Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1) for being found unlawfully present in the United States after previous deportation subsequent to a felony conviction. The court concluded that the district court did not err by denying the defense's motion for a court-ordered mental competency evaluation and by not sua sponte conducting a mental competency hearing thereafter. The court also rejected defendant's claim that the district court denied him his constitutional right to testify in his defense where, inter alia, defendant wanted to testify regarding excluded matters. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice and one count of knowingly making a materially false statement to a governmental agency. Defendant's convictions stemmed from him falsely representing that he was a licensed attorney. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial supported the jury's verdict; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with defendant's definition of "corruptly"; and assuming the district court erred in applying one or more of the enhancements to defendant's offense level, thereby incorrectly calculating the advisory guidelines range, the Government, as proponent of the sentence, had discharged its burden to show that defendant's substantial rights were not affected by any error because the district court made detailed, alternative findings that it would have sentenced defendant to 65 months of imprisonment, notwithstanding whether any or some of the enhancements were applied to his offense level.

Petitioners, proprietors of a family-run funeral home, were convicted of embezzlement in connection with their business. The State appealed from the district court's grant of their petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners petitioned for habeas relief because, inter alia, the Mississippi Court of Appeals denied their Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the proper rule, petitioners were entitled to relief on their ineffective assistance claim stemming from joint representation. Because the Mississippi court's decision was contrary to clearly established law where it applied a rule that contradicted the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, the court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.

Defendant was convicted of the use of facilities of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, and entice a minor female to engage in illegal sexual activity. Defendant appealed his sentence on various grounds. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the charged offenses; there was no indication that the district court abused its discretion for excluding defendant's witness, having found no good reason for the delay at issue and finding the testimony to be redundant; defendant's argument that the evidence presented to the jury, chat conversations, video, and texts, presented to the jury was not properly authenticated was unpersuasive to the court; and the testimony of the officer at issue was not hearsay where the officer was testifying based upon his investigation. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case dealt with the district court's application of the obstruction of justice enhancement and non-application of the minor role reduction to defendant's sentence for aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Because defendant was not substantially less culpable than the average participant, the district court did not clearly err when it denied him the minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b). Defendant failed to object to the application of the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice at the district court and this failure to object foreclosed the court's review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff and his mother sued the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff's sister shot her husband and plaintiff, then thirteen-years-old, confessed to the murder. Plaintiff claimed that the county actors coerced a confession and plaintiff's mother claimed separation from her son while he was confessing violated her rights. The court held that, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff's confession was voluntarily given and its introduction at trial did not offend the Fifth Amendment. Although a thirteen-year-old's separation from his mother, his desire to please adults, and his inexperience with the criminal justice system all weigh against voluntariness, his express desire to help his sister decided the issue. There was no evidence that, absent plaintiff's resolve to reduce his sister's punishment, the deputies' interrogation tactics would have produced a confession. The sister may have used her brother's love to make him lie on her behalf, but there was no evidence that the deputies knew of her plan. Looking back on his interrogation after he was released from prison, plaintiff told a national television audience, on the "Dr. Phil" show, that the deputies did not coerce him into confessing. The court rejected the remaining challenges and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride. The Government subsequently appealed the district court's sentence of defendant below the mandatory minimum sentence for his offense pursuant to the safety valve. The court concluded that the 2002 Edition of the Guidelines Manual was not ambiguous with respect to whether departures pursuant to section 4A1.3 were to be considered when evaluating safety valve eligibility. The court also concluded that the 2002 Edition of the Guidelines Manual did not permit district courts to consider departures pursuant to section 4A1.3 when evaluating a defendant's safety valve eligibility. As the applicable guidelines were ambiguous, the rule of lenity did not apply. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court and sentenced to death. Petitioner subsequently sought habeas corpus relief from his conviction and death sentence. The court concluded that the jury could not meaningfully consider relevant mitigating evidence presented by petitioner in determining whether a death sentence was appropriate. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting habeas relief on petitioner's Penry v. Lynaugh claim. Petitioner was not entitled to a certificate of appealability on the claims denied by the district court because he has abandoned all but three of those claims, which were themselves procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has also not demonstrated that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applied to allow federal habeas review of those claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a Mississippi state prisoner, appealed from the judgment in favor of defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Plaintiff alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated (1) by delay in holding a probable cause determination after his arrest and (2) by his warrantless arrest. The court held that the reasons for delay could be seen as extraordinary where only a brief time passed beyond 48 hours when police resolved the uncertainties about jurisdiction and the subsequent overnight delay was the result of the magistrate's unavailability. The court also rejected plaintiff's illegal arrest claims and several other claims he raised on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of stolen firearms and body armor. Defendant's plea was subject to an appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, namely, the guns and armor discovered during a search of his house. Defendant alleged that the police unlawfully entered the curtilage while attempting to conduct a "knock and talk" in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that his mother's consent to enter the premises was vitiated by his prior express refusal under Georgia v. Randolph. The court held that the mother's consent attenuated any alleged Fourth Amendment violation in entering through the outside doors such that the causal chain between the alleged violation and the discovery of the evidence was broken. The court agreed with the Seventh and Eight Circuits that the objection of an absent co-tenant did not vitiate the consent of a physically present co-tenant under Randolph. Accordingly, Randolph applied only to searches conducted in the face of a present and objecting co-tenant. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.