss calculation than the one agreed to and that the district court erred in its loss calculation by including legitimate claims with fraudulent ones. The court held that the breach of the plea agreement likely did not affect the sentence so defendant's substantial rights were not affected and, as a result, the district court did not plainly err. Even if the error affected defendant's substantial rights, the court declined to exercise its discretion to require resentencing. The court also held that the district court committed no error by including the entire amount requested from FEMA after Hurricane Gustav, as well as a small portion requested after Hurricane Rita, as intended loss.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of structuring financial transactions to evade federal reporting requirements. DHS subsequently attempted to introduce defendant's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) in a removal proceeding; the immigration court refused to admit the PSR without the district court's approval, which DHS then sought. Defendant in turn requested criminal contempt sanctions against the DHS attorneys who pursued disclosure of his PSR. The district court granted DHS's motion after redacting much of defendant's information and denied the sanctions request. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the United States v. Huckaby factors, for determining a "compelling, particularized need for disclosure," nor did it err in evaluating and balancing those factors. Further, that court did not abuse its discretion in declining to initiate contempt proceedings, as DHS's attorneys did not contumaciously violate a clear order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty under a plea agreement to possession of child pornography and his plea agreement was conditioned on retaining the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. Defendant claimed that the search warrant that led officers to the pornography violated the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment's particularity and probable cause requirements under the circumstances.

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written agreement, to possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. At issue was whether the denial of defendant's motion under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2) to modify the terms of supervised release imposed as part of the original sentence fell within the scope of defendant's waiver, as part of his plea agreement, of his right to appeal his conviction and sentence and to contest his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding. The court held that it did where defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion fell within the scope of a broadly-worded appeal and therefore, dismissed the appeal.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the murders of four victims. Petitioner applied for a certificate of appealability (COA) so that he could appeal the district court's denial of his federal habeas relief on his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of his trial. The court concluded that reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law on the record before it, and that petitioner's claims were not adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's request for a COA.

Appellant, a journalist, appealed from the district court's entry of an order barring communication with the media and its denial of his motion to intervene in a case involving charges of terrorism. The government indicted defendant for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and the day that the indictment was filed, the district court entered an order barring the parties, their representatives, and their attorneys of record from communicating with the news media about the case. On appeal, appellant argued that the district court wrongly found that he had no right to intervene and that the district court's gag order violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The court concluded that FRCP 4(a) controlled this appeal and that notice was timely; that the gag order affected appellant's right to gather news and therefore, he had standing to challenge it; but, on the merits, appellant had not shown that the gag order violated the First Amendment where the gag order was not overly broad on its face and the gag order did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the denial of his motion to intervene did not limit his right to earn a living through news gathering in violation of his due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendants were committed of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349. Defendant Grant also was convicted of two counts of aiding and abetting health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1347 and 2. Defendants each appealed their convictions. The court concluded that: (1) the district court did not plainly err by admitting a co-conspirator's statements; (2) the government's second cross-examination of Grant was not reversible prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to elaborate with a missing witness instruction; and (4) there was proof enough to support defendants' convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted illegal reentry in the United States after having been deported and one count of false personation. Defendant subsequently appealed her sentence, contending that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level enhancement based on its conclusion that her prior Oklahoma kidnapping conviction was a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The court concluded that the district court erred because the Oklahoma offense did not constitute any of the enumerated offenses that were crimes of violence; nor did it have an element of "physical force," as that term was defined in Johnson v. United States. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

PLN, a non-profit corporation, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the TDCJ and three individual TDCJ officials (collectively, defendants) for alleged First Amendment and due process violations with TDCJ's censorship of five books PLN wished to distribute to inmates in the Texas prison system. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that PLN had not presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on its First Amendment claims where PLN had, at most, demonstrated that reasonable minds might differ on whether to permit certain books into a general prison population, which was very different from demonstrating that TDCJ's practices and exclusions had no reasonable relation to valid penological objectives. The court also rejected PLN's due process claim, concluding that TDCJ's procedures were reasonable. Because TDCJ had not violated PLN's due process rights, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.