Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of Pseudoephedrine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(2). The conviction rendered defendant deportable and he was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. There was no direct appeal and the conviction became final on February 24, 2009. On March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Padilla v. Kentucky that the Sixth Amendment imposed on attorneys representing noncitizen criminal defendants a constitutional duty to advise the defendants about the potential removal consequences arising from a guilty plea. At issue was whether, under the retroactivity framework established in Teague v. Lane, Padilla announced a rule that applied retroactively to convictions that became final before Padilla was decided. The court held that the rule announced in Padilla was "new" within the meaning of Teague, and accordingly, it did not apply retroactively and could not serve as the basis for defendant's collateral challenge to his conviction that had already become final when Padilla was decided. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition but reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress with respect to the firearm and ammunition. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the police officer's decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and, although the officer could have had an ulterior motive to search the vehicle, the inventory search was reasonable and valid under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant's motion for bond pending appeal, or in the alternative, for expedited appeal was denied.

Defendant plead guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 554 by attempting to export a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun and various ammunition, and concealing the items for export. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of U.S.S.G. 2M5.2, arguing that the court erred by finding that he did not qualify for a base offense level of 14 under subsection (a)(2) and by applying the base offense level of 26 under subsection (a)(1). The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred by finding that section 2M5.2(a)(2) did not apply because the court improperly read the term "only" in isolation without interpreting subsection (a)(2) in the context of the overall Guidelines. Because the district court did not err in its application of section 2M5.2, the court affirmed the judgment, noting a harmless typographical error in the judgment.

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court. Petitioner filed a motion in the district court pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)(6), seeking relief from the district court's judgment denying his initial federal habeas corpus petition. He also filed a motion for a stay of execution. That same day, in a separate district court action, petitioner filed a second-in-time federal habeas petition and a motion for stay of execution. The court held that the district court improperly granted a stay of execution pending the resolution of petitioner's 60(b)(6) motion. Therefore, the court vacated the stay of execution. Because the court concluded that the second-in-time petition was successive, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition. Therefore, the court concluded that, to the extent that the petition was construed as an application for a successive petition, the district court correctly transferred the case to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631 and the court had jurisdiction to consider that application. However, because petitioner brought the same two claims in his successive habeas petition as he did in his initial federal habeas petition, the petition was barred under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). Therefore, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over this petition and dismissed petitioner's successive habeas petition.

Defendant was convicted of knowingly making a false statement to the Department of Defense security personnel when he entered Brooke Army Medical Center demanding to see a patient in the hospital accused in the Fort Hood shooting, Major Nidal Hasan, an army psychologist. The false statement at issue was defendant's statement to an army captain that he was Major Hasan's lawyer. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his false statement was material. The court concluded that a statement to a decision maker in a military hospital that the speaker was a lawyer for a restricted military prisoner was the type of statement capable of influencing the decision maker to allow the speaker to visit the patient and that the protocols in place did not affect the statement's materiality. The court also concluded that defendant's delivery of the statement in a manner not likely to persuade did not affect the materiality of the statement. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction.

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal reentry into the United States under 8 U.S.C. 1326. At issue was whether the record evidence was sufficient to justify the trial judge's conclusion that defendant was an alien at the time of his reentry. The court found that there was substantial evidence showing that defendant was an alien when he reentered the United States. The court also found that the nunc pro tunc divorce decree obtained in 2010 purporting to retroactively rearrange defendant's custody status in 1994 did not raise a reasonable doubt as to this alienage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the county, the sheriff's department, and the sheriff and a deputy, in their individual and official capacities. On appeal, defendants argued that they were detained for more than 48 hours without a determination of probable cause or an initial appearance in violation of their constitutional rights. The court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' argument that defendants did not show the delay was justified by extraordinary circumstances because plaintiffs failed to show that any defendant was liable for the alleged deprivation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The sheriff and the deputy were both entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims failed for the same reasons as their Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Defendant, a federal prisoner, contended that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney overestimated his sentencing exposure under a proffered plea deal, leading him to reject the deal and stand trial. The district court rejected the argument. The court held that, in light of the conflicting accounts by defendant and his counsel and the incomplete record on other relevant factors, the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing before dismissing defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 application.

Defendant appealed from his sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Because restitution to a pawn shop to which defendant sold stolen firearms that he unlawfully possessed was not authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3663 under the facts of this case, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. The court also concluded that the district court plainly erred in calculating defendant's criminal history but did not reach the question of whether that error affected defendant's substantial rights since resentencing would occur.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Board, arguing that the fee charged at the conclusion of his public intoxication and public inhabitation case violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment because it discouraged public defenders from exonerating their clients. Louisiana's funding mechanism for indigent defense required indigent defendants who were found guilty, or plead nolo contendere, to pay a $35 fee at the conclusion of their cases, but it did not require defendants who were exonerated to pay the fee. The district court ruled that abstention was required under the Younger doctrine and, alternatively, that plaintiff did not state a claim for relief under the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment. Because the court held that the district court did not err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's lawsuit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.