Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed this action against several defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights that arose out of their incarceration in New Orleans at and around the time that Hurricane Katrina struck the city. The court concluded that there was no doubt that plaintiffs suffered terribly while held in custody after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. However, the court held that Defendant Gusman's failure to release plaintiffs fell within the emergency exception to the rule that a probable cause determination must be made within 48 hours, and Defendant Hunter's failure to allow plaintiffs to use cell phones was not objectively unreasonable in light of any clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Gusman and Hunter on all claims asserted by plaintiffs.

Appellants appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tony Arcuri and the City of San Antonio on their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, that SAPD officers, led by Arcuri, violated appellants' Fourth Amendment rights by failing to knock-and-announce their identity and purpose prior to forcibly entering appellants' home to execute a search warrant. Taken together, the deposition testimony of officers and the City's admission that the search of appellants' home was conducted in accordance with SAPD policies, were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of municipal liability. Therefore, appellants made the requisite showing to survive summary judgment on the issue and the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry and was sentenced to 20 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed the district court's application of an eight-level sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that defendant's prior Indiana conviction was an aggravated felony within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) where the offense included a term of imprisonment of at least one year. The court held that "term of imprisonment" in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) referred to the actual sentence imposed.

Defendant was convicted of robbery in interference with interstate commerce, carjacking, the use of a firearm in relation to each of those offenses, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant asserted eleven claims of error, including claims related to the denial of his motion for a new trial; the denial of his motion to sever the charges against him; the failure to suppress his confession; a ruling in limine; prejudice in the jury venire of his second trial; his Batson v. Kentucky challenge; the denial of surrebuttal to the Government's rebuttal case in the second trial; the failure to grant his motion for a mistrial; jury instructions; and several other challenges. The court rejected all the challenges and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner asserted that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and develop mitigating facts that could have been presented at the punishment stage of trial. The district court determined that petitioner was not entitled to relief on this claim but granted a certificate of appealability. Because the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law on the record before it, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence on count 26 of a superseding indictment, which charged him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, defendant contended that his guilty plea to count 26 was not made knowingly and voluntarily because he was not properly admonished regarding the direct consequences of his plea. The court found that if defendant knew before his plea hearing that the district court would interpret his plea to count 26 as an admission of guilt to the machine gun offense, it "would have been likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty." Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's guilty plea as to that count and remanded to the district court to allow him to plead anew.

Defendant pled guilty to lying about his U.S. citizenship on a Firearms Transaction Record form which he completed while attempting to purchase a handgun. Defendant also pled guilty to illegal re-entry to the United States after deportation following a conviction for an aggravated felony. Defendant appealed the district court's decision on his ineffective counsel claim where defendant claimed counsel failed to independently research and investigate the derivative citizenship defense. The court concluded that defendant's guilty pleas were not entered knowingly or voluntarily because counsel advised him without investigating derivative citizenship. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was indicted and pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to receipt of child pornography. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that he was entitled to a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(1) because he distributed no material involving the exploitation of a minor. Because the district court did not err by declining to apply the two-level reduction where defendant's conduct was not limited to that of a mere viewer of child pornography, nor was his conduct casual or isolated, the court affirmed the sentence.

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Ruddy Elizondo, appealed from two separate district court orders granting summary judgment to Officer W.M. Green and the City of Garland, Texas, on their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 that Green used excessive force against Ruddy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Green's use of deadly force was not clearly unreasonable when Ruddy ignored repeated instructions to put down the knife he was holding and seemed intent on provoking Green; at the time Green discharged his weapon, Ruddy was hostile, armed with a knife, in close proximity to Green, and moving closer; and in considering the totality of the circumstances in which Green found himself, it was reasonable for him to conclude that Ruddy posed a threat of serious harm. Finally, in the absence of a constitutional violation, there was no municipal liability for the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement to being illegally present in the United States after being deported. Over defendant's objection, the district court increased his base offense level of eight by 16 levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), on the theory that his 2009 conviction for sexual activity with a minor in violation of Florida Statute 794.05 was a "crime of violence." Defendant timely appealed. Because defendant did not adequately preserve his objection to the sentence, plain error review applied. The court held that although "plain error" occurred, the court was not compelled to reverse under the circumstances because the applicable state court records, coupled with defense counsel's admission that the victim was fourteen, established either the victim's status as a minor or the inequity, under the fourth prong of clear error review, of the court reaching out on appeal to correct the plain error.